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Cover
U.S.S. New Mexico (BB 40), an oil painting by Walter L. Greene. Launched on 13
April 1917, the battleship New Mexico
was commissioned on 20 May 1918, in
time to escort President Woodrow Wilson
home from the Versailles Peace Conference. Designated flagship of the newly organized U.S. Pacific Fleet in 1919, New
Mexico was to receive six battle stars for
World War II service; the ship is pictured
as appearing in 1925. Walter L. Greene
(1870–1956) was an architect, artist, and
prolific illustrator, known for his masterful use of color and detail in portraying
technological subjects, notably locomotives and warships. The painting, which
belongs to the U.S. Navy Art Collection in
Washington, D.C. (by whose courtesy it
appears), hung in an exhibit—“Command of the Sea: Highlights from the U.S.
Naval Academy Museum, U.S. Navy Art
Collection, and the U.S. Naval War
College Museum”—at the Newport Art
Museum in Newport, Rhode Island, in
July–August 2007.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, held in Newport 16–19
October 2007, provided a fitting occasion for the unveiling of a new maritime
strategy for the Navy and the nation. This document, signed jointly for the first
time in such a case by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, marks what may in future times be seen as a historic turn for America’s sea services in the direction of
a new global regime of intensified maritime security cooperation. The text is reprinted in full in the front of this issue. In coming issues, we will further explore
its implications for the United States and for global maritime security, as well as
the steps required to promote and implement it.
Our lead article, “Air Force–Navy Integration in Strike Warfare: A Role Model
for Seamless Joint Service Operations,” by Benjamin S. Lambeth, provides an authoritative account of an important organizational relationship within today’s
armed forces and helps compensate for what the naval aviation community may
feel is comparative neglect in this journal. The story Lambeth tells is one that
bodes well for the future of military jointness and does credit to both services.
Next, and providing the theme for this issue’s cover, Professor James Holmes of
the Naval War College faculty, in “‘A Striking Thing’: Leadership, Strategic Communications, and Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet,” evokes a seminal moment in
the history of the U.S. Navy. Just one hundred years ago, in December 1907, an
impressive armada of warships departed on a trip around the world designed to
signal the global reach of American naval might and assert the nation’s claim to
great-power status. This audacious attempt to shape foreign perceptions of the
United States is worth recalling as the Navy contemplates what it must do to
operationalize its new maritime strategy.
Two articles mark the reappearance of our “Asia Rising” feature. Gabriel Collins,
Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray offer an account of Chinese views of the American submarine force. Like other products of the Naval
War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, this study is based on extensive
research and analysis in the open Chinese-language military and technical literature. Shifting the focus away from China, a second paper, by Victor Huang, an
officer in the Republic of Singapore Navy, provides an impressive survey of
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issues relating to maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia and the role
the United States should play there. This is a most constructive contribution to
the dialogue on maritime strategy that the U.S. Navy has sought with its foreign
counterparts, and it helps lay the groundwork for the essential next step of understanding the regional implications of the new strategy document.
Finally, Scott C. Truver examines a neglected topic in the homeland security
domain—the potential threat of mines or “improvised explosive devices” in
American ports and waters. This provides an important supplement to the discussions of maritime terrorism featured in our Summer 2007 issue.
WOMEN IN NAVAL HISTORY
We commemorate an important anniversary this year: sixty years ago, on 12
June 1948, Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act (Public Law 625), which allowed women to gain permanent status in all branches of
the U.S. military. Six enlisted women were sworn into the regular Navy: Kay
Langdon, Wilma Marchal, Edna Young, Frances Devaney, Doris Robertson, and
Ruth Flora. That same year, on 15 October, eight women were commissioned as
the first female officers of the regular Navy: Captain Joy Bright Hancock, Lieutenant Commander Winifred Quick Collins, Lieutenant Commander Ann King,
Lieutenant Commander Frances Willoughby, Lieutenant Ellen Ford, Lieutenant
Doris Cranmore, Lieutenant Junior Grade Doris A. Defenderfer, and Lieutenant
Junior Grade Betty Rae Tennant.
NEWPORT PAPERS ON “SHAPING” AND MARITIME STRATEGY
Two new and important Newport Papers are now in print as well as online (contact the editorial office if you’d like to become a series subscriber or to ask for copies of these titles). The editor of Shaping the Security Environment (Newport Paper
29), Derek S. Reveron of the Naval War College faculty, argues, “The question . . . is
not whether the military should be engaged in . . . shaping”—diplomacy, security
cooperation, and strategic communications in furtherance of regional stability—
but “how these operations should be structured to ensure unified action and what
new capabilities are necessary to perform these missions efficiently.” Papers by six
scholars and practitioners examine this vital concept from a variety of
perspectives.
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30, is the
third of a series in which Dr. John B. Hattendorf, the Ernest J. King Professor of
Maritime History at the Naval War College, is documenting the history of U.S.
naval strategic thinking in recent decades. It reprints the key capstone documents for U.S. naval strategy in the seventies. These documents are described in
Professor Hattendorf ’s Newport Paper 19, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s
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Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, and were the predecessors of the documents that
he published in Newport Paper 27, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents. A collection of selected documents of the 1980s is in preparation.
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
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A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR
21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER

A

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” represents an historical
first. Never before have the maritime forces of the United States—the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—come together to create a unified maritime
strategy. This strategy stresses an approach that integrates seapower with other
elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies. It describes
how seapower will be applied around the world to protect our way of life, as we join
with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, inter-connected
system through which we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland
and winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing war.
Our citizens were involved in development of this strategy through a series of
public forums known as the “Conversations with the Country.” Three themes
dominated these discussions: our people want us to remain strong; they want us
to protect them and our homeland, and they want us to work with partners
around the world to prevent war. These themes, coupled with rigorous academic
research, analysis and debate, led to a comprehensive strategy designed to meet
the expectations and needs of the American people.
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower binds our services more
closely together than they have ever been before to advance the prosperity and
security of our Nation. The demands of an uncertain world and the enduring interests of the American people require nothing less.

James T. Conway
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Gary Roughead
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
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INTRODUCTION
The security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly
coupled to those of other nations. Our Nation’s interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade,
finance, information, law, people and governance.
We prosper because of this system of exchange among nations, yet recognize
it is vulnerable to a range of disruptions that can produce cascading and harmful
effects far from their sources. Major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten U.S. national
security and world prosperity.
The oceans connect the nations of the world, even those countries that are
landlocked. Because the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports
90% of the world’s trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth. Covering three-quarters of the planet, the oceans make
neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need
and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores.
Today, the United States and its partners find themselves competing for
global influence in an era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at
peace. Our challenge is to apply seapower in a manner that protects U.S. vital interests even as it promotes greater collective security, stability, and trust. While
defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of seapower, it must be applied more broadly if it is to serve the national interest.
We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. There is a tension, however, between the requirements for continued peacetime engagement
and maintaining proficiency in the critical skills necessary to fighting and winning in combat. Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively
while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively influence events, and ease the impact of disasters.
As it has always been, these critical tasks will be carried out by our people—
the key to success in any military strategy. Accordingly, we will provide our
people—our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen—with the training, education
and tools necessary to promote peace and prevail in conflict.
Guided by the objectives articulated in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and the National Strategy for
Maritime Security, the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will
act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from
direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action;
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strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establish favorable security conditions.
Additionally, maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust
among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats
and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world. To do so will require an unprecedented level of integration among our maritime forces and enhanced cooperation with the other instruments of national power, as well as the
capabilities of our international partners. Seapower will be a unifying force for
building a better tomorrow.
CHALLENGES OF A NEW ERA
The world economy is tightly interconnected. Over the past four decades, total
sea borne trade has more than quadrupled: 90% of world trade and two-thirds
of its petroleum are transported by sea. The sea-lanes and supporting shore infrastructure are the lifelines of the modern global economy, visible and vulnerable
symbols of the modern distribution system that relies on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions.
Expansion of the global system has increased the prosperity of many nations.
Yet their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources and
capital with other economic powers, transnational corporations and international organizations. Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider
claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural
resources—potentially resulting in conflict.
Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as energy development, resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the
oceans. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only
to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape
the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for
growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and
natural resources.
Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education,
culture, and the conduct of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a
hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies
in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt governments, growing dissatisfaction
among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and
changing demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—exacerbate tensions and are contributors to
conflict.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
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Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause
systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and influence. Their actions, often designed to purposely incite conflict between other parties, will
complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional conflict.
Proliferation of weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors to challenge maritime access,
evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception. Asymmetric use of technology will pose a range of threats to the United States and its partners. Even more worrisome, the appetite for nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same
time, attacks on legal, financial, and cyber systems can be equally, if not more,
disruptive than kinetic weapons.
The vast majority of the world’s population lives within a few hundred miles
of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the potential to create significant
disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering
through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding, could
lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises.
Mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less tolerant of
their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to
those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will also exploit
this social instability.
These conditions combine to create an uncertain future and cause us to think
anew about how we view seapower. No one nation has the resources required to
provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to
counter these emerging threats.
MARITIME STRATEGIC CONCEPT
This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at
sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces
provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic,
social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the
presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21
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The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint
or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal
arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity.
United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime
forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people
and governance.
We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility
inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives.
Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies
our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat
power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence
fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition,
persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order
to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate
disruptions and crises.
Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power
Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and
the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends
and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise
elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives:
Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the
interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While
this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot
be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict.
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Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and
multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence,
escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and
combat-ready provide the Nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of
declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond
quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain
sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure
friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order.
Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft,
Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian
populations from attack.
Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global
stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major
power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the
near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all
elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—
our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a
credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.
Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control,
overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power
ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver.
Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces,
sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.
Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces
The Sea Services will establish a persistent global presence using distributed
forces that are organized by mission and comprised of integrated Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard capabilities. This global distribution must extend beyond traditional deployment areas and reflect missions ranging from humanitarian operations to an increased emphasis on counter-terrorism and irregular
warfare. Our maritime forces will be tailored to meet the unique and evolving
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21
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requirements particular to each geographic region, often in conjunction with
special operations forces and other interagency partners. In particular, this
strategy recognizes the rising importance and need for increased peacetime activities in Africa and the Western Hemisphere.
Contribute to homeland defense in depth. Maritime forces will defend the homeland by identifying and neutralizing threats as far from our shores as possible.
From fostering critical relationships overseas, to screening ships bound for our
ports, or rapidly responding to any threats approaching our coastline, our
homeland defense effort will integrate across the maritime services, the joint
force, the interagency community, our international partners and the private
sector to provide the highest level of security possible. When directed, maritime
forces will promptly support civil authorities in the event of an attack or natural
disaster on our shores.
Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners. Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all. Although our
forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged. They must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the
participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.
A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen
to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners. Building and
reinvigorating these relationships through Theater Security Cooperation requires
an increased focus on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule
of law in the maritime domain.
Additionally, the Sea Services must become adept at forging international
partnerships in coordination with the other U.S. services and government departments. To this end, the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of law by
countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other
illicit activities.
Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system. Maritime forces will work with others to ensure an adequate level of security and
awareness in the maritime domain. In doing so, transnational threats—terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; and other criminals—will
be constrained.
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By being there, forward deployed and engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with regional and global partners, maritime forces will promote
frameworks that enhance security. When natural or manmade disasters strike,
our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining
with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely
and predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to
support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions.
IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY
To successfully implement this strategy, the Sea Services must collectively expand the core capabilities of U.S. seapower to achieve a blend of peacetime engagement and major combat operations capabilities.
Expanded Core Capabilities
Although the Sea Services conduct many missions, the following six capabilities
comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an increase in emphasis on
those activities that prevent war and build partnerships.
Forward Presence. Maritime forces will be forward deployed, especially in an era
of diverse threats to the homeland. Operating forward enables familiarity with the
environment, as well as the personalities and behavior patterns of regional actors.
Mindful of the sovereignty of other nations, this influence and understanding
contributes to effective responses in the event of crisis. Should peacetime operations transition to war, maritime forces will have already developed the environmental and operational understanding and experience to quickly engage in
combat operations. Forward presence also allows us to combat terrorism as far
from our shores as possible. Where and when applicable, forward-deployed
maritime forces will isolate, capture, or destroy terrorists, their infrastructure, resources and sanctuaries, preferably in conjunction with coalition partners.
Deterrence. Preventing war is preferable to fighting wars. Deterring aggression
must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional,
unconventional, and nuclear means. Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence, creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by
providing an umbrella of protection to forward-deployed forces and friends and
allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the
United States. Our advantage in space—upon which much of our ability to operate in a networked, dispersed fashion depends—must be protected and extended. We will use forward based and forward deployed forces, space-based
assets, sea-based strategic deterrence and other initiatives to deter those who
wish us harm.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21
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Sea Control. The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important
enablers of joint and interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities
in all aspects of the maritime domain, including space and cyberspace. There are
many challenges to our ability to exercise sea control, perhaps none as significant
as the growing number of nations operating submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear propelled. We will continue to hone the tactics, training
and technologies needed to neutralize this threat. We will not permit conditions
under which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver
and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and commerce.
We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert
with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.
Power Projection. Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and
sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility. Our advantages will
be sustained through properly sized forces, innovative technologies, understanding of adversary capabilities, adaptive joint planning processes and the
proficiency and ingenuity of our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. We
will maintain a robust strategic sealift capability to rapidly concentrate and sustain forces, and to enable joint and/or combined campaigns. This capability relies on the maintenance of a strong U.S. commercial maritime transportation
industry and its critical intermodal assets.
Maritime Security. The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential
to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and
transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. Our maritime forces
enforce domestic and international law at sea through established protocols
such as the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR). We also join
navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and
suppress common threats.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. Building on relationships forged
in times of calm, we will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard
of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion
and in response to crises. Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance.
Our ability to conduct rapid and sustained non-combatant evacuation operations is critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety
is in jeopardy.
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Implementation Priorities
Implementation of this strategy will require that the Sea Services demonstrate
flexibility, adaptability and unity of effort in evolving to meet the enduring and
emerging challenges and opportunities ahead. Specific initiatives in support of
this strategy must be vetted and tested over time through experimentation,
wargaming, and continued operational experience, with periodic oversight and
unified guidance provided by the senior leaders of the Sea Services. While many
initiatives must come to fruition to enable this strategy, three areas will receive
priority attention:
Improve Integration and Interoperability. The combatant commanders’ increased
demand for mission-tailored force packages requires a more integrated approach to how maritime forces are employed.
Marines will continue to be employed as air-ground task forces operating
from amphibious ships to conduct a variety of missions, such as power projection, but they will also be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of
ships and cutters for maritime security missions. Sailors, Marines, and Coast
Guardsmen, teamed in various combinations of security forces, mobile training
teams, construction battalions, health services, law enforcement, and civil affairs
units to conduct security cooperation and humanitarian assistance missions,
illustrate adaptive force packaging.
Homeland defense is the most obvious example of the requirement for
greater integration. It is not sufficient to speak of homeland defense in terms of
splitting the responsibilities and authorities between the Navy and the Coast
Guard along some undefined geographic boundary. Rather, the Sea Services
must—and will—work as one wherever they operate in order to defend the
United States. Consistent with the National Fleet Policy, Coast Guard forces must
be able to operate as part of a joint task force thousands of miles from our
shores, and naval forces must be able to respond to operational tasking close to
home when necessary to secure our Nation and support civil authorities. Integration and interoperability are key to success in these activities, particularly
where diverse forces of varying capability and mission must work together
seamlessly in support of defense, security, and humanitarian operations.
Expanded cooperation with the maritime forces of other nations requires
more interoperability with multinational partners possessing varying levels of
technology. The Global Maritime Partnership initiative will serve as a catalyst for
increased international interoperability in support of cooperative maritime
security.
Achieving the requisite level of integration and interoperability will demand
a high degree of coordination among service headquarters staffs to fulfill their
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responsibilities of providing, training, and equipping forces. Furthermore, Navy
and Marine Corps component commanders and Coast Guard functional commanders will play a central role in determining how maritime forces are organized, deployed, and employed. This role involves identification of combatant
commander requirements and articulation of how their respective service capabilities can be integrated in innovative ways to meet those requirements. Close
coordination among, if not outright integration of, maritime components may
be required to do this effectively. At all echelons of command, we must enhance
our ability to conduct integrated planning, execution, and assessment.
Enhance Awareness. To be effective, there must be a significantly increased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and expand intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and capacity. New
partnerships with the world’s maritime commercial interests and the maritime
forces of participating nations will reduce the dangerous anonymity of sea
borne transport of people and cargoes. Great strides have already been taken in
that direction, and the National Strategy for Maritime Security has mandated an
even higher level of interagency cooperation in pursuit of effective MDA. Maritime forces will contribute to enhance information sharing, underpinning and
energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from our
shores as possible.
Critical to realizing the benefits of increased awareness is our ability to protect information from compromise through robust information assurance measures. Such measures will increase international partner confidence that
information provided will be shared only with those entities for which it is
intended.
Adversaries are unlikely to attempt conventional force-on-force conflict and,
to the extent that maritime forces could be openly challenged, their plans will almost certainly rely on asymmetric attack and surprise, achieved through stealth,
deception, or ambiguity. Our ISR capabilities must include innovative ways to
penetrate the designs of adversaries, and discern their capabilities and vulnerabilities while supporting the full range of military operations. We must remove
the possibility of an adversary gaining the initiative over forward-deployed
forces and ensure we provide decision makers with the information they need to
deter aggression and consider escalatory measures in advance of such gambits.
Prepare Our People. Given the distributed nature of the forces executing this strategy, we must properly prepare Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen for the
challenges and opportunities ahead. We are creating a dispersed force under decentralized authority in a world of rapid information exchange. Maritime forces
will normally operate in a less concentrated manner than they do today, and
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junior leaders will be entrusted with a higher level of responsibility and authority for carrying out important aspects of strategically important missions. Junior personnel will be required to interact with a far greater variety of U.S. and
multinational partners and indigenous populations than their predecessors.
Professional development and unit training must be refined accordingly. Operations as an integrated team require improved mutual understanding of respective service or agency capabilities and cultures, which can be achieved through
expanded interagency teaming of students and instructors throughout training,
education, and staff assignments.
Similarly, if we are to successfully partner with the international community,
we must improve regional and cultural expertise through expanded training,
education, and exchange initiatives.
Significantly, this strategy requires new ways of thinking—about both empowering individual commanders and understanding the net effects of dispersed operations. Such operations require a broadly shared responsibility among: the
on-scene commander responsible for ensuring actions are in accordance with the
commander’s intent; the higher commander responsible for providing intent and
guidance to subordinates; the parent service of dispersed forces responsible for
ensuring that units are trained, equipped, and culturally prepared for the missions
they will undertake; and, finally, the regional commanders responsible for determining appropriate force levels and readiness postures.
CONCLUSION
This strategy is derived from a thorough assessment of the Nation’s security requirements. It does not presume conflict but instead acknowledges the historical
fact that peace does not preserve itself. Looking across the wide maritime domain, it calls for a broad portfolio of core capabilities to support our vital interests, realized by well-trained, highly motivated and ably-led people.
The strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear;
and on confidence—not doubt. It recognizes the challenges imposed by the uncertain conditions in a time of rapid change and makes the case for the necessity
of U.S. seapower in the 21st Century.
As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the Sea Services to
evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives. Further experimentation, operational experience,
and analysis are necessary, as is sea service commitment to building upon the
ideas that this document puts forward. However, the Sea Services cannot do
this alone. The diverse elements of the greater maritime community must be
inspired and supported as they invest to secure peace and prosperity across the
maritime domain.
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The Sea Services commit to continuing the process of collaborative strategy
implementation in the years ahead. United States seapower is a force for good,
protecting this Nation’s vital interests even as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe.

The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard released this new cooperative maritime strategy at the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College on
17 October 2007. The report can be found online at www.navy.mil/maritime/
MaritimeStrategy.pdf.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

AS MOST OF YOU ARE WELL AWARE, for over a century the College has

played a unique role in the analysis and formulation of national
maritime strategy and policy as well as national grand strategy. Over the past
two years, the Naval War College has found itself once again in a key position to
support the leadership of our maritime forces, and of those of our global partners, in thinking through the implications of a new set of global security challenges and opportunities (see the “President’s Forum” in the Autumn 2006 issue
of the Review). The current effort finds its roots in the discussions of the 17th International Seapower Symposium (ISS), held in the fall of 2005.
At that conference, fifty-five chiefs of navies and coast guards, along with
twenty-seven war college presidents from around the world, gathered in Newport to share perspectives on a broad range of issues important to our navies,
coast guards, and countries through the mechanism of regionally oriented seminars (eight of them). The two days produced from each region comprehensive
lists of key concerns, the similarity of which was remarkable. As the symposium
drew to a close, a consensus was articulated that maritime security was fundamental to address these concerns, that the scope of security challenges reached
beyond the waters of individual nations, and most importantly, that responsibility for the maritime domain—the great “commons” of the world—was shared.
Moreover, the need was expressed for regional and global mechanisms that
would allow maritime nations to bring more routinely and effectively their particular capabilities together to ensure a free and secure maritime domain.
The host of that ISS, Admiral Mike Mullen, summarized the key proposition
of the symposium: “Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be
collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas
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and in our need for security for the vast commons. This is a requisite for national
security, global stability, and economic prosperity.” Acknowledging that “the
United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain,” Admiral Mullen said that “it must count on assistance
from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and
precluding its use by others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”
So too must each nation count on contributions from other nations.
Then began a very productive period, when the College—aligned with the
fundamental notions of the 17th International Seapower Symposium—was
tasked to work on a new maritime strategy “of and for its time.” Critical to our effort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive scenario analysis and
war-gaming effort and a series of high-level conferences, symposia, and other
professional exchanges with maritime partners here in Newport and other venues around the world. This collaborative effort has produced great insight and
has brought into focus the diverse perspectives necessary to make this strategy
robust across multiple challenges and useful both for Navy leadership and national policy makers in understanding the key role maritime forces must play in
the evolving international system.
We see some powerful ideas in this strategy: the preeminent value of maritime forces to underwrite stability for the global system, and an emphasis on the
unique capabilities inherent in maritime forces to prevent global shocks and to
limit and localize regional conflict. Over and above the long-standing naval
commitment to provide high-end military capability, there are clear new demands related to sustaining the global system—demands that are peculiar to the
maritime domain. The new maritime strategy also recognizes that we must rely
increasingly, across the range of military operations, on an expanded set of more
robust, global maritime relationships—in effect, partnerships that engender
trust, contribute to war prevention, and yield more effective maritime security.
At the 18th International Seapower Symposium, hosted here at the College in
October 2007, General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard; and Admiral Gary
Roughead, our new Chief of Naval Operations, presented before the largest
gathering of high-ranking naval leadership ever assembled in the world the results of the work of the last two years. Present in Spruance Auditorium were
sixty-nine chiefs of naval operations, twenty-one commandants of coast guards,
sixteen war college presidents, and many senior uniformed and civilian leaders
from the United States. (I should note that nearly a quarter of our foreign guests
were graduates of the College!) In all, ninety-eight countries were represented,
and the event—with the three service chiefs presiding—was televised to the national security press corps in the Pentagon.
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The strategy they presented (printed in its entirety in this issue) provides a
long-needed, overarching logic that links the vital contribution of the nation’s
maritime services to global security and prosperity.
This has truly been an international collaborative effort. Many, if not most, of
the navies represented at the 2007 ISS were engaged in some fashion during the
strategy’s development, and its substance and wording were significantly influenced by these discussions and inputs. If the initial reception by the heads of navies in attendance is any indication, the new strategy will provide a sound basis for
achieving the vision of global maritime cooperation on an unprecedented scale.
The new strategy also reflects the extensive collaboration with the Navy’s
maritime service partners. The three sea services have worked on the strategy as
an integrated team from the very first. All three service chiefs have signed the
document; it truly represents a national maritime strategy. This collaboration
also extended to the staffs of our joint combatant commanders and the U.S. interagency arena.
The strategy’s rollout at Newport underscores the unique role the College
plays in enabling genuine collaboration among the other sea services, international navies, and a host of other organizations. In fact, it was the formation of
new relationships and the strengthening of existing ones that compelled the development of the new strategy. On the basis of the open sharing of information
and of respect for the perspectives and ideas of all, the College was able to integrate the thinking of a wide range of people who would not ordinarily have an
opportunity to exchange views. This synthesis of diverse perspectives embodies
the philosophy behind the strategy itself, so in a sense the development of the
strategy was also a step in its execution.
As I have outlined, this has been a very different kind of strategy development
process. In the words of Paul Bracken, “It represents a break with recent U.S.
strategic thinking in that it did not start with the answer.”* I am not saying that
we started with a completely blank sheet of paper, but we did free ourselves from
preexisting biases on desired fleet size or shape. In fact, we all but banned any
discussion of ships, submarines, or aircraft, focusing instead on the relationship
between grand strategy and seapower. By maintaining that discipline throughout the project, I think we achieved one of the going-in goals—that is, to elevate
the discussion in order to create a broader definition of seapower. I anticipate
that A Cooperative Strategy will be an influential document for years to come.
Part of its influence will be due to the way we went about crafting it, giving it a
joint, interagency, and international pedigree, as well as solid intellectual underpinnings to make it robust and durable. From the very beginning we were intent
* Paul Bracken, “Maritime Strategy and Grand Strategy,” Chinfo News Clips, 29 September 2006.
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on taking the “long view,” to borrow from the title of Peter Schwartz’s book,*
and we applied Schwartz’s idea of a “strategic conversation” with a broad range
of expert stakeholders around the nation and the world.
Despite the strategy’s strong pedigree, I don’t think anyone would consider it
a finished product in the sense that we can now put it in a drawer and go on to
other things. Quite the contrary—if history is any guide, it will be a number of
years before the implications of the new strategy are completely understood. It
took several decades for us to sort out the program and resource implications of
War Plan ORANGE, and the 1980s Maritime Strategy was still being refined and
interpreted when the Soviet Union fell. Thus, I would expect that we will be discussing, analyzing, arguing, and gaming the new strategy for several years.
The College will have a significant role in all of these efforts, including involvement in the Navy’s new Adaptive Planning Process, which seeks to establish
systematically a strategic “front end” for the requirements process in the Pentagon. Among other activities, the College will reenter the arena of “Title X” war
gaming, whereby services can examine, integrate, and evolve their future concepts. The Naval War College was the originator of this type of game in the late
1970s, with its “Global” series. Whereas the Global games actually preceded and
informed the 1980s Maritime Strategy, this new maritime strategy will set in
motion a new series of strategy and concept games to translate the document effectively into operational, policy, and resource contexts.
I fully expect this national and international dialogue on strategy to continue,
building on the work of the last two years and the investment of honest and expert intellectual capital it represents.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

* The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1991).
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AIR FORCE–NAVY INTEGRATION IN STRIKE WARFARE
A Role Model for Seamless Joint-Service Operations
Benjamin S. Lambeth

O

ne of the most remarkable aspects of American joint-force combat capability today is the close harmony that has steadily evolved since the 1991
Persian Gulf War in the integrated conduct of aerial strike operations by the U.S.
Air Force and U.S. Navy, along with the latter’s closely associated Marine Corps
air assets. This under-recognized and little-appreciated aspect of the nation’s
warfighting posture stands in marked contrast to the more familiar and contested relationship between the two services in the roles and resources arena,
where a fundamentally different incentive structure has tended to prevail and
where seemingly zero-sum battles for limited defense dollars have appeared to
be the natural order of things from one budget cycle to the next. As a former Air
Force three-star general and fighter pilot recently remarked on this important
point, although there remains “lots to be done at the budget table, tactically the
1
[two] services are [now] bonded at the hip.” Indeed, in the words of a former
Navy Fighter Weapons School instructor, now the commander of Second Fleet,
such integration “is now a part of the culture” of U.S. fixed-wing combat
aircrews, regardless of whether the wings they wear on their uniforms are made
2
of silver or gold.
In this regard, the Air Force and Navy have come a long way since the Vietnam
War and its early Cold War aftermath more than three decades ago, when the
two services remained cultures apart, operated in wholly separate physical and
conceptual worlds, and could claim no significant interoperability features to
speak of. Once the unexpected demands of Operation DESERT STORM so starkly
dramatized the downside consequences of that absence of interoperability between the two services, however, the Navy, in particular, responded with due
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alacrity and began implementing the many needed changes in its equipment,
doctrine, and operating practices to accommodate the demise of its former
open-ocean mission against Soviet naval forces and the emergence of a need to
work more closely with its Air Force sister service in the conduct of joint air operations in dealing with littoral combat challenges around the world.
For its part, the Air Force likewise embraced not only the new demand but
also the many new opportunities for working more synergistically with its navalaviator counterparts in both peacetime training and actual contingency operations. From the most tentative initial stirrings of this early move toward greater
interoperability between the two services in the late 1970s, the Air Force and
Navy registered ever-greater progress toward synchronized air operations
throughout the 1990s, to a point where the fruits of that integration were finally
realized during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM over Afghanistan in late 2001
and further clinched by the all but seamless joint combat performance of the
two services a year later during the three-week period of major combat in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
A BACKDROP OF APARTNESS
The integration of the Navy and Air Force in aerial strike warfare is a fairly recent
phenomenon in American military experience. For more than two centuries the
Navy was proudly accustomed to operating independently on the high seas, with
a consequent need to be completely self-reliant and adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances far from the nation’s shores, with the fewest possible constraints on its freedom of action. The nation’s sea service was forward deployed
from the beginning of its existence and, throughout most of the Cold War, was
the only service that was “out there,” in and above the maritime commons and
ready for action. Largely for that reason, operations integration between the
Navy and Air Force was not even a remote planning consideration. On the contrary, the main focus was rather on force deconfliction between the two services.
Not only figuratively but also literally, the Navy and Air Force conducted their
daily routines in separate and distinct operating environments, and no synergies
between the two services were produced—or even sought. Not surprisingly, a
unique Navy operating culture emerged from this reality that set the Navy
clearly apart from the Air Force and its more structured and rule-governed way
of conducting its missions.
These widely divergent service approaches to air operations persisted
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, with the final years of the Cold War (after
the nation’s combat involvement in Vietnam ended in 1973) seeing little significant change from the previous pattern of segregated operations that had been
the norm throughout the eight-year air war in Southeast Asia. Throughout
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those final Cold War years, the Navy’s carrier battle groups figured most prominently in a sea-control strategy that was directed against Soviet naval forces, including long-range and highly capable shore-based naval air forces, in
open-ocean engagements around the world. Because the Maritime Strategy of
the Reagan administration put the focus of American naval force projection
more than a thousand miles away from the most likely focus of any Air Force
combat operations in both Europe
and the Pacific, such geographic
It would be hard to overstate the shock effect
separation, in an apt portrayal,
that DESERT STORM had on the Navy, to say
nothing of carrier air, with respect to the newly “simply ruled out any concern
with or interest in cross-service
emergent needs of joint strike warfare.
synergies at the operational or
3
tactical levels.” Any combat operations against Soviet forces in the northernmost reaches of the Norwegian Sea or off the Kamchatka Peninsula in the western
Pacific would have involved solely the U.S. and Soviet navies, with no other force
operations in the area. That accordingly freed the Navy to develop long-range
fire-and-forget weapons, like the AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile and the
AGM-84D Harpoon antishipping missile, that were unconstrained by any need
for concern over the risk of fratricide or the possibility of causing unintended collateral damage should they go astray.
For its part, the Air Force was looking at a very different and more complex
operating arena in which friendly and enemy aircraft would be simultaneously
airborne and often commingled in the same block of airspace. Unlike the Navy,
which was focused literally a thousand miles away—on the open-ocean environment, on NATO’s northern flank and the defense of northern Norway, and
on Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula of the Soviet Union—the Air Force was
preparing itself for joint operations in shared battle space with the Army and
with the nation’s NATO allies in Central Europe. Given that stark dissimilarity
in outlook and mission orientation, the Navy and Air Force, in a fair characterization, “simply thought about and operated within two separate conceptual
4
worlds.”
As a result of these widely divergent mind-sets and operating environments, a
pronounced culture divide separated the Air Force and naval aviation in the
strike-warfare arena. In telling testimony to this divide, Air Force pilots who
participated in joint peacetime training exercises with their Navy counterparts
during the early post-Vietnam years were often heard to tell horror stories about
such (to them) cavalier and undisciplined Navy practices as last-minute unannounced changes in flight schedules, controlling agencies, radio frequencies,
operating areas, or even mission profiles. For their parts, Navy pilots who flew in
similar joint training exercises routinely complained that overly rigid adherence
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to maintenance, operation, and crew-rest requirements greatly hampered the
Air Force’s ability to be fully flexible in executing its assigned missions. One junior naval aviator in 1991 voiced a commonly heard refrain that neatly encapsulated the essence of the cultural divide from the Navy’s perspective: “Naval
aviators are fond of saying that Air Force pilots may only do something if it is
written somewhere that they can, while Navy pilots may do whatever they want
5
as long as it isn’t written somewhere that they can’t.”
THE WATERSHED OF DESERT STORM
Iraq’s sudden and unexpected invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 presented naval aviation, in particular, with a new and unfamiliar set of challenges. During
the course of the six-week Persian Gulf War that began five and a half months
later, the Navy’s carrier force found itself obliged to surmount a multitude of
new adjustments the need for which came to light for the first time in that campaign. Few of the challenges that were levied on naval aviation by that U.S.-led
offensive, code-named Operation DESERT STORM, bore much resemblance to the
planning assumptions that underlay the Maritime Strategy, which had been created during the early 1980s to accommodate a very different set of concerns. Although naval aviators had routinely trained for and were wholly proficient at
over-the-beach conventional strike operations, the Navy’s carrier battle groups
during that period had been geared, first and foremost, to doing open-ocean
battle against the Soviet Navy. As such, they were not optimally equipped for
conducting littoral combat operations. They also were completely unaccustomed to operating within the Air Force’s complex air tasking system for managing the large-force operations involving two thousand or more sorties a day that
dominated the DESERT STORM air war.
Simply put, the 1991 Gulf War in no way resembled the open-ocean battles
that the Navy had planned and prepared for throughout the preceding two decades. To begin with, there were no opposed surface naval forces or enemy air
threat to challenge the Navy’s six carrier battle groups that participated in that
war. Moreover, throughout the five-month buildup of forces in the region that
preceded the war and the six weeks of fighting that ensued thereafter, the Navy
did not operate independently, as had been its familiar pattern throughout most
of the Cold War, but rather in shared operating areas with the Air Force, Army,
and Marine Corps.
With respect to equipment, the naval air capabilities that had been fielded
and fine-tuned for open-ocean engagements, such as the long-range AIM-54
carried by the F-14, were of little relevance to the coalition’s predominantly
6
overland air-combat needs. Navy F-14s also were not assigned to the choicest
combat air patrol (CAP) stations in DESERT STORM, because, having been
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equipped for the less-crowded outer air battle in defense of a carrier battle
group, they lacked the redundant onboard target-recognition systems that the
rules of engagement promulgated by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) required for the denser and more conflicted air environment over Iraq. Relatedly,
because of the Navy’s lack of a compatible command and control system that
would enable receipt of the document electronically, the daily air tasking order
(ATO) generated by the Air Force–dominated combined air operations center
(CAOC) in Saudi Arabia had to be placed aboard two S-3 antisubmarine warfare
aircraft in hard copy each day and flown to the six participating carriers so that
the next day’s air-wing flight schedules could be written. As for the Navy’s other
equipment items and habit patterns developed for open-ocean engagements,
such as fire-and-forget Harpoon antiship missiles and decentralized command
and control, all were, in the words of the former vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Admiral William Owens, “either ruled out by the context
of the battle or were ineffective in the confined littoral arena and the environ7
mental complexities of the sea-land interface.”
Because of the Navy’s lack of a significant precision-strike capability when
the call to deploy for DESERT STORM arose, its six carrier air wings that participated in the campaign were denied certain targets, which were assigned to the
Air Force instead, by default. The participating carrier air wings also had to turn
down some target-attack opportunities because of their lack of a penetrating
munition like the Air Force’s Mark 84 improved two-thousand-pound bomb.
One strike fighter squadron’s after-action report, submitted not long after the
Gulf War ended, remarked that the Navy’s lack of the sort of precision-attack capability that the Air Force had used to such telling effect in the war “was eloquent testimony that naval aviation had apparently missed an entire generation
8
of weapons employment and development.”
POST–GULF WAR ADJUSTMENTS TO NEW DEMANDS
It would be hard to overstate the shock effect that the DESERT STORM experience had
on the Navy as a whole, to say nothing of its carrier air component, with respect to
the newly emergent needs of joint strike warfare. As one rising naval aviator noted
insightfully in 1992 in this regard: “Nearly two decades of narrow focus—on
one-shot, small-scale, and largely single-service contingency operations—left naval
aviation temperamentally, technically, and doctrinally unprepared for some key
9
elements of a joint air campaign such as Desert Storm.” Admiral Owens put the
point even more bluntly four years later: “For the Navy, more than any other service, Desert Storm was the midwife of change. . . . [The war] confirmed the operational doctrines that the Army and Air Force had developed over the previous
two decades, but it also demonstrated that the Maritime Strategy—the basic
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operational concept driving Navy planning since the early 1970s—did not fit the
10
post–cold war era.”
Fortunately, although naval aviation entered the post–Cold War era ill
equipped for that era’s new demands, the Navy quickly made the necessary adjustments in the early aftermath of DESERT STORM. In the realm of equipment, it
stepped out smartly to upgrade its precision-strike capability by fielding both
new systems and improvements to existing platforms, soon achieving a degree
of flexibility that it had lacked throughout the six-week Gulf War. First and foremost, it moved to convert the F-14 from a single-mission air-to-air platform
into a true multimission aircraft, through the incorporation of the Air Force–
developed LANTIRN* infrared targeting system, which allowed the aircraft to
deliver laser-guided bombs (LGBs) both day and night.
The Navy leadership also rectified its shortfall in precision-guided-munitions
delivery capability, by equipping more F/A-18s with the ability to fire the
AGM-84E standoff land-attack missile (SLAM) and to self-designate targets. To
correct yet another equipment-related deficiency highlighted by the DESERT
STORM experience, naval aviation also undertook measures to improve its command, control, and communications arrangements so that it could operate
more freely with other joint air assets within the framework of an ATO. Those
measures most notably included gaining the long-needed ability to receive the
daily ATO aboard ship electronically.
Finally, in the realm of doctrine, the Navy began to accept the value of strategic air campaigns and the idea that naval air forces must become more influential players in them. As Admiral Owens noted as early as 1995, “the issue facing
the nation’s naval forces is not whether strategic bombardment theory is absolutely correct; it is how best to contribute to successful strategic bombardment
11
campaigns.” In a major move to formalize this new thinking, the Navy and Marine Corps on 28 September 1992 promulgated a fundamentally new strategy for
12
the naval establishment in a white paper called . . . From the Sea. That new mission orientation put the main emphasis on power projection and explicitly envisioned naval forces as working jointly with both Air Force and Army elements to
control events ashore. Importantly in this respect, Admiral Owens later stressed
that “naval aviation must see itself as a component part of the full air power the
nation can bring to bear on military problems, especially in support of land and
13
air campaigns.”
There were notable changes as well in naval aviation tactics, techniques, and
procedures to make the nation’s sea-based strike fighters more compatible with
the needs of joint warfare. After DESERT STORM, naval aviation’s emphasis
* LANTIRN is an acronym for “low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night.”
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shifted from air superiority and battle-group defense to multimission operations against heavily defended targets ashore. Although the air-to-air skill set
was retained, the focus of naval fighter training in the 1990s took a pronounced
swing toward ground-attack operations, with a predominant stress on day and
night precision strike. The effect of these improvements in equipment, doctrine,
and concepts of operations was to transform carrier-based air power from a
force configured mainly for sea control to one able to exploit sea control as a basis for enabling and participating in joint strike operations ashore.
To be sure, despite these nascent trends toward more harmonious cooperation in joint strike warfare, a number of disconnects between the Navy and Air
Force persisted throughout the 1990s. One recurring manifestation of the cultural divide that still separated the two services in air warfare came in the form
of continued expressions of Navy discomfiture over the Air Force–inspired ATO
and the way in which, at least in
the view of many naval aviators, it
During the Cold War a pronounced culture
sometimes made less than the
divide separated the Air Force and naval
best use of the nation’s increasaviation in the strike-warfare arena.
ingly capable carrier-based strike
forces. Ever since their first exposure to operating in an ATO context during
DESERT STORM, naval aviators had been inclined to chafe, sometimes quite insistently, at the alleged rigidity of that document and at its perceived insensitivity
to certain unique features of sea-based air power, such as the inescapable operating requirements and limitations imposed by the carrier deck cycle.
This persistent Navy discontent with the air tasking process, which was almost exclusively a mission-management artifact of the Air Force, was especially
apparent during the contingency-response operations that were conducted by
the Navy’s carrier air wings, in conjunction with Air Force and allied air assets,
over the Balkans in the 1990s. After the first of those early joint evolutions, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, ended in success, there were recurrent expressions
of Navy dissatisfaction over the Air Force’s centralized control of mission tasking, especially with respect to the air tasking message (ATM), which specified
munition types to be used against particular targets and numerous other mission particulars.
Some of those complaints merely reflected a less than full understanding of
the air tasking process and what lay behind it. Most of them, moreover, would
have been voiced under just about any alternative mission-management arrangements as well. Often overlooked was the fact that NATO operations over
the former Yugoslavia were highly constrained exercises in force employment, in
which it was not possible for CAOC planners to make optimal use of any air assets, Navy or any other. In those cases, the ATM often provided a convenient
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lightning rod for Navy complaints that were actually prompted by severe operating limitations imposed by U.S. political leaders in the interest of avoiding fratricide, collateral damage, noncombatant civilian casualties, or other violations
of standing rules of engagement, with the intent both to reassure reluctant
NATO allies and to prevent tactical mistakes from producing undesirable strategic consequences.
In all, the single most influential factor in bringing the two services together
during the 1990s was the nation’s ten-year experience of operations NORTHERN
WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH, in which both Air Force land-based fighters
and Navy carrier-based fighters jointly enforced the United Nations–imposed
no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq that had been first put into effect
shortly after DESERT STORM. That prolonged aerial policing function proved to
be a real-world operations laboratory for the two services, and over time it was
the main crucible in which their integration in strike warfare was forged. By
conscious choice, both services sent their best tacticians and intelligence officers
to serve temporary-duty assignments in the supporting CAOCs in Turkey and
Saudi Arabia, working together in the joint planning and execution of those
nonstop air operations over Iraq. Their working relations became more and
more transparent and seamless. Viewed in hindsight, this convergence was not
just a result of the Navy’s need to acquire the wherewithal for remaining relevant
in joint warfare but even more a direct outgrowth of conscious leadership determination in both services, based in considerable part on steadily evolved mutual
trust relations, to move toward a more common operating culture when it came
to coordinated joint-force execution.
A CONVERGENCE OF INTEGRATION OVER AFGHANISTAN
The terrorist attacks carried out against the United States on September 11,
2001, levied upon the nation a demand for a deep-strike capability in the remotest part of Southwest Asia, where the United States maintained virtually no access to forward land bases. That unusual demand required the Navy’s carrier
force to provide the bulk of strike-fighter participation in the joint air war over
14
Afghanistan that ensued soon thereafter. To be sure, Air Force heavy bombers
also played a prominent part in that air-centric campaign, code-named Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Nevertheless, carrier-based aviation operating from
stations in the north Arabian Sea substituted almost entirely for what would
have been a far larger complement of land-based strike fighters in other circumstances, because of an absence of suitable forward operating locations close
enough to the war zone to make the large-scale use of the latter practicable.
Between 7 October, when ENDURING FREEDOM began, and 23 December,
when the major combat phase ended with the rout of the ruling Taliban, some
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6,500 strike sorties were flown by CENTCOM altogether. Navy fighters accounted
for 4,900 of the strike sorties flown during that period, 75 percent of the total. For
its part, although the Air Force flew only a quarter of the strike missions, its aircraft dropped 12,900 munitions, adding up to more than 70 percent of the total.
The heavy B-52s and B-1s flew only 10 percent of the total strike missions, yet they
delivered 11,500 of the 17,500 munitions, accounting for 65 percent of the total
15
and 89 percent of all the munitions dropped by the Air Force.
Much energy was wasted during the war’s early aftermath in parochial fencing between some Air Force and Navy partisans over which service deserved
credit for having done the heavier lifting in ENDURING FREEDOM, with Air Force
advocates pointing to the preponderance of munitions and overall tonnage
dropped by that service and Navy proponents countering that it had been carrierbased aircraft, in the end, that had flown the overwhelming majority of combat
sorties and that had performed nearly all of the “true” precision LGB attacks.
That contretemps was entirely unhelpful to a proper understanding of what integrated Air Force and Navy strike operations had actually done to produce such
a quick and lopsided win over the Taliban and al Qaeda. True enough, Air Force
F-15Es and F-16s operating out of the Persian Gulf flew only a small percentage
of the overall number of fighter missions conducted in ENDURING FREEDOM.
Yet Air Force B-1 and B-2 bombers, with very few exceptions, dropped nothing
but satellite-aided precision munitions of various types, and Air Force B-52s
dropped large numbers of accurate Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), in
addition to unguided Mark 82 five-hundred-pound general-purpose bombs. It
accordingly is a toss-up as to which service predominated in the precision-strike
arena. Arguing over whether Navy or Air Force air power had been more important in achieving the successful outcome of ENDURING FREEDOM is on a par
with arguing over which blade in a pair of scissors is more important in cutting
paper.
The fact is that, for the first time in the history of joint warfare, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM showed real synergies in Air Force and Navy conduct of integrated strike operations. Navy fighters escorted Air Force bombers into Afghan
airspace until assured allied air supremacy was established. For its part, the Air
Force, along with the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF), provided
roughly 80 percent of the tanker support that allowed Navy carrier-based fighters to reach central and northern Afghanistan. That support, in turn, enabled
sea-based strikes far beyond littoral limits as well as a sustained carrier-based
strike-fighter presence over remote target areas for hours, if needed, for on-call
strikes on time-sensitive targets.
In addition, for the first time naval aviators found themselves occupying key
CAOC positions, ranging from the deputy combined-force air component
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commander (CFACC), then–rear admiral David Nichols, on down. These positions included that of the night CAOC director; the night guidance, apportionment, and targeting cell director; and codirectors or principal deputies for all
16
key CAOC divisions (strategy, combat plans, combat operations, and ISR*). In
hindsight, two knowledgeable commentators on the evolution of the Air Force–
Navy relationship since DESERT STORM were more than a little prescient in having predicted, on the very eve of the September 11th attacks, that the coming
year would witness “a triumph of the synergistic view of jointness . . . where the
Navy and Air Force are concerned,” and in turn a “closing of a promise-reality
gap” that would yield “effects-based capabilities that are good for our regional
17
commanders in chief and right for our nation.”
FURTHER CONVERGENCE IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
If the air war over Afghanistan was tailor made for integrated Air Force and Navy
strike operations, the three-week campaign a year later to topple Saddam
Hussein would prove to be no less so. During that second campaign’s
unpreplanned opening night on 19 March 2003, in response to what President
George W. Bush and his principal deputies believed at the time to have been
solid last-minute intelligence reporting that Hussein and his two sons were
meeting at a certain location in the Baghdad suburbs, Navy EA-6Bs provided
electronic jamming support for Air Force F-15Es and RAF Tornado GR4s. The
latter opened a penetration corridor for the two Air Force F-117 stealth attack
aircraft that led the ultimately unsuccessful decapitation attempt, followed
shortly thereafter by forty Navy theater land-attack missiles fired against the suspected meeting site. As had been true in operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM, the availability of Navy EA-6B jamming support was an
ironclad go/no-go criterion for all IRAQI FREEDOM strike missions, including
those that involved stealthy Air Force B-2s and F-117s.
Later the next morning, when the Iraqis fired several theater ballistic missiles
at Kuwait in a response to the initial U.S. attack, the Navy’s USS Higgins (DDG
76), a guided-missile destroyer on station in the north Arabian Gulf, transmitted
launch-point information to the CAOC, which in turn targeted two Air Force
F-16s that geolocated and destroyed the Iraqi missile launchers. Similarly, Air
Force B-1 bombers used their onboard moving-target-indicator radar in an ISR
role to geolocate time-sensitive targets and transmit their coordinates to Navy
strikers. Several days later, the Air Force E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft was used as a dynamic retasking tool to direct and
redirect Navy strike aircraft during a three-day sandstorm that occurred during
the campaign’s first week, as was a pair of Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft
* ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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when Navy satellite-aided JDAMs were needed to replace LGBs that would not
function to their fullest potentials during the sandstorm. Once the sandstorm
abated, Air Force RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles provided accurate
target geolocation for Navy JDAM strikes. Air Force Special Operations Command joint terminal attack controllers on the ground also provided updated target coordinates for Navy JDAM attacks.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM also set a new record for close Navy involvement
in the high-level planning and conduct of joint air operations. As the deputy
CFACC once again, Rear Admiral Nichols was not just the “senior naval representative” in the CAOC but the alter ego, to all intents and purposes, to the Air
Force CFACC, then–lieutenant general T. Michael Moseley, when it came to
commanding and managing the air war. In addition, alternating with Colonel
Douglas Erlenbusch of the Air Force, Captain Russell Penniman of the Navy was
codirector of the combat plans division, which did all of the target analysis and
weaponeering.18 Captain (now Rear Admiral) William Gortney was the naval air
liaison coordinator. That representation and more stood in stark contrast to the
Navy’s less gratifying experience twelve years before during DESERT STORM,
when the overwhelming majority of the targeting cell’s staff had been Air Force
officers, its Navy members both too few in number and far too junior in rank to
influence the day-to-day decision making.
In sum, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a true joint-service effort involving
wholly integrated Air Force and Navy strike operations. In the apt words of two
historians writing an early synopsis of the war, that effort saw “little of the petty
parochialism that too often marks interservice relations within the [Washington]
19
Beltway.” Speaking as the combined-force maritime component coordinator
for IRAQI FREEDOM, Admiral Timothy Keating characterized the operational
payoff of all this as “joint warfighting at the highest form of the art I’d ever seen. . . .
There was understanding, friendship, familiarity, and trust among all the services and special forces working for [Army] General [Tommy] Franks [the overall joint-force commander for the three-week campaign]. He did, in my view, a
remarkable job of engendering that friendship, camaraderie, and trust. In fact,
20
he insisted on it. . . . There was no service equity infighting—zero.”
EMERGENT TRENDS IN AIR FORCE–NAVY INTEGRATION
The performance of Air Force and Navy strike assets in the first two American
wars of the twenty-first century bore ample witness to the giant strides that have
been made in the integration of the two services’ air-warfare repertoires since
DESERT STORM. The two wars saw naval aviation fully integrated into the joint
and combined air operations that largely enabled the successful outcomes in each
case. They also showed increased Air Force and Navy acceptance of effects-based
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thinking and planning, as well as a common use of the joint mission-planning
tools that the Air Force had refined during the decade after DESERT STORM. As attested by the Navy’s experiences in both ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, the CAOC-generated air tasking order is now disseminated electronically
to carrier strike groups in an easily usable form and is updated hourly for each
carrier via secure e-mail. Moreover, prompted by the experiences of ENDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, prospective carrier air-wing commanders and
other rising naval aviation leaders now routinely spend upward of a hundred
days forward deployed in the Central Command Air Forces’ new combined air
operations center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar for operational-planning familiarization in senior CAOC staff assignments before assuming their new command responsibilities. They also routinely attend the Air Force’s strike planning
course at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and later, having moved on to postcommand
billets, its week-long CFACC course at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
This convergence was not just a matter of the Navy’s accommodating to the
Air Force by seeking ways to work more easily with the latter’s ingrained practices. At about the time that CENTCOM was gearing up for the major combat
phase of IRAQI FREEDOM, the Air Force chief of staff, General John Jumper,
frankly conceded that some criticism of the ATO process had a legitimate basis.
Said General Jumper: “We take a rap in the Air Force about having a 72-hour
ATO cycle. . . . It is really not true. It’s the planning cycle that is 72 hours. The execution cycle can be instantaneous.” However, he went on to note, “There is a
point to that argument. . . . You go into an AOC [air operations center] today, and
what will you see? Tribal representatives sitting down in front of tribal
workstations, interpreting tribal hieroglyphics to the rest of us who are on
watch. And then what happens? They stand up and walk over to another tribal
representative, and reveal their hieroglyphics, which are translated by the other
21
tribe into its own hieroglyphics and entered into its own workstation.” His
point was a need for tighter horizontal integration of command and control
both within each service and across service lines in the interest of shortening the
sensor-to-shooter connection.
In this regard, with the advent of the global command-and-control system,
Link 16, and related cross-service connectivity improvements, the prospect has
finally emerged of joint operations by the two services that entail what two early
commentators on air-naval integration called “true interoperability, functional
22
integration, and order-of-magnitude improvement in capability.” This welcome prospect has arisen in part from the Navy’s development of cooperative
engagement capability (CEC) during the waning years of the Cold War. Responding to the stress in that period on space-based surveillance and to the need
to be capable of reacting to a common operating picture, CEC laid down the
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needed groundwork for closer operational convergence of the Navy with the Air
Force. As early as 1993, the Navy demonstrated cooperative engagement and its
potential by linking the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with the Air
Force’s Air Combat Command and the Army’s Forces Command, and subsequently Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic as well. Thus were planted the seeds of a
growing convergence by the Air Force with the Navy’s concept of networkcentric warfare. As the commander of Naval Air Systems
The fruits of integration were finally realized
Command remarked in 1999,
over Afghanistan in late 2001 and further
“We have spent this whole decade
clinched by the all but seamless joint combat
concentrating on better interperformance in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
operability. We learned a lesson in
Desert Storm that we have to pay more attention to operating with our counterparts. . . . We must be able to communicate freely—both in planning and in
operations—and many of the systems we have in development or deployed to23
day are aimed specifically at improving that ability.”
As a result of these developments, the second Gulf War, in 2003, featured a
more closely linked U.S. force than ever before. As one CENTCOM staffer put it,
24
“everything that had a sensor was connected.” To note a representative example, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln had a joint “fires” network and
CEC system that allowed strike-group participants to share radar information
and fire missiles on the basis of off-board information provided by other ships
in the battle group. This capability was expanded with the arrival of the carrier
USS Nimitz and the first Navy E-2C Hawkeye aircraft equipped with the system.
The joint fires network allowed carriers to receive imagery from airborne platforms and signals intelligence from the Air Force’s RC-135 Rivet Joint. Similarly,
the Multifunction Information Distribution System, a nodeless and secure, Link
16–based, jam-resistant tactical data link, also made a major difference, by enabling enhanced interoperability with other joint and multinational platforms
25
equipped with that capability.
As for other signs of progress toward greater cross-service integration in
strike warfare, there have been steady improvements in joint operations and
training between the Air Force and Navy since American combat involvement in
Vietnam ended more than three decades ago. For years, naval aviators have routinely taken part in the Air Force’s recurrent RED FLAG, a realistic large-force
employment training exercise that began in late 1975 and continues to be conducted roughly six times a year on the instrumented range complex north of
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Also, the Air Force’s and Navy’s undergraduate pilot training (UPT) programs are now fully integrated, with Air Force officers
commanding Navy primary UPT squadrons and vice versa. The two services
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continue as well to provide exchange officers to each other’s line squadrons and
flight-test units on a regular basis; a Navy lieutenant commander, for instance,
was recently assigned to fly the F-22A Raptor fifth-generation Air Force fighter
with the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron at Nellis. In addition, Navy E-2C
crew members regularly fly aboard the Air Force’s E-3 AWACS* whenever there
is an operational need for their presence at the console. Similarly, ever since the
Air Force retired its EF-111 electronic-warfare aircraft, not long after DESERT
STORM, Air Force aircrews have routinely been assigned to full tours of duty
with the Navy’s EA-6B shore-based expeditionary squadrons.
Furthermore, there have been recurrent cross-communication and crossfertilization between the Air Force’s and Navy’s weapons schools in an instructor exchange program that has experienced ups and downs since its inception
during the late 1970s. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Air Force
Weapons School produced three classes per year, the instructor exchange was a
standard, twice-yearly exercise. However, when the Air Force Weapons School
went to two classes a year and the Navy’s TOPGUN program moved from Naval
Air Station Miramar, California, to NAS Fallon, Nevada, those initial exchanges
began to die on the vine. There was none from 1999 until the most recent commander of the Air Force Weapons School’s F-15C Division pressed hard to reestablish the program, the first renewed exchange taking place in June 2006. The
exchange was adjudged by all participants to have been a great success, with useful and important lessons learned by both sides. Thanks to that success, a repeat
performance was scheduled for June 2007, the F-15C Division’s commander
having arranged to host a TOPGUN deployment to Nellis to keep a resurgent
26
yearly exchange program going.
Perhaps most constructively of all, the two services continue to bring their respective forces and combat-support assets together in a variety of joint training
and experimentation exercises aimed at further honing their interoperability
and extracting the most from their synergistic potential in effective strike operations. One such recent exercise brought Air Force and Navy air assets together in
the Alaskan operating environment in a scenario that focused on homeland security and entailed military responses to a range of simulated natural disasters
and terrorist events. That exercise, the 2005 iteration of the annual NORTHERN
EDGE series, featured the involvement of both a Navy surface maritime action
group and Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard aircraft, which took part in various
at-sea deterrence and defense operations over five days. Significantly, during this
evolution, the Navy exercised for the first time tactical control of an Air Force
AWACS in a maritime-operations scenario, and the participating Air Force F-15Es
* AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System.
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were controlled by the guided-missile destroyer USS Russell (DDG 59). After the
exercise ended, the maritime action group commander, Captain Vic Mercado,
reported that “the coordinated joint surveillance resulting in the call for a
show-of-force by the [Air Force] fighters was a highlight for the maritime operations, because it demonstrated a key exercise objective of cooperation and
27
interoperability among the services for homeland defense.”
Most recently, joint Air Force and Navy involvement in realistic large-force
training in a maritime setting occurred during Exercise VALIANT SHIELD ’06, a
five-day evolution conducted in the vicinity of Guam from 19 to 24 June 2006.
Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, then commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, served as
joint force commander for the exercise, with Lieutenant General David Deptula,
commander of U.S. Pacific Command Air Forces’ Kenney Warfighting Headquarters at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, as his joint-force air component
commander (JFACC) and Rear Admiral Mark Emerson, commander of the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon, assigned as deputy JFACC. VALIANT
SHIELD involved the participation of some twenty-two thousand personnel, 280
aircraft, and thirty ships, including the aircraft carriers Kitty Hawk, Abraham
Lincoln, and Ronald Reagan and their respective air wings. The largest military
exercise conducted in Pacific waters since the Vietnam War, it represented the
first installment of what will become a regular biennial exercise series involving
various U.S. service branches and communities.
After the exercise ended, with nearly two thousand sorties having been flown
by all participating aircraft, General Deptula characterized it as “an opportunity
to interface large numbers of [American] air and sea forces together in a unique
environment and to work out some of what we call frictions. . . . You find out
things that might not go as you would have anticipated or planned. These types
of exercises allow us to work out those challenges in advance.” On the synergy
that was sought and achieved during the course of the joint-force exercise, he
added: “We’re not interested in what Navy or Air Force airplanes are doing separately. We take the approach that air power is air power, and we’re interested in
ensuring [that] we take a unified stance in working those assets together with
28
our sea-based assets in achieving the commander’s overall objectives.”
A NEW SYNERGY OF LAND- AND SEA-BASED STRIKE WARFARE
The unprecedentedly close integration of Air Force and Navy strike operations
during the first two American wars of the twenty-first century handily confirmed the observation of a respected ship-design specialist when he wrote in
1998 that “carrier-based and land-based tactical aircraft, as well as the CONUS
[continental United States]-based Air Force bomber force, are intertwined in their
support of each other.”29 To be sure, the two services have long paid lip service to
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their mutually reinforcing potential in their declaratory rhetoric. Yet in the increasingly competitive annual budget battles within the Pentagon, the
strike-warfare components of the Air Force and Navy have all too often appeared as though they were mainly devoted to putting each other out of
business.
The real-world experience described above, however, strongly suggests that
when it comes to the crucial matter of integrated strike-warfare operations, the
two services are, and should duly regard one another as, natural allies in the roles
and resources arena. They did not compete with each other in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM but rather supported one another in the
successful pursuit of joint campaign objectives. Indeed, when viewed from an
operational rather than a bureaucratic perspective, the Air Force’s and Navy’s
long-standing involvement in air-delivered conventional force projection are
complementary rather than competitive in the service of joint force commanders; land-based bombers and fighters and carrier-based fighters are not duplicative and redundant but rather offer overlapping and mutually reinforcing as well
as unique capabilities for conducting joint strike warfare (see the Venn diagram,
30
which captures this unique interrelationship).
For example, Air Force long-range bombers can penetrate deeper beyond littoral reaches than can carrier-based strike fighters supported solely by organic
tanking. They also can launch directly from their home bases in the United
States, if no carrier strike group is positioned within immediate reach of a designated target area. Unlike bombers,
ATTRIBUTES OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF AIR POWER
however, carrier air power can provide a sustained presence as long as
may be required over a target area
once it is in place and provided with
the requisite nonorganic tanker support. The greatest liability of aircraft
carriers for immediate crisis response is that they may not be close
enough on short notice to where
they are most needed. In sharp contrast, the greatest advantage of
long-range bombers is that they can
be over a target complex anywhere in
the world within twenty hours of
takeoff. The downside for bombers,
however, is that they cannot loiter for
Source: Reproduced from Benjamin S. Lambeth Combat Pair: The Evolution of Air Force–Navy
Integration in Strike Warfare, MG-655-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2007),
pp. xi, 83.
long or regenerate striking power
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once their munitions have been expended, whereas carriers—especially with
more than one on station—can offer persistence once they are in place.
Therein lies the synergy offered by Air Force bombers and land-based fighters
and Navy carrier air wings when employed in an integrated fashion, as was amply demonstrated over Afghanistan and Iraq during the first two American wars
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As one commentator
noted in this regard long before those two wars bore compelling witness to his
observation, “bombers are quick to respond over vast distances to deliver very
large bomb loads to an increasing variety of targets, but they are not as responsive to quick-turnaround requirements. Carrier air provides a visible presence
and does not need anyone’s permission to ‘be there,’ but has limited assets and
potentially long deployment times. Theater-based attack air has the potential to
provide quick turnaround in high numbers and can deploy relatively quickly
but is dependent on a dwindling number of forward bases. In short, each element has strengths and weaknesses. To shortchange any one area is to hamstring
31
the nation’s ability to protect its global interests.”
One area in particular in which land-based and sea-based air power has a
symbiotic relationship that warrants further nurturing has to do with
nonorganic in-flight refueling. As was shown during operations ENDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, the participating Navy carrier air wings plainly
needed the support of long-range Air Force and allied tankers to generate missioneffective sorties on a sustained basis. Yet the tankers also needed the protective
screening against potential enemy threats that was offered by Navy fighters in a
situation in which land-based fighters were unavailable in sufficient numbers
due to the lack of adequate regional basing. For his part, especially in the case of
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM over remote Afghanistan, the air component
commander needed both force elements in order for the nation’s air weapon to
offer its greatest contribution to joint warfare, a fact that bore out the observation of one Air Force advocate almost a decade before that “there is a place on the
team for all the nation’s land, sea, air, and space forces,” with the only real ques32
tion being one of appropriate mix and affordability.
In both wars, to sum up, each service brought a needed comparative advantage to the fight. In the case of ENDURING FREEDOM, Air Force bombers flew
only around 10 percent of the total number of combat sorties but dropped
roughly 80 percent of the ordnance, including the preponderant number of
satellite-aided JDAMs. For its part, although the Navy needed the support of Air
Force tankers to be mission effective, its sea-based strike fighters operating off
the coast of Pakistan from the north Arabian Sea provided an essential combat
capability in a part of the world where the Air Force both lacked the needed access to operate its fighters most efficiently and remained limited in the number
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of fighter sorties it could generate even after it finally achieved its needed access.
The reason for the latter was the substantially greater distances to Afghanistan
from forward land bases in the Persian Gulf that demanded fighter missions
lasting as long as fifteen hours, which were unsustainable by the Air Force over
the long haul.
In both cases, carrier air power, long-range bombers, land-based tankers, and
land-based fighters were all eventually available and ready for CFACC tasking
when the time came, and all four force elements were crucial to the timely
achievement of the joint-force commander’s declared objectives. Rather than
continuing to engage in pointless either-or arguments over carrier versus
land-based air power that miss this overarching point, Air Force and Navy proponents should instead be using their recent combat experience as a model for
seeking ways, as one writer put it over a decade ago, to “enhance the synergy of
the air power triad of long-range projection forces” consisting of bombers,
land-based fighters, and sea-based fighters that, taken together, make up the na33
tion’s overall air power equation. The former commander of Naval Air Force,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Vice Admiral John Mazach, gave clear voice to this critically
important point when he reflected after the Afghan air war: “Rather than pitting
one variant of air power against the other, . . . Enduring Freedom convincingly
demonstrated that such 20th-century interservice rivalries have no place in the
21st-century U.S. warfighting establishment. The operation was remarkable for
its degree of seamless interoperability between the U.S. Air Force and the Navy–
Marine Corps team’s sea-based aviation. . . . In short, aircraft carriers and
[land-based] bombers should not be viewed as competitors for resources, but as
34
partners able to leverage unique synergies on the modern battlefield.”
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Air Force and Navy integration in aerial strike warfare has shown remarkable
progress in the nearly two decades since DESERT STORM, when such integration
could be fairly said to have been all but nonexistent. By the frank admission of
key participants in both services, that process still has a way to go before it can be
rightly described as having fully matured. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt
that the strike-warfare arena is now by far the most developed area of force integration in the nation’s joint-operations repertoire. Indeed, one can safely say
that it has now progressed to a point where it can be showcased as an object lesson in the sorts of closer integration that can be successfully pursued by the Air
Force and Navy in other mission areas where the air and maritime operating mediums intersect, as well as by the Air Force and Army, for that matter, when it comes
to joint air-land operations.35
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As for still-unresolved issue areas between the two services where further
work can be done in the interest of closer Air Force–Navy integration, senior
leaders in each service have often cited continued communications shortcomings as one important problem area in need of further attention. Within that
arena, bandwidth limitations remain, by all accounts, a major constraint on the
implementation of many good-in-principle ideas in the realm of C4ISR integration that could bring the services more closely together as a joint warfighting
team. One step toward a possible resolution, in the views of both Air Force and
naval warfighters, would be a dynamic bandwidth management system that automatically prioritizes incoming messages.
Another persistent sore spot between the Air Force and Navy, at least from the
Navy’s perspective, has to do with a rapidly looming problem in the electronicattack mission area. When the Air Force decided to retire its twenty-four aging
EF-111 Raven electronic jammer aircraft not long after DESERT STORM, primarily because of excessive upkeep costs, the Navy and Marine Corps picked up the
tactical electronic-attack mission with their now greatly overworked EA-6B
Prowlers, with the result that those aircraft became, to all intents and purposes,
high-demand/low-density national assets. That arrangement has, by and large,
worked satisfactorily until now, but the EA-6Bs are rapidly running out of service life, the first replacement EA-18G Growlers will not enter fleet service until
2009 at the earliest, and the interservice memorandum of agreement that made
the Navy the lead service in the provision of standoff jamming after DESERT
STORM expires in 2011. Accordingly, senior naval aviation leaders insist that the
Air Force will soon have to decide, conjointly with the Navy, what it intends to do
36
by way of proceeding with timely gap-filler measures.
Still other possible joint ventures worth exploring in the training arena by the
Air Force and Navy might include

• More recurrent exercises between the two services, to include greater Air
Force involvement in Navy carrier air-wing predeployment workups at Naval Air Station Fallon and more Navy participation in Air Force RED FLAG
and other large-force training evolutions, as instruments for spotlighting
persistent cross-service friction points

• Greater joint reliance on distributed mission simulation, which will entail
high buy-in costs but can offer substantial long-term payoffs as fuel and associated training costs continue to soar

• A more holistic look at the joint use of training ranges, perhaps with a view
toward ultimately evolving to a truly national range complex
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• More comprehensive joint use of realistic adversary threats in training, not
only in air but also in space and cyberspace operations

• Extending integrated air-warfare training to the surface and subsurface Navy
• Enlisting the real-time involvement of air operations centers worldwide.
Many such initiatives are already being cooperatively pursued, or at least carefully considered, by the Air Force Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base and the
Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, with
the primary limiting factor being insufficient funds to support them.
As for additional areas of possible closer Air Force and Navy cooperation that
pertain more to investments in equipment and hardware capability, the two services could usefully consider

• Continued pursuit of ways of bringing their connectivity systems into
closer horizontal integration

• Greater attention to exploiting the promise of new electronic-warfare
means in joint warfare

• Getting the greatest operational leverage for the least cost out of the highcommonality F-35 multirole combat aircraft that both services will be acquiring in the coming decade

• Further coordination in setting agreed integration priorities.
Finally, in the studies and analysis arena, one potentially high-payoff initiative that would cost essentially nothing beyond a determined Air Force and Navy
effort to devote the right talent to it would be a careful review of any and all archived aircrew mission reports and other records associated with past training
exercises and actual contingency-response operations since DESERT STORM in
search of any friction points that may still be in need of cooperative attention
and correction by both services.
Even with this much room remaining for further progress, however, the overall
record of Air Force and Navy accomplishment in integrated air-warfare planning
stands as a resounding good-news story that is a credit to each service both separately and together. As such, it offers a role model for what can be done along similar lines elsewhere, not just in the interface between air and maritime operations,
but even more so in the still-troubled relationship between the Air Force and
Army when it comes to the most efficient conduct of joint air-land warfare. Furthermore, the operational integration described above had to overcome multiple
barriers and the most deeply ingrained resistance to change in both services. The
fact that organizations, especially military organizations, tend to resist rather than
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embrace change makes the history and experience described above all the more
remarkable.
More encouraging yet, thanks to the guiding role played by individuals in
both services with the right focus and a determination to act on it, there is now a
well-ensconced successor generation in place in both the Air Force and the Navy
who grew up as line aircrew members during the formative years of this integration process. Those individuals have since migrated through such midlevel positions as CAOC night coordinators, combat plans and operations staffers, and
strategy division principals to the more senior flag ranks and positions that will
help them ensure that the strike-warfare communities in both services continue
to pursue an increasingly common operational culture. Today, such commonality of purpose at the operational and tactical levels has become more important
than ever as the nation finds itself increasingly reliant on the combined-arms
potential that is now available in principle to all services for continuing to prosecute counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations, while hedging also
against future peer or near-peer competitors at a time of almost unprecedented
lows in annual spending for force modernization.

NOTES

This article is extracted and adapted from the
author’s recent RAND study Combat Pair:
The Evolution of Air Force–Navy Integration in
Strike Warfare, MG-655-AF (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2007).

5. Lt. Dennis Palzkill, USN, “Making Interoperability Work,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1991), p. 52.
6. James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson,
Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942–1991 (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 115.

1. Lt. Gen. Tad Oelstrom, USAF (Ret.), Director,
National Security Program, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University,
e-mail to the author, 1 June 2006, commenting on Benjamin S. Lambeth, American Carrier
Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century,
MG-404-NAVY (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, 2005).

7. Vice Adm. William A. Owens, USN, “The
Quest for Consensus,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (May 1994), p. 68.
8. Strike Fighter Squadron 87, “Aircraft—Yes,
Tactics—Yes, Weapons—No,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1991), p. 55.

2. Vice Adm. Evan Chanik, USN, then-Director,
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
(J-8), Joint Staff, conversation, Washington,
D.C., 1 August 2006.
3. Maj. Gen. John L. Barry, USAF, and James
Blaker, “After the Storm: The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and Navy,” Naval
War College Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001),
p. 122.

9. Cdr. James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, “It’s Time
for a Revival,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1992), p. 34.
10. Adm. William A. Owens, USN (Ret.), High
Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted
World (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1995), p. 4.
11. Ibid., p. 96.

4. Ibid.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

53

48

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 1, Art. 21

12. The full citation of the 17-page document
was U.S. Navy Dept., . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: 1992).
13. Owens, High Seas, p. 49.
14. For a full treatment of that joint air war, see
Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring
Freedom, MG-166-CENTAF (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).
15. William M. Arkin, “Old-Timers Prove Invaluable in Afghanistan Air Campaign,” Los
Angeles Times, 10 February 2002.
16. The first CAOC director for ENDURING FREEDOM, Air Force then–Maj. Gen. David
Deptula, summed it up this way: “What was
amazing to me in the CAOC was the seamless
nature of the way the components worked. . . .
It was just great, it was so refreshing, particularly between the SOF folks, the Navy, and us
[in the Air Force]. . . . I have good things to
say about the Navy. It really, really worked
well in the CAOC.” Comments by General
Deptula on an early draft of the author’s
RAND study Air Power against Terror, 24 January 2004.
17. Barry and Blaker, “After the Storm,” p. 130.
18. Kim Murphy and Alan C. Miller, “The Team
That Picks the Targets,” Los Angeles Times,
March 2003.
19. Williamson Murray and Maj. Gen. Robert H.
Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap,
2003), p. 114.
20. Vice Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN, “This
Was a Different War,” interview, U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (June 2003), p. 30.
21. Mark Hewish, “Out of CAOCs Comes Order,” Jane’s International Defense Review
(May 2003), p. 22.
22. Barry and Blaker, “After the Storm,” p. 118.
23. Vice Adm. John A. Lockard, USN, “Affordable
Readiness for the Operator: 21st-Century Aviation Solutions Enable Dominance from the
Sea,” interview, Sea Power (June 1999), p. 8.
24. Thomas E. Ricks, “What Counted: People,
Plan, Inept Enemy,” Washington Post, 10
April 2003.

25. Capt. David C. Hardesty, USN, “Fix Net
Centric for the Operators,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 2003), p. 69.
26. Lt. Col. Andrew Croft, USAF, Commander,
433rd Weapons Squadron, Nellis Air Force
Base, Nevada, e-mail to the author, 4 April
2007.
27. Lt. Denise Garcia-Barham, USN, “U.S. Warships Complete Exercise in Alaska,” Navy
NewsStand, 26 August 2005.
28. Capt. Yvonne Levardi, USAF, “Air Ops Center Wraps Up Valiant Shield,” news release,
Office of Public Affairs, Kenney Warfighting
Headquarters, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, 26 June 2006.
29. Reuven Leopold, Sea-Based Aviation and the
Next U.S. Aircraft Carrier Design: The CVX,
MIT Security Studies Program Occasional
Paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, January 1998), p. 11.
30. This figure is a development of a most instructive graphic that originally appeared
in David A. Perin, Angelyn Jewell, Barry F.
McCoy, and Stephen C. Munchak, Comparing Land-Based and Sea-Based Aircraft:
Circumstances Make a Difference (Alexandria,
Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1995).
31. Lt. Col. Gene Myers, USAF (Ret.), “Bomber
Debates,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(August 1996), p. 35.
32. Col. Brian E. Wages, USAF (Ret.), “Circle the
Carriers: Why Does ‘Virtual Presence’ Scare
the Navy?” Armed Forces Journal International
(July 1995), p. 31 [emphasis added].
33. Myers, “Bomber Debates,” p. 36.
34. Vice Adm. John Mazach, USN (Ret.), “The
21st-Century Triad: Unconventional
Thinking about the New Realities of Conventional Warfare,” Sea Power (March
2002), p. 53.
35. For further discussion on this latter point, see
Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom,
Karl P. Mueller, and David T. Orletsky, Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New AirGround Partnership, MG-301-AF (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).
36. Vice Adm. James Zortman, USN, Commander, Naval Air Forces, conversation with

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21

54

War College: Winter 2008 Full Issue

V I R I BUS

Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, e-mail to the author, 28 January 2007.

NA
V

E
TH

S
TE

49

R COLLE
GE
WA
AL

UNITED S
TA

the author, 2006 annual meeting of the
Tailhook Association, Reno, Nevada, 8 September 2006; Rear Adm. Mark Emerson,
USN, Commander, Naval Strike and Air

LAMBETH

TO
M A RI VI C

RIA

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

55

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 1, Art. 21

James Holmes, a former battleship sailor, is an associate
professor in the Strategy and Policy Department of the
Naval War College. He was previously a senior research
associate at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. He earned a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, and is the author of
Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power
in International Relations (2006), the coauthor of Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to
Mahan (2007), and the coeditor of Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (2007).
Naval War College Review, Winter 2008, Vol. 61, No. 1

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21

56

War College: Winter 2008 Full Issue

“A STRIKING THING”
Leadership, Strategic Communications, and Roosevelt’s Great
White Fleet
James R. Holmes

T

he voyage of the U.S. Navy’s “Great White Fleet” constituted an exercise in
personal leadership on the part of President Theodore Roosevelt and in international leadership on the part of a United States announcing its arrival as a
world power. Sixteen battleships, eight armored cruisers, six torpedo-boat destroyers, and associated auxiliaries steamed out of Hampton Roads in December
1
1907, embarking on a world cruise. The fleet rounded South America before
standing out across the Pacific, stopping at a variety of ports of call along the
way. It passed through Malacca, the Bab el Mandeb, Suez, and Gibraltar before
returning home through the Atlantic. The vessels entered harbor in early 1909,
2
allowing “TR” to conclude his presidency on a triumphant note.
The voyage was “a striking thing,” to borrow the president’s words, in more
ways than one. The armada, the largest ever to attempt to circumnavigate the
globe, demonstrated an unprecedented naval capability, defying military experts who pronounced such a feat of seamanship impossible. While at sea, the
ships’ crews honed their tactical proficiency, conducting gunnery practice and
other exercises. While in port, they performed an important diplomatic function. And their exploits fired imaginations back home—which was precisely
3
TR’s intent.
Roosevelt advanced extravagant claims for the nautical enterprise he had superintended. “In my own judgment,” he wrote in his autobiography, “the most important service I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the
world.” This is quite a statement, coming from a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.4 TR
maintained that the cruise had invigorated the American national character,
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renewing Americans’ enthusiasm for seafaring pursuits, and that it had done so
while encouraging sea powers to police their geographic environs and discouraging them from imperial adventures in Asia and the New World.
It is worth revisiting this venture in American diplomatic and naval history
now, precisely a century hence, when the U.S. Navy is again fashioning a maritime strategy predicated on American leadership. To gain some analytical purchase, I briefly review James MacGregor Burns’s theory of leadership. I
introduce the concept of “strategic communications,” observing that the ability
to persuade domestic and foreign audiences is essential to each mode of leadership Burns identifies. I then apply these concepts to the historical record, evaluating the accomplishments TR asserted for the Great White Fleet in his
autobiography. My findings are at once of historical interest and of use for today’s framers of maritime strategy.
Despite his reputation for bombast, TR executed his diplomatic duties with
discretion, taking seriously the “speak softly” element of the West African proverb that inspired his “big stick” philosophy. His approach combined unbending
resolve on matters of principle with compromise on less critical matters, leaven5
ing diplomatic discourses with tact and good humor. Wielded deftly, seagoing
forces clearly make a useful instrument for this sort of statesmanship, beyond
their primary mission of waging war at sea. It behooves naval leaders to understand how basic tenets of leadership pertain to maritime strategy—now, as in
Roosevelt’s day.
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS AND MARITIME LEADERSHIP
Leadership is normally thought of as an individual quality. This is especially so
when considering a figure like Theodore Roosevelt, whose larger-than-life personality tends to overshadow his policy accomplishments. Most studies of leadership strive to explain how statesmen, soldiers, businessmen, and other
individual leaders inspire their followers, vectoring their energies toward desired ends. Lists of individual traits, coupled with tactics successful leaders purportedly employ, constitute the norm in such studies, many of which have the
feel of how-to manuals. In his classic work on leadership, by contrast, Burns
proffers a richer working definition of this elusive quality: “Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in combination or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological,
6
and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”
Burns divides leadership into two broad categories: “transactional” and
“transformational.” For him, transactional leadership involves exchanging
7
“goods or services or other things in order to realize independent objectives.”
There is clearly a strong material aspect to leadership. Self-interest counts.
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More interesting—and just as relevant to Roosevelt and the expedition of the
Great White Fleet—is transformational leadership. A common assumption
8
about leadership is that leaders lead, followers follow. This imputes a certain
passiveness to subordinates in an institution or group. Defying such assumptions, Burns posits an interactive dynamic between leaders and the led, presupposing a real or latent community of motives and values that leaders can tap.
Whereas transactional leadership, exercised honorably and fairly, can help all
parties to the transaction realize their material aspirations, transformational
leadership “is more concerned with end-values, such as liberty, justice, equality.
9
Transforming leaders ‘raise’ their followers up through levels of morality.”
An interactive relationship also implies that there are limits to leadership.
People are not as malleable as many scholars of leadership suggest. From time to
time TR ran up against these limits—notably in the bitter dispute over Japanese
immigration, which at one point
threatened to precipitate war—as
Theodore Roosevelt’s maritime leadership
10
he grudgingly conceded. If pubincorporated the message that the United
States was a worthy steward of certain universal lic communications can tax the
skills of American presidents,
ideals of good government.
who enjoy a “bully pulpit” by virtue of their office, this is even more true in diplomacy, which by nature represents communication across national and cultural lines. Exerting political
leadership is no simple prospect—but robust seagoing forces can help.
While Roosevelt lacked James MacGregor Burns’s vocabulary for discussing
leadership, he likely would have accepted depiction of himself as a practitioner
of transformational leadership. His writings and speeches are replete with exhortations to moral virtue, “true Americanism,” and the “strenuous life” lived by
11
those possessed of a martial spirit. He regarded public office and the bully pulpit it affords as a medium for social uplift, presaging Burns’s concept of instilling
end-values. Also, while he would have taken a more skeptical view of
transactional leadership, in light of his lifelong crusade against corruption and
patronage, he probably would have acknowledged that offering public goods
was central to effective leadership—both at home and abroad—provided such
goods were bestowed in an aboveboard manner, accountable to the public.
For TR, combining transactional and transformational leadership was intrinsic to prudential statecraft—the art of promoting lofty ideals through
pragmatic means, abiding by the limits of the possible. Burns’s analysis can be
carried a step farther. In the international domain, nations, like statesmen, can
12
exercise transactional and transformational leadership. A nation’s capacity
to do so, particularly in efforts at transformation, is in large measure a func13
tion of its leadership’s skill at strategic communications. This would have
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been an uncontroversial notion for Roosevelt, who beseeched nations to follow
14
the same standards—notably the Golden Rule—expected of individual citizens.
RENEWING AMERICA’S SEAFARING ETHOS
Now, we turn to some specifics. What benefits accrued from dispatching the battle fleet around the world? “My prime purpose,” declared TR, “was to impress
the American people; and this purpose was fully achieved.”15 His confidant
Alfred Thayer Mahan listed national character—a people’s propensity for nautical endeavors—among his six attributes of sea power. Roosevelt heartily agreed,
although he did not cite Mahan’s works as authority for the healthful effects the
16
world cruise would bring. Much as the Founding Fathers had constructed a
“usable past” to inspire the loyalties of Americans, binding the fractious new Re17
public together, TR hoped to create a new tradition that prized great sea power.
That public sentiment was the propellant for seaborne pursuits must have
seemed self-evident to President Roosevelt, concerned as he was with nurturing
the national character. Turning America’s gaze seaward was his uppermost concern in ordering the Great White Fleet to sea.
Nations too should behave virtuously. Roosevelt transposed his vision of individual virtue into the international realm, holding nations to the same standards as those governing ordinary citizens’ conduct. The better-off in American
society should work to improve the lot of those impoverished during the Industrial Revolution. Just as the doctrine of noblesse oblige enjoined individuals to
exert themselves on behalf of the common good, so governments should maintain order while improving the health, welfare, and morals of the body politic.
Also, just as he saw enlivening and channeling America’s national character in
the right direction as part of his writ in domestic statecraft—Progressive politics allowed the United States to claim its rightful place in the vanguard of “civilization”—
he saw preserving and extending civilization as part of America’s writ in diplomatic and military affairs.
The upshot: TR applied the same principles to both domestic and international affairs. Affirmed Elihu Root, his secretary of war and later his secretary
of state, whom the president affectionately described as “the brutal friend to
18
whom I pay the most attention”:
The fundamental convictions of his political philosophy were in perfect accord with
this way of treating international questions. Those convictions which he applied in
practice to government and social organization were identical with the basis upon
19
which the law of nations rests and must necessarily rest if it is to endure.

To employ Burns’s taxonomy of leadership, President Roosevelt’s motives and
purposes in ordering the fleet around the world included stimulating interest and
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enthusiasm for sea power among an American populace that had long avoided foreign political entanglements, allowing its navy to atrophy. Roosevelt admitted his
quest for sea power faced stiff political opposition, concentrated among influential
newspapers and the remnants of the anti-imperialist movement—a movement led
by the likes of Mark Twain and Andrew Carnegie—that had opposed annexing the
20
Philippines.
To overcome determined opposition, TR hoped to encourage and satisfy
what he believed was Americans’ innate propensity to the sea. He summoned up
political and psychological resources. Transactional leadership played its part.
Like Mahan, Roosevelt pointed out that sea power conferred tangible benefits,
including not only the safety of American shores from foreign naval attack but
also assured access to the international trade and commerce on which an economy wracked by depression—the 1893 crash was comparable to the Great
Depression—seemed to depend. Mahan had depicted commerce, overseas
21
bases, and merchant as well as military shipping as the “pillars” of sea power.
Self-interest beckoned America to the oceans after a century of apathy toward
the republic’s aquatic surroundings.
TR also put his bully pulpit to good use, giving his exercise of leadership
strong transformational overtones. He appealed to Americans’ sense of national
mission as well as to their commercial and security interests. Elihu Root aptly
described Roosevelt’s approach to strategic communications toward domestic
audiences. Root observed that what Roosevelt called “the peace of justice” rested
22
on two grounds: first, his conviction that “a very rich people incapable of defending its independence and its citizens against aggression” would tempt “some
other nation of predatory instincts” to prey upon it, and second, his belief that
no nation can exercise a helpful influence upon the development of civilization unless it commands the respect which follows from a recognition that its adherence to
peaceful methods and its regard for the rights of others comes from power controlled
by justice and not from weakness controlled by fear. The sending of the battleship
fleet around the world was a gesture designed to strike the imagination of the nations
including the United States with a conviction that this was the kind of judgment to
which the United States was entitled.23

Theodore Roosevelt’s effort at maritime leadership, then, incorporated the
message not only that the United States was entitled to defend its own national
interests—practitioners of realpolitik conceded this right to all nation-states—
but also that it was a worthy steward of certain universal ideals of good government, namely, those embedded in his Progressive politics. The cruise of the
Great White Fleet telegraphed this message to domestic audiences in vivid
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terms, earning acclaim even from many staunch opponents of his assertive for24
eign policy.
GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE
Impressing foreign peoples was likewise important, observed Roosevelt, and
“positive achievement” was the best way to do so. The “two American achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the first dozen years of this
century [were] the digging of the Panama Canal and the cruise of the battle fleet
around the world.”25 He might have added that conjoining these endeavors with
a forceful interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine helped rouse popular support
at home for an ambitious, maritime-intensive foreign policy.
26
In 1904, Roosevelt fashioned a “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. When
the Dominican Republic defaulted on its foreign debt and European intervention seemed imminent, TR informed Congress that “chronic wrongdoing” or
“governmental impotence” preventing Caribbean governments from meeting
27
their foreign obligations warranted preventive U.S. intervention. The United
States would forestall violations of the doctrine by stepping in itself. “If we are
willing to let Germany or England act as the policeman of the Caribbean,” proclaimed Roosevelt, “then we can afford not to interfere when gross wrongdoing
occurs. But if we intend to say ‘Hands Off ’ to the powers of Europe, then sooner
28
or later we must keep order ourselves.”
He therefore claimed the right to deploy “an international police power”
when governmental incompetence in the Caribbean basin threatened to leave
American territory in the hands of European powers—especially Kaiser Wilhelm’s
Germany. In TR’s day, a common practice among the great powers was to send
warships to seize the customhouses of weak American governments that had refused or been unable to honor their foreign debts. Europeans would use these
governments’ tariff revenues—their chief source of income—to repay their aggrieved creditors. This left imperial powers in possession of American territory—
territory that could be used to base warships. Roosevelt feared Europeans would
use debt collection as an excuse to establish naval bases in the Caribbean basin,
endangering the independence of American republics and the vital American
interest in free navigation.
Indeed, the geostrategic value of secure sea communications with the Isthmus of Panama, a geographic feature Mahan had described as the “gateway to
29
the Pacific for the United States,” could hardly be overstated. A canal would
spare commercial or naval shipping originating in East Coast ports the arduous
voyage around South America. American ships would enjoy more direct communications with the modest Pacific empire won from Spain in 1898, not to
mention easier access to the China trade. Last but not least, the U.S. Navy could
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concentrate its Atlantic and Pacific fleets far more readily—bolstering the battle
fleet’s ability to discharge its defense and police duties in critical waterways.
TR thus did not regard the doctrine as a pretext for U.S. hegemony over the
30
Western Hemisphere—or so he said; it was, rather, an expression of American
31
leadership of a joint defense against European great-power pretensions. He
questioned whether democratic regimes could sustain consistent policies; the
doctrine offered a rare standard around which to rally Americans for grand
foreign-policy enterprises. Accordingly, he declared that “it would be well were
we sufficiently farsighted steadily to shape our policy with the view to the ultimate removal of all European powers from the colonies they hold in the western
hemisphere.”32 He assumed that all American republics shared an interest in preventing Europe from partitioning the Americas, as it had much of Asia and Africa.
Sending to sea a U.S. Navy able to fend off European encroachment thus advanced mutual security objectives. To assuage fears of American hegemony,
however, American statesmen had to communicate clearly that their nation had
no desire to dominate its neighbors politically or militarily, taking on a hegemonic role of its own. This was a
real fear in Latin America. In
For TR, combining transactional and
1895, Richard Olney, President
transformational leadership was intrinsic to
Grover Cleveland’s secretary of
prudential statecraft.
state, had injected himself—
uninvited—into a territorial dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. The American “fiat [was] law” on
matters it deemed of vital interest, decreed Olney—primarily because the U.S.
33
Navy could enforce America’s will throughout the hemisphere. He cited the
Monroe Doctrine as authority for this “fiat,” illustrating how Monroe’s defensive precepts could be abused to justify meddling in Latin American affairs.
Roosevelt, by contrast, declared that he wanted to interfere in fellow American republics as little as possible, consistent with such goals as digging the
34
all-important isthmian canal. He accentuated the self-restraint implicit in his
international police power—foreshadowing his emphasis on the Great White
Fleet’s constabulary mission. “I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to
do” in the Dominican Republic, he assured his friend Joseph Bucklin Bishop,
who had questioned his motives for intervening on the island. “As for annexing
the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor
35
might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to.” Furthermore, he disavowed
plans for thrusting wide-ranging reform on the island: “If I possibly can I want
to do nothing to them. If it is absolutely necessary to do something, then I want
36
to do as little as possible.”
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In effect he wanted to show Latin Americans that they were not replacing one
imperial menace—Europe—with another one far closer to home. In 1906, he
sent Secretary of State Root on a goodwill tour of the region. Thomas Bailey
credits Root’s diplomacy, coupled with the numerous South American port vis37
its of the battle fleet in 1907–1908, with easing worries about U.S. intentions.
Dr. Luis Drago, the Argentine foreign minister, summarized the Monroe Doctrine as “the traditional policy [by which] the United States without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance condemned the oppression of the
nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great
Powers of Europe.” TR congratulated Drago for discerning the “true attitude” of
38
the United States toward its southern neighbors.
DETERRING AND CONCILIATING JAPAN
Demonstrating strength, responsibility, and forbearance was at the core of Roosevelt’s Asia policy as well. TR was a great admirer of Japan, which had vaulted
into the front rank of progressive civilization within a few generations of its
opening to the outside world. The Japanese—unlike the Chinese, who were enduring a prolonged period of decay, weakness, and imperial exploitation that
aroused TR’s contempt—embodied the manly virtues he extolled. “What wonderful people the Japanese are!” he exclaimed to his friend Cecil Arthur Spring
Rice, a British diplomat. “They are quite as remarkable industrially as in warfare.
39
. . . [Japan] is now a great power and will be a greater power.” Consequently, “I
wish to see the United States treat the Japanese in a spirit of all possible courtesy,
40
and with generosity and justice.”
Indeed, TR considered Japan a worthy partner in the advanced nations’ effort
to police the developing world. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900–1901, for instance, Roosevelt hoped that Japan would join the Western powers to intervene
41
in China, chastening those he regarded as bandits. (Tokyo did deploy troops as
part of the German-led expeditionary force.) Giddy at the success of Japanese
arms against Russia in 1904, when the Imperial Japanese Navy smashed a Russian fleet at Tsushima, Roosevelt proclaimed that Japan had a “paramount interest”
in the Yellow Sea basin similar to the one the United States claimed in the Caribbean. “I thought it for the interest of all the world,” he reported telling one Japanese
42
official, “that each part of the world should be prosperous and well policed.”
In Burns’s terms, Roosevelt believed a community of interest united Japan
with the Western world. He wanted to entrust this new Asian power (along with
certain nations in Europe and the Americas) with the same international police
authority he had reserved for the United States in his corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. Accordingly, notes Bailey, “throughout the cruise the function of the
43
navy as a police force and not as a threat was constantly emphasized.” (To be
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sure, Roosevelt’s narrative of the cruise as an innocuous venture was not universally embraced. Warned Commander Taniguchi Naomi, the Japanese naval
attaché in Washington, “The cruise was aimed at not only enhancement of mili44
tary efficiency in time of war but also implicitly at intimidating Japan.”) In a
very real sense, then, the voyage presaged today’s efforts to assemble a Global
Maritime Partnership to police regional seas for terrorists, pirates, and traffickers in weapons-related goods.
Whether a fleet of armored, heavily gunned men-of-war built for Mahanian
fleet actions offered the best tool for international police work was another
question—hence Tokyo’s ambivalence toward TR’s foray into maritime leadership. Then as now, reconciling navies’ war-fighting and constabulary functions
was a delicate matter. However successful his attempt to organize international
police efforts might be, Roosevelt realized that great-power policemen would
themselves need policing should their realpolitik ambitions overreach. His solu45
tion was to build up countervailing power as a strategic hedge. Demonstrating
the U.S. Navy’s capacity to fight in Asian waters, he believed, would deter Japanese adventurism while consolidating the shared interests he believed had coalesced with Japan’s entry into the civilized world. Of the world cruise, he stated,
46
“I regard it really as a peace measure.”
Encouraging Japan to assume a leadership role of its own while discouraging
it from using maritime leadership as a pretext for territorial conquest was essential. Proving the United States could defend the islands wrested from Spain in
1898—in particular the Philippine Islands, the platform for American sea power
in Asia—was central to Roosevelt’s Japan policy and strategy. The islands
brought great geopolitical advantages to an America jealous of its share of the
China trade, but they also threatened to embroil the United States in controversies or even conflict. “The Philippines form our heel of Achilles,” lamented TR.
“They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous.” Possessing
the Philippines without maintaining a fleet able to carry the fight into Asian seas
47
would represent “a veritable national calamity.”
The need to convince Tokyo that the U.S. Navy could hold the Philippines imparted a distinct operational component to TR’s exercise of maritime leadership. One of the president’s foremost concerns was to dampen the euphoria with
which the Japanese had celebrated their naval victory over Russia. Defeating a
European great power, he feared, might strengthen the hand of militarists in Tokyo,
emboldening them to attempt new conquests that would bring their nation into
conflict with Western powers. Geography had conspired against Russia, compelling the tsars to divide their navy. The Imperial Japanese Navy had exploited
Russia’s fragmentary naval power, using local supremacy to defeat first the Russian Pacific Squadron, then the Baltic Fleet Moscow dispatched in relief.
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Like Russia, the United States maintained fleets on opposite coasts, violating
the Mahanian maxim that a fleet should operate as a unified whole. TR feared
the Tsushima analogy would encourage Japan to embark on military expansion
inimical to the Philippines, America’s geostrategic Achilles’ heel, or to U.S. com48
mercial and diplomatic interests in continental Asia. “If any one lesson is taught
by the Russo-Japanese war, and indeed by naval history generally,” Roosevelt asserted, “it is that in the effort to protect even two important points a division of
49
force may mean the failure to protect either and the final loss of the war.”
He admitted there was some geostrategic risk to leaving American coasts unguarded during the world cruise, but he insisted that “I will not leave in one
ocean a considerable fragment of the fleet, not enough to stand by itself, but
enough to greatly weaken by its absence the remainder of the fleet.” The virtues
of concentration, he maintained, were “elemental.”50 To assure the Great White
Fleet enjoyed a preponderance of force over the Imperial Japanese Navy,
I want our fleet to be a unit. If there is war we must run the risk of raids on the Atlantic coast and accept the inevitable howl that will come, merely using such monitors
and torpedo vessels as are available, together with any unarmored cruisers, to try to
protect the Atlantic coast. When our fleet goes to the Pacific I want every battleship
and armored cruiser that can be sent to go.51

President Roosevelt downplayed European predictions that Japan would attack the U.S. fleet as it passed, setting back the cause of American sea power. At
the same time, he took this slight possibility seriously, asking Admiral Willard
Herbert Brownson “whether, if a war was started, we could build battleships
during the course of a year or eighteen months, so that if the war lasted that
length of time we could begin to have ships take the place of those we should
52
lose.” He also inquired whether the United States could stall for time, working
53
around Japan’s Mahanian naval strategy:
The German and English experts evidently believe that in the event of war, which
they (as I hope and believe, wrongly) think inevitable, the Japanese would at first
avoid a general engagement and trust to torpedo attacks and the like, and the long
distance from our base, gradually to wear our fleet down. Under such circumstances
I should like to know whether we could not ourselves play a waiting game by taking
advantage of the delay and our enormous wealth to build up the fleet.54

TR understood there were economic, industrial, and geographic elements to
a viable strategic-communications campaign vis-à-vis Tokyo. Japanese strategists expected the U.S. Navy to surge out across the Pacific in wartime, steaming
toward a Tsushima-like fleet engagement in Asian waters. Roosevelt sought to
deflate such expectations. If the United States deferred its offensive, it could exploit its vast material resources to build a navy capable of overcoming the
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tyranny of distance in the Pacific—and Japan’s attrition strategy—by virtue of
numbers. So the world cruise was something of a gamble, but at least, reasoned
55
TR, the fleet would be concentrated if trouble did come. Employed wisely, a
credible navy held major psychological potential, lending weight to his courteous yet firm Big Stick diplomacy.
A cautionary note is in order. The results of the world cruise vis-à-vis Japan
remain a matter of some dispute among historians. As discussed before, Burns
postulated an interactive relationship between leaders and led. This dynamic
sort of relationship is even more evident in international affairs, a milieu in
which the protagonists—nation-states—are formal equals possessing fewer incentives or disincentives than those available to leaders in an authority
relationship.
The Japanese, in short, were not mere passive objects of American leadership,
no matter how impressively or tactfully conducted. Whereas Bailey depicts the
naval diplomacy carried on by the Great White Fleet as an almost unvarnished
success, Howard K. Beale holds out the possibility that the fleet achieved only
short-term diplomatic gains, and only at the cost of empowering Japanese militarists over the long term. Determined never again to see their nation overawed by
the United States, this faction launched Japan into the militarized foreign policy
56
that culminated in World War II. Without taking sides in this debate, it is fair to
say that practitioners of U.S. maritime strategy should recognize the limits to nautical diplomacy, not to mention its unforeseen—perhaps unforeseeable—consequences. What may look to Americans like a friendly yet firm display of naval
force can look far different to foreign eyes.
LEADERSHIP IS FOR THE BOLD
Theodore Roosevelt saw seagoing forces as an instrument to help uphold vital
American interests, discourage territorial aggrandizement on the part of rival
great powers, and spread the blessings of civilization among the less advanced
nations, primarily those adjoining important waterways. In James MacGregor
Burns’s formula for leadership, the journey of the Great White Fleet served dual
transactional and transformational purposes. The U.S. Navy represented an important resource at TR’s command. According to proponents of the cruise, port
visits and exercises proved that the United States could project force not only
throughout critical waters in the Western Hemisphere but also into Asia, where
the rise of Japan might hold the islands wrung from Spain at risk. In short, the
Navy offered a potent deterrent against European or Japanese pretensions, lending persuasive force to American diplomacy.
With regard to transformation, fostering wide acceptance of the concept that
naval forces could perform constabulary duty, furthering the cause of
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civilization, was central to TR’s maritime leadership. His success depended on
the existence of sentiments among the advanced powers favorable to the endvalues expressed in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Guarding against governmental incompetence or malfeasance in the less advanced world, believed
Roosevelt, was an interest common to all advanced nations. During the voyage,
accordingly, administration spokesmen stressed the capacity of great-power naval forces to police a nation’s geographic environs. To ward off the perils implicit
in codifying a right of international intervention, the president hoped a balance
of naval power would check the ambitions of advanced nations tempted to pursue imperial expansion under the guise of police action.
It is fitting to round out an assessment of Theodore Roosevelt and the Great
White Fleet with some observations about Roosevelt’s personal leadership characteristics. While TR valued consensus in international affairs, he also reserved
the option of acting alone—even preventively, under his corollary—should a
lack of consensus obstruct what
he saw as the correct course of acThe armada, the largest ever to attempt to cirtion. He believed domestic and
cumnavigate the globe, demonstrated an unforeign audiences would ratify his
precedented naval capability.
policies if those policies yielded
concrete accomplishments. His
bias toward action—Henry Adams famously described him as “pure act,” while
Carl Schurz, vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League, marveled at his “master nature”—is worth bearing in mind when formulating and executing mari57
time strategy. If conducted adeptly, naval diplomacy can advance transactional
and transformational goals vis-à-vis both domestic and foreign audiences.
Roosevelt’s philosophy of decisive leadership manifested itself clearly in the
cruise of the Great White Fleet. “I determined on the move,” he recalled in his
autobiography, “without consulting the Cabinet. A council of war never fights,
and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not to take refuge behind the
58
timid wisdom of a multitude of councilors.” He also dared congressional opponents of the voyage to make good on their threat to defund it. “The fleet is to
go to the Pacific,” proclaimed TR, and it would stay there if Congress declined to
59
appropriate funds for its return. Because of the factors examined previously—
the need to show that the battle fleet could circumnavigate the globe, the need to
conciliate Latin America and deter Japan—he acted with his customary vigor,
60
leaving it to the American people and posterity to render judgment.
TR professed confidence that history would vindicate his handling of American foreign relations. In his final message to Congress, delivered in December
1908, the president proclaimed that his approach had derived from “the theory
that right must be done between nations precisely as between individuals.” He
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invited historians to scrutinize his and the nation’s efforts at leadership, maintaining that “in our actions for the last ten years we have in this matter proven
61
our faith by our deeds.” For architects of contemporary U.S. maritime strategy:
scrutinize away. Some insights from the Roosevelt era worth factoring into today’s strategic deliberations:

• U.S. maritime power offers a solid foundation for multinational police work.
American seagoing forces, not only the U.S. Navy but the Coast Guard,
can help Washington exercise transactional and transformational leadership. Despite its decline in numbers, the Navy remains preeminent in
Asia, supplying the international public good of maritime security for rising powers like China and India as well as such lesser powers as those
ringing the South China Sea. This frees Asian governments to apply national resources to economic development rather than large military
forces. Over time, moreover, cooperation between the United States and
the Asian nations on matters such as maritime counterterrorism and
counterproliferation may give rise to an international norm opposing
these universal scourges—much as TR hoped regional sea powers would
police their neighborhoods.

• National interests and perspectives intersect with police work. U.S. naval leaders should keep Burns’s apt depiction of leadership as an interactive process
squarely in view. While it might seem uncontroversial to Americans, for example, policing regional waters for items usable for building nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or ballistic missiles poses problems for some
governments. As China becomes more and more dependent on the seas for
energy security, Chinese leaders are increasingly wary of entrusting the security of vital sea lanes to the perhaps-fleeting goodwill of the United
States. Even India, which appears amenable to a strategic maritime partnership
with the United States and certainly covets the operational and tactical
benefits of working with the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, would likely balk
at any arrangement implying that New Delhi had accepted junior status in
the Indian Ocean—its rightful sphere of predominance, in Indian eyes. Assent in putatively universal ideals such as counterproliferation is far from a
foregone conclusion—much as U.S.-Japanese cooperation proved elusive in
the early twentieth century.

• Show how high-end capabilities contribute to police efforts. U.S. leaders should
consider the psychological impact of big-deck aircraft carriers—the latter-day
counterparts to TR’s battleships—on foreign audiences. Explaining the uses of
these behemoths for endeavors that promote common interests would advance
U.S. strategic communications—and thus the cause of American maritime
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leadership. TR mentioned, but only in passing, that the Great White Fleet
had paused on its homeward voyage to render assistance to earthquake victims
63
in Messina. This was an uncharacteristic oversight on his part. Today’s Navy
should make better diplomatic use of its nontraditional missions. The 2004–
2005 tsunami relief operation, for example, underscored the multiple missions
entrusted to U.S. naval forces. The future of any American-led seagoing partnership could depend as much on diplomatic skill as on operational and tactical
proficiency.
Effective strategic communications is the common denominator in
transactional and transformational leadership. Deterring foreign sea powers
while conciliating them is a delicate task. In Burns’s terms, arousing, engaging,
and satisfying the motives of skeptical powers such as China will challenge even
the best practitioners of strategic communications. Nor is success guaranteed. If
China, India, or some other prospective partner repeatedly rejects American
overtures, other motives may be at work. Even failed efforts to exercise maritime
leadership, however, can produce useful results. Whatever the case, there is no
substitute for sustained, painstaking diplomacy on the part of statesmen and naval leaders. International police work depends on it.
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CHINESE EVALUATIONS
OF THE U.S. NAVY SUBMARINE FORCE
Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray

T

he U.S. Navy submarine force has set the standard in undersea warfare for at
least half a century. America’s submarines made a vital contribution to victory in the Second World War, and they formed an elite force of truly innovative
capabilities during the “Cold War at sea” with the Soviet Navy. Since the end of
the Cold War, the submarine force has been a leader among U.S. military warfighting communities in transforming itself to remain relevant against militant
Islamist extremism and other emerging threats.
In such missions, the submarine force conducts strategic deterrence, intelligence and surveillance, extended-range land attack, and insertion of special
forces, in addition to forming the essential backbone of the Navy’s mission of
sea control—the all-important, enabling task of maintaining command of the
seas for the U.S. armed forces. With the launch of the first of the Virginia class in
2003, the Navy’s position at the forefront of global submarine forces was set for
the foreseeable future.
Perhaps partly inspired by the great successes of the U.S. submarine force, navies around the world have invested heavily in undersea warfare, especially in
submarine capabilities. China stands out among these
The authors are research faculty in the Center for
as an emerging submarine power. Over the last decade,
Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College
in Newport, Rhode Island. They are members (Dr.
Beijing has been building four different classes of boats
Goldstein is the founding director) of the College’s
while importing the Kilo-class diesel submarine from
China Maritime Studies Institute. The opinions exRussia in large numbers. Indeed, China’s intense focus
pressed in this report are those of the authors alone
and not the assessments of the U.S. Navy or any
on undersea warfare has led some to speculate that a
other entity of the U.S. government.
transpacific rivalry is already under way, at least with
respect to submarine capabilities. As policy makers in
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Washington grapple with the challenge of China’s rise, therefore, it may be wise
to consider how Beijing is approaching its evolving naval strategy dilemmas. This
article examines Chinese views of the American submarine force. As that submarine force constitutes one of the most vital elements of Washington’s overall
strategy for establishing and maintaining sea control in times of conflict, Beijing’s
assessment of those capabilities may be critical to uncovering the future evolution of this nascent rivalry.
More specifically, then, this research was undertaken for three reasons:

• The U.S. Navy submarine force is thought to represent a key capability
for conflict scenarios involving China.

• This part of the U.S. Navy has undertaken major efforts at transformation
within a new geostrategic and technological environment.

• The American submarine force represents a rather well-defined warfare
area and thus lends itself to a bounded research effort.
Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of publishing in China on all
subjects, including strategic and military-technical research. Thus, there are at
least five serious journals devoted to naval warfare and dozens of more technically oriented journals.1 In this project, well over a thousand Chinese articles were
surveyed, of which approximately 150 were judged worthy of closer scrutiny and
analysis by the research team. The danger of circularity—attributing to Chinese
analysts ideas that have simply been translated from original English-language
sources into Chinese—is real, but one that the research team carefully considered
throughout. Most Chinese journals now openly attribute English-language articles to their original sources. By and large, this kind of material (direct translation
from English) was not evaluated in this study, in favor of articles that appeared to
represent the actual opinions of Chinese naval and defense analysts.
This article is divided into five parts. The first section surveys Chinese reactions to a variety of current issues in the U.S. submarine force, including recent
deployments and incidents of special interest. A second section examines Chinese
evaluations of specific submarine force capabilities, focusing especially on new
factors (e.g., the development of SSGNs) that have been central to transformation efforts. Section three considers some critical historical issues, particularly
Chinese perceptions of U.S. submarine operations during the Cold War. A fourth
section considers how Chinese analysts believe their antisubmarine forces would
match up against the U.S. submarine force. Section five reviews Chinese perceptions regarding the overall future trajectory of the U.S. submarine force. A conclusion summarizes the article and offers policy recommendations.
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Overall, this article finds that Chinese naval analysts study the U.S. submarine
force in excruciating detail, as concretely manifested in thousands of both strategic and technical articles that focus on it.2 As one Chinese naval analyst puts it,
“Nuclear attack subs are the most worthwhile weapons investments because they
are the most survivable weapons platforms. . . . During a regional conflict, [U.S.]
nuclear attack submarines are the first in and last out.”3 Nevertheless, there is also
a keen appreciation that the U.S. Navy is focusing primarily on ongoing military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Writing in the official PLA journal 当代海军
(Modern Navy), one analysis declares, “The U.S. Navy’s capabilities to wage war at
sea are gradually declining, and open ocean warfare is already not a focal point.”4
Recognizing the potentially major role of the U.S. submarine force in China contingencies, another analyst suggests: “On the basis of a great quantity of research,
the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] believes that U.S. nuclear submarines are
very quiet, and difficult to discover and counterattack; at the same time, [their]
attack power is great, [and] must [be] restrain[ed].”5 Such assessments underline
the importance of a closer examination of Chinese perspectives concerning the
American submarine force.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
In order to give a sense of what Chinese analysts believe to be the trajectory of
U.S. submarine force development, it is useful to examine their assessments of
two significant recent events: the grounding of the Los Angeles–class submarine
USS San Francisco (SSN 711) and the stationing of nuclear-powered submarines
on Guam.
The Grounding of the USS San Francisco
The collision of San Francisco with an underwater mountain on 8 January 2005
greatly interested China’s naval press. The articles published then, which prominently feature official U.S. photos of the damaged vessel, express admiration that
a submarine that received such damage could have returned to port. This respect
is couched in terms of the fundamental strength designed and built into the ship,
however, not in terms of the critical factors of crew training and damage control. Author Qi Yaojiu, for example, wrote approximately four months after the
incident in a typical article, “In order to investigate battle damage strength, the
U.S. undertook strength tests [for submarines] under the conditions of nuclear
weapons detonation.” Additionally, “almost every U.S. submarine, before entering into active service, undergoes tests that use underwater explosives to evaluate
resistance to battle damage.”6
Notwithstanding this apparent respect, the author recognized that the damage
San Francisco incurred would have amounted to a “mission kill,” stating: “If the
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San Francisco collision had occurred during wartime, and crew members had experienced such wounds, the San Francisco would essentially lose its basic combat
effectiveness.”7 A realization that submarines do not have to be destroyed in order
to lose combat effectiveness could influence Chinese operational calculations.
Also characteristic of Chinese discussions of San Francisco’s grounding is an
undercurrent of bewilderment, asking in effect, “Why were they going so fast?”
The tone of analysis implies that such a high-speed transit is somewhat reckless.
Thus, one Chinese analyst states that “a nuclear submarine in the process of underwater high speed transit is confronting serious danger” and that “even some U.S.
Navy officials expressed that they could not understand the incident.”8 Another
author declares, “It is well known in all navies that as soon as a submarine enters
international waters in order to protect its stealth, the submarine will not rely
on its active sonar. Objectively speaking, a submarine at high speed that is not
operating its active sonar is in danger comparable to a vehicle without headlights
traveling in the pitch dark.”9 Perhaps because China’s submarine force consists
primarily of diesel submarines that rarely make high-speed, long-distance transits, the circumstances surrounding the collision seem peculiar to Chinese naval
analysts.
Chinese analyses of the San Francisco incident recognize the United States as
a world leader in submarine rescue.10 As one author observes, “Overall, the USN
employs the best submarine rescue vehicles and has the most extensive exercises,
so its submarine rescue capability leads the world.”11 This appraisal is corroborated in Modern Navy: “Over the last few years, the U.S. Navy has continuously
explored submarine rescue methods, and thus strengthened international cooperation, enhancing submarine rescue exercises with its allies. For us this represents a certain inspiration.” Moreover, the Chinese author states, “small groups at
various bases are alternatively ready for war or ready to go out and undertake the
rescue of an American or allied submarine at any time.”12 Even though the Chinese navy evidently has extreme respect for the U.S. submarine force, the analyses
of the San Francisco incident appear to show awareness that even this elite force
can make errors and must invest in cutting-edge rescue technologies.
SSNs in Apra Harbor
As might be expected, China’s naval press has watched the military buildup on
Guam with great interest, particularly that of the American submarines.13 A 2004
article in Modern Navy suggests, “The U.S. Navy has stationed three nuclearpowered Los Angeles–class attack submarines on Guam. At present, the U.S. military has considered dispatching an additional 6 nuclear submarines. . . . Deployment of such weapons would give the U.S. military considerable capacity to ‘gain
the initiative by striking first’ at us from the sea.”14
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The same journal a year later described the basing of nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs) on Guam in greater detail, observing that the United States officially reestablished Submarine Squadron 15 on Guam under Submarine Group
7 in February 2001 and deployed three nuclear-powered attack submarines there:
the first and second in fall 2002 and the third in summer 2004. Moreover, as administered by Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, the submarine group “on
the basis of troop deployment plans regularly dispatches 4–5 submarines under its 7th fleet jurisdiction. The duty period of these submarines is ordinarily 6
months. Each submarine can execute missions independently, or can attach to a
carrier battle group.”15
The operational significance of stationing SSNs on Guam is not lost on Chinese naval analysts. One observes that “if [a submarine] sets out from Guam,
especially in a Taiwan Strait crisis, it may only require 2 days or so.”16 A significant
finding of the present study is that even in official journals, Chinese analysts are
exploring Guam’s vulnerabilities. The same author notes that Guam, in addition
to conferring some advantages to the United States in a Taiwan crisis, also carries
self-defense vulnerabilities having strategic implications:
The U.S. military has still not established a defense system of anti-aircraft, antimissile, and other defense systems on Guam—[there exists] only a pittance of
coastal patrol forces. Once there are hostilities, Guam’s defense can only rely on
the U.S. Navy’s sea-based missile defense system and Air Force joint operations.
Consequently, in wartime, Guam’s defense is still a problem; also, because it is in
a special position surrounded on four sides by ocean at the intersection of three
major international sea lanes, it is impossible to defend effectively. If the other
side’s long-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, long-range
bombers or maritime special forces operations units, etc., can break through
Guam’s peripheral warning and defense, [to] destroy or seriously damage its naval
port, airfield, munitions warehouse, and communications system, [then] the
entire operational system of America in the Pacific Theater can become ineffective, its sustained warfare capability can greatly fall short of requirements [and] its
resolution and dynamics of military intervention would have to change.17

Regardless of the validity of their specific claims, then, it is clear that some Chinese analysts perceive Guam to be vulnerable to offensive attacks.
U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES
Having set the scene by reviewing major submarine force developments noted
by Chinese analysts, we now turn to a more comprehensive survey of the major American capabilities that have attracted their attention. These include nuclearpowered cruise missile–armed submarines (SSGNs) and Tomahawk cruise
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missiles, Trident submarines, fast attack submarines, sensors and systems, and
research and development.
SSGNs and Tomahawks
Chinese analyses demonstrate interest in the Navy’s four new SSGNs, their conversion from Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, and their mission areas.18 A
fairly typical article observes that
refitting focal points are refitting the first 1–2 of 24 ballistic missile launch tubes
for the use of special forces; tubes 3–10 into special forces use or for Tomahawk
cruise missiles; [and] tubes 11–24 for Tomahawk cruise missiles. After refitting,
the submarine can carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and 66 special forces personnel, a dock/shipyard cover, a frogman transport ship (SDV), and an advanced
Seal Transport System (ASDS).19

Although they clearly recognize the potential value of an SSGN’s embarked
special operations forces, Chinese analysts appear to be much more impressed by
the implications of one SSGN’s potentially large inventory of Tomahawk cruise
missiles and the high readiness rate that SSGNs will be able to maintain. One
perceptive article observes that these features will allow other ships to focus on
different mission areas:
After being refitted, SSGNs will be deployed 65% of the time each year on average. . . .
As such, the USN will always have at least 2 SSGNs ready for battle at any time,
and in wartime, 1 SSGN can take over the duties of many attack submarines and
surface ships. Once the SSGN goes into service, this will significantly reduce the
land attack burden shouldered by the surface fleet and allow it to focus on providing air defense against missile threats. At the same time, the SSGN will reduce the
land attack role of SSNs, enabling them to concentrate on anti-surface and ASW
[antisubmarine warfare] missions.

The same analysis also recognizes with some alarm that “it is conceivable that in
the future the arsenal ships could from a safe distance simultaneously rain 500
or more guided missiles upon several points of an enemy’s territory. Using [the
SSGN] would be stealthier and faster than an air raid by carrier based aircraft and
would also avoid pilot losses.”20
Chinese literature on SSGNs suggests anxiety regarding this capability and
what it may mean for Chinese forces. One analysis calculates that SSGNs will
allow the United States to engage in saturation attacks: “The ground forces that
have relied on the traditional deception against air attack, such as fake targets and
positions, will be severely tested under future conditions in which the U.S. armed
forces are able to employ saturation attacks by low-cost [cruise missiles].”21 Another analyst, however, points out that Tomahawks are expensive, estimating that
Tactical Tomahawks cost anywhere between 5.7 and 8 million dollars a round.22
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One Chinese lesson from the Kosovo conflict was that the United States does not
possess an infinite inventory of Tomahawk cruise missiles; even in that relatively
minor conflict, it adjusted its weapons stocks to cope with apparent resource
limitations.23
Trident Submarines
Chinese writings about SSBN capabilities express concern about potential U.S.
plans to place conventional warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
One scholar writes that “the new Trident II D5 can achieve a CEP [circular error
probable—generally, accuracy] of nine meters. Therefore, as far as point targets
are concerned, there already exists the ability to achieve nuclear destruction with
a conventional warhead.” This accuracy, he worries, might raise the risk of war
overall: “One can see that through lowering one’s own barriers to war, one can
more realistically deter the enemy. This undoubtedly reduces war’s actual combat
threshold.”24 This may reflect a Chinese concern that Trident conventionalization
could give the United States more ability to coerce China in a variety of combat
scenarios.
The nuclear deterrence provided by American nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarines (SSBNs) is well recognized in the majority of Chinese writings, as
is the significance of the shifting of five Ohio-class SSBNs (USS Pennsylvania,
Kentucky, Nebraska, Louisiana, and Maine) from the Atlantic to Pacific fleets from
2002 to 2005. This transfer occurred as the four oldest Ohio-class SSBNs, which
had all been stationed in the Pacific, were temporarily taken out of service for
conversion to SSGNs; the two transactions effectively rebalanced the American
SSBN force from a Pacific/Atlantic ratio of ten/eight to nine/five.25
Fast Attack Submarines
Chinese observers are intensely interested in and closely follow other modern
U.S. nuclear submarines, including the USS Jimmy Carter, Seawolf, and Hawaii.
Highly detailed, full-page color photos of Seawolf- and Virginia-class submarines
appear in China’s most prominent naval journals. These photos are usually accompanied by articles that imply an advanced state of technology and advanced
acoustic quieting. Thus, for example, Seawolf is described as having
an X type stern, [sic] employ[ing] a non-circulating main pump SbW [sic] pressurized water reactor, rel[ying] on natural circulation [of cooling water], thereby
reducing noise; us[ing] an advanced pump jet propulsor, [thereby] reducing noise,
us[ing] anechoic tiles on the hull. Anechoic tiles can absorb the enemy’s active
sonar survey waves as well as both separate and reduce the submarine’s own noise
radiation. Moreover, this ship’s own machinery power equipment also employs
[sound isolation] technology. These measures reduce the Seawolf-class’s noise level
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to 95 decibels, making it the world’s quietest submarine (ocean background noise
is 90 decibels, Kilo 636 noise is 105 decibels).26

Additionally, Chinese authors believe Seawolf possesses “beyond-first-class performance” and is regarded as the most sophisticated and lethal submarine yet to
go to sea, despite its “tortuous development history.”27
The Chinese also respect Virginia-class submarines for their advanced technology and quietness. An author in Modern Navy states that “compared with the
Sea Wolf–class submarine, the Virginia is slower and carries fewer weapons, but
is just as quiet. Its acoustic signature is lower than that of the improved model
of Russia’s Akula-class attack submarine and Russia’s fourth-generation attack
submarine that will hereafter be in active service.”28 Another analyst, in discussing
the Virginia class’s acoustic achievements, reports, “The Virginia-class has been
called ‘the world’s quietest submarine,’ with a cruising sound level that is only
1/10 that emitted by a Los Angeles class boat pierside.”29
The techniques used to build Virginia and its sister ships also evoke respect,
with one author noting, “The use of modular construction has been a major
breakthrough in the construction of the Virginia-class SSN. . . . This construction
method is a revolutionary breakthrough compared to the methods used to build
the Los Angeles–class.”30 Modular construction is widely perceived as a tremendous advantage, allowing the United States to “promptly design and build new
nuclear submarines on the basis of new circumstances and requirements.”31 Plans
for Virginia, it is implied, having been generated by computer-aided design tools
and relying on modular construction, could be used as the basis of a new SSBN
design.32 Chinese authors argue that Virginia’s impressive technology allows it to
“scout, reconnoiter, and keep watch from a concealed position using its modern
sensors to gather intelligence; analyze it; fix radar positions, missile bases, and
command centers; as well as watch and track warship movements.”33 The Virginia
class is thus seen as “a completely new attitude emerging on the world military
combat arena.”34 Some Chinese analysts believe “the U.S. will keep building Virginia class boats and the final number could exceed 30.”35
Los Angeles–class submarines receive significant attention from Chinese authors. One article on this class notes, “The American Navy believes that: nuclear
attack submarines are the most worthwhile weapons investments because they
are the most survivable weapons platforms, have the advantage of being stealthy,
and have become one of the premier threats at sea.”36 Another author rates their
performance as “outstanding,” with the reservation that although they have superior weaponry, they “might not [have proved] an effective counter to new types
of Soviet nuclear submarines.” This impending disparity, in turn, is credited with
precipitating U.S. follow-on designs.37 Still another observer notes that Los
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Angeles–class submarines are aging: “By the year 2020, the U.S. military intends to
have built 30 nuclear attack submarines. However, by the year 2016, all of the Los
Angeles–class submarines will exceed 30 years of service life”; the writer emphasizes the great expense of replacing them with Virginia-class vessels.38
Chinese naval observers regard American torpedo technology highly. Noting an enviable six decades of torpedo experience, one Chinese author observes,
“Since World War II and for a relatively long period, U.S. torpedo technology has
always been among the best in the world.”39 With specific reference to the Mark
48 heavyweight torpedo, another analyst assesses that “the [Mark 48] torpedo’s
outstanding effectiveness in all combat circumstances has been proven and it
can be used to attack surface ships, nuclear submarines, and also diesel electric
submarines.”40 The same author describes the aggressive U.S. torpedo-testing
program: “The USN has already carried out more than 6500 exercises and warshot firings [with the Mark 48], in addition to 20,000 simulations and 9 million
mathematical simulations, so that this torpedo reaches a high state of reliability.”
Perhaps in reference to the sinking of Russian Oscar-class submarine Kursk, and
also as part of an overall effort to improve submarine safety consciousness, this
analyst later observes that “the [Mark 48] system has been in active service since
1982 and there have been no safety accidents.”
Not every Chinese analyst would readily agree that the Mark 48 torpedo or its
Advanced Capability (ADCAP) variant is especially fearsome. In a 2005 article, a
Chinese author flatly stated, “Traditional heavy-weight torpedoes practically have
no way to cope with modern diesel submarines in shallow waters.”41 The author
notes that “shallow waters constitute a very acoustically complex warfare environment” and that the U.S. Navy has allocated significant resources to developing
sonars suitable for littoral combat against diesel submarines.42 Another analyst,
however, appreciates the U.S. Navy’s ability to upgrade the weapon: “At the moment, [the Mark 48] torpedo is still being upgraded, so that it can correspond
to the challenges associated with shallow water environments and threat—it is
expected to be in service with the USN until 2025.”43
Sensors, Systems, Research, Development, and Training
American efforts at exploiting advancements in commercial off-the-shelf technology have received attention. One article observes that “the updated (COTS)
CCS MK II [fire control] system is not only used on the Los Angeles and Ohio
classes, but is also used on the new Seawolf and Virginia class submarines”;44 another points out that “92% of the hardware and 90% of the software used in
non-publicly available projects in fact come from popular commercially available
technologies.”45 China’s intense interest in the U.S. Navy’s use of COTS may stem
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in part from Beijing’s effort to develop a world-class commercial informationtechnology industry and to incorporate its products into the PLA.
Chinese analysts also monitor American submarine sensor development. One
article notes, “At present, the U.S. is the world leader in developing periscope
technology and using it on its submarines.”46 U.S. efforts to bolster the submarine
force’s mine warfare capabilities receive particular attention.47 Moves to develop
and acquire the Long Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) have been noted, with one researcher stating that “the U.S. is now buying 8 long-range mine
scouting systems to be put on the Los Angeles and Virginia class nuclear attack
submarines.”48
Chinese observers pay fairly close attention to American submarine-related research and development efforts. For example, websites on Chinese naval matters
frequently report on the awarding of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracts.49 Chinese journals take
advantage of these announcements and also scour the U.S. open press for sources
that can be exploited. For example, a rather lengthy article in the June 2002 issue
of 现代舰船 (Modern Ships) reprinted the “Submarine of the Future” briefing
slides (complete with a logo in the upper left-hand corner of each) generated
by the DARPA-sponsored, Lockheed Martin–led industrial consortium “TEAM
2020.” These slides depict futuristic hull forms, sonar configurations, propulsors,
weapons storage ideas, interfaces for unmanned underwater vehicles, and other
elements of advanced submarine designs and concepts.50 It seems that little, if
any, publicly released information regarding U.S. submarine-related research and
development escapes the attention of Chinese analysts.
In keeping with the technological dynamism of U.S. platforms and their constant improvement, Chinese analysts also credit the American submarine force
with an extremely rigorous selection and training process for commanding officers. In a coauthored article in Modern Navy, Rear Admiral Yang Yi, a PLA expert on the United States and former naval attaché in Washington, emphasizes
that “the U.S. Navy’s selection process for the commanding officers of nuclear
submarines is very strict.” Yang details the numerous education and training programs that successful candidates must attend, as well as the periodic qualifying
tests they must undergo. A major emphasis of his article is the extent to which
submarine commanders must periodically update their “specialized [technical]
knowledge.”51
HISTORICAL ISSUES
Although China is emerging as a submarine power, its submarine force, and indeed its navy overall, generally lacks blue-water experience, to say nothing of a
combat history. Of course, this paucity of experience stands in stark contrast
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to the U.S. submarine force, and PLA Navy analysts are acutely aware of that
disparity. In fact, Chinese naval analysts have expressed particular admiration for
the record of American submarines in World War II, pointing out that “the U.S.
submarine force had the fewest losses” of any major submarine force “but had
high combat effectiveness. According to statistics, the U.S. submarine force destroyed 1,314 enemy ships during the war.”52 Moreover, Chinese sources indicate
an appreciation for the accumulated knowledge that the U.S. Navy has achieved
through decades of intense submarine operations. Another Chinese source observes: “The U.S. is a country with 100 years of experience in building submarines, and with so many years of experience the USN constantly emphasizes
the ability of a submarine to take punishment [and survive].”53
While there are numerous Chinese writings on the U.S. Navy’s submarine
force’s campaign against Japan, this article focuses on the Chinese perceptions
of American submarine operations during the Cold War. Some of the observations made in this context may explain aspects of contemporary PLA Navy
submarine doctrine. For example, an article in Modern Ships relates an anecdote
of a “Soviet Type 627 [known in the West as “November”] nuclear attack
submarine [that] once went all out in a race with a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier,
revealing the Soviet attack submarine’s capabilities. [This revelation] apparently
has had a major impact on the development of a new class of American submarines.”54 This appraisal of the peacetime interaction between the two navies
may suggest that overly aggressive tactics employed by the Soviet Navy yielded
too much information to the U.S. Navy. In general, it is quite clear that Chinese
sources understand that a “main mission of [U.S.] nuclear attack submarines
[during the Cold War] was to deal with the Soviet Navy’s SSBNs.”55
With respect to the Cold War at sea, one Chinese book published in 2006 is
worthy of particular note.56 The translation of a Russian book, Secrets of Cold
War Undersea Espionage, it states that “U.S. nuclear and conventional submarines
would often lurk along the routes of Soviet warships, and even within Soviet territorial waters, conducting intelligence activities.”57 It is noted that “the SOSUS
[Sound Surveillance] system substantially helped the U.S. to cope with the capabilities of the Soviet submarine force.”58 The subject of acoustic signatures is also
raised: “In the ocean, there are simply too many sources of noise. . . . In order to
cope with this problem, the U.S. decided to build an acoustic signature catalogue
(resembling a fingerprint) for Soviet submarines.”59
CHINESE ASW AND THE U.S. NAVY SUBMARINE FORCE
When considering Chinese views of the American submarine force, it is certainly
relevant to consider how China appraises its own antisubmarine warfare forces.
Generally, China considers its ASW forces to be weak. One Chinese naval
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analyst observes: “[Chinese] people are focused on China’s submarine force (both
conventional and nuclear) development, but often neglect the threat we face from
[U.S. Navy] submarines.”60 It is, moreover, suggested that “there is still a relatively
large gap between [China’s] ASW technology level and that of the world’s advanced level.”61 In appraising the ASW capabilities of its own surface forces, another naval analyst notes, “Across the world, most naval ships are now equipped
with towed array sonars, which has increased their ASW capabilities, but most of
our ships only have hull mounted sonars.”62 Finally, there is a concern that these
antisubmarine assets are themselves highly vulnerable: “Submarines can carry
out ferocious missile attacks from tens or even 100–200km ranges, causing the
submarine hunting vessels to become the hunted targets.”63
Chinese aerial ASW is also highlighted as a particular weakness. One Chinese
analyst judges that the Z-9 helicopter lacks adequate range and internal space
for the ASW mission.64 A second argues that while the Z-8 has better range and
capacity, it is too big for most surface combatants to carry and chronic engine
troubles have limited production.65 The Russian-import Ka-28 ASW helicopter
is reported to be capable but few in numbers.66 As for Chinese maritime patrol
aircraft, some designs have apparently been developed, including a variant of the
Y-7 Fearless Albatross, but the outlook is said to remain bleak.67 Thus, one evaluation of Chinese aerial ASW concludes, “Our country at the present stage does
not have an ASW maritime patrol aircraft . . . but the number of submarines in
our peripheral seas is increasing, and their technological sophistication is also
increasing. This contradiction is becoming more obvious every day, creating a
grim situation.”68
In Chinese discussions of Russian ASW systems, there is a pointed recognition that the Soviets leaned heavily toward the use of tactical nuclear weapons
(e.g., nuclear depth charges and torpedoes) in ASW operations.69 Tactical nuclear
weapons are also mentioned in the context of mine warfare. An article in the July
2006 issue of Modern Navy, in discussing possible PLA Navy use of sea mines,
suggests the potential combat value of nuclear-armed versions.70 It will be important to watch closely for any sign of Chinese efforts in this direction.
While the overall impression is that of Chinese ASW weakness, there is one
notable exception. Significant prioritization appears to be given to the use of sea
mines for the antisubmarine mission, as if to produce a “poor man’s ASW capability.”71 One discussion explains, “Because of a tremendous change in the maritime
strategic environment, since the early 1990s the PLA has made mobile ASW sea
mines a focal point of weapons development.” The analysis continues, “[China]
is energetically undertaking the research mission [of] using [mobile ASW sea
mines] against U.S. nuclear submarines.”72 The same discussion also hints at a
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possible PLA Navy ASW role: “The major mission of self-guided sea mines is to
isolate American nuclear submarines outside the First Island Chain.”73
It is noteworthy for the future development of Chinese antisubmarine warfare that hydroacoustics has been called a “key point” technology for state investment.74 The conventional wisdom has long been that the Chinese submarine
force is focused entirely on the anti–surface ship mission. This assumption may
have become outdated, perhaps especially after the PLA Navy received the last
of eight new Kilo-class diesel submarines (and accompanying weaponry) from
Russia in 2006. According to Professor Li Daguang of China National Defense
University, these new Kilos have four missions: to blockade Taiwan, threaten carrier battle groups, employ land-attack cruise missiles as a “strategic weapon,” and
“form an underwater threat to the U.S. nuclear submarine force.”75 There is also
preliminary evidence that China is moving toward deploying antisubmarine rocket weapons on its newest surface combatants.76 This system is no “silver bullet,”
as the Chinese would still have severe, perhaps insurmountable, targeting and
cueing problems, but successful acquisition and deployment of ASROCs would
extend the engagement range of Chinese ASW weapons significantly. It is also
worth noting that Chinese sources discuss “many openly published dissertations
concerning underwater targeting for a homing depth charge.”77
To reverse the equation: How do Chinese naval analysts appraise American
ASW, and in particular the submarine force’s part in it? Clearly, the PLA Navy
understands the overall centrality of SSNs in U.S. antisubmarine warfare. Thus
an article in Modern Navy states: “The nuclear attack submarine . . . is the most
effective tool for ASW.”78 However, some PLA Navy observers appear rather unimpressed by American efforts in ASW. The same official Chinese Navy journal
observes: “The U.S. Navy actually has not had sufficient exercises in the [ASW
arena] and also lacks experience.”79 In the same article, it is likewise noted that
“conducting ASW in the littorals represents a special difficulty for the USN” and
that “the combat advantage of the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine force in the littoral areas is far from obvious.”80 On this note, Campaign Theory Study Guide,
a 2002 textbook written by China National Defense University scholars that
draws on a variety of high-quality doctrinal publications, emphasizes that “nuclearpowered attack submarines have difficulty operating in close proximity to shore
due to natural conditions.”81 Another Chinese naval analysis suggests that “up
to 2005, the USN has altogether 350 ASW platforms, just 11% of the number of
[ASW] platforms it fielded in 1945. Moreover, many of these current naval and
air platforms are not specialized for ASW, but more often are multi-mission platforms.”82 This quantitative comparison across historical periods is crude in some
ways, but there is no denying that inherent physical principles combined with the
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vast geographical area of the Pacific Ocean will likely keep ASW an asset-intensive
mission, even in the age of “net-centric warfare.”
THE U.S. NAVY SUBMARINE FORCE-LEVEL TRAJECTORY
Chinese discussions of the American submarine force focus heavily on the continuing decline in its size. As one article from a People’s Republic of China (PRC) navalinterest publication states, “The decline of U.S. submarine strength is inevitable.”83
Indeed, that a wide variety of Chinese naval sources share this evaluation suggests
that this “decline” now passes for conventional wisdom within the PLA Navy. The
Chinese naval community is likely paying close attention to internal U.S. debates,
knowing that investments made (or forgone) today in submarine fleet modernization shape the future fleet.
Some Chinese assessments of the Seawolf program appear to point out indirectly the internal political tensions that hold down American submarine build
rates now and perhaps in the future. One volume notes: “Although the Sea Wolf–
class SSN gathers the era’s most advanced technology in a single hull, and possesses beyond-first-class performance, the appraisals of ‘Sea Wolf ’ by American
public figures from all walks of life differ, with a roughly half-and-half split between praise and condemnation.”84
Taking the long view, Chinese naval strategists recognize that force levels have
dropped drastically from Cold War levels. One source observes, “Since 1989,
the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarine [force] has been reduced by
half.”85 A more recent Chinese naval press article estimates that “[U.S.] nuclear
attack submarines will decline in number by close to 40%, eventually reaching 30
boats.”86 This calculation is roughly consistent with a projection in Modern Navy
that anticipated a sustained build rate of one boat per year.87 Rear Admiral Yang
Yi, writing in 2006 on the future size of the American submarine force, quoted
one American analysis as follows: “China already exceeds [U.S. submarine production] five times over. . . . 18 [USN] submarines against 75 or more Chinese
navy submarines is obviously not encouraging [from the U.S. perspective].”88
A REPUTATION FOR MASTERY?
This article demonstrates that Chinese strategists are keenly interested in the U.S.
Navy’s submarine force. Thousands of articles have reviewed various aspects of
American submarine capabilities, operations, and developmental trends. There is
clear evidence that Chinese naval analysts have enormous respect for U.S. submarines, submariners, and their weapons. Certainly, China aspires to be a submarine
power and hopes to emulate certain aspects of American experience. However,
it is equally clear in these writings that the U.S. submarine force is seen as a key
challenge in any military confrontation between Beijing and Washington. It is
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significant in that regard especially that Chinese analysts are increasingly drawing
attention to, and seeking to remedy, their antisubmarine warfare deficiencies. The
study also reveals an apparent assumption within Chinese naval analytic circles
that American submarine force levels are on a downward trajectory.
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BUILDING MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Outsiders Not Welcome?
Major Victor Huang, Republic of Singapore Navy

T

oday’s globalized economy is intricately interconnected and is heavily dependent on maritime trade in order to sustain the movement of energy, raw
materials, and finished goods. The arteries of global trade include the narrow
waterways of Southeast Asia, with about a third of the world’s trade and half its
1
oil transiting through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore alone. As China and
India continue their strong growth, sea trade through the straits is expected to
2
increase correspondingly. Major economies such as the United States, China,
Japan, and India all have stakes in ensuring the safe passage of shipping through
the region. The littoral states of Southeast Asia may be the most concerned of all;
any interruption in shipping would heavily impact their economies by disrupting port operations and the smooth flow of raw materials and finished products.
Armed robbery at sea is a persistent problem in the area, and maritime
3
hijackings and kidnappings continue to occur. There are fears that the straits
could become a target for terrorism and a haven for illegal trafficking of people
4
and weapons. Many states are interested in the strengthening of maritime secuMajor Huang is a surface warfare officer by training
rity in Southeast Asia in order to protect their trade
and is currently the commanding officer of the patrol
and prevent illegal activity.
vessel RSS Resilience. He is a Singapore Armed Forces
While the littoral states have recently overcome hisOverseas Scholar and holds a bachelor of science with
honors from the California Institute of Technology. He
torical mistrust sufficiently to engage in basic mariis a June 2007 graduate of the ten-month course of the
time cooperation, the efforts of extraregional players
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to introduce security frameworks from without have
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been met with ambivalence or outright rejection. For
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example, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI), proposed by the United States, was strongly
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criticized after the media incorrectly reported that U.S. high-speed vessels
5
would conduct antiterrorist patrols in the Strait of Malacca; similarly, the Pro6
liferation Security Initiative (PSI) continues to be viewed with suspicion. Resistance to the establishment of security frameworks can arise from outside
Southeast Asia as well. In 1999, a proposal of the Japanese prime minister, Keizo
Obuchi, that a regional coast guard be created as an antipiracy measure was
7
strongly opposed by China.
The resulting absence of extraregional states in operational maritime security
initiatives is depriving the region of important resources and capabilities such as
information sharing and responsive multinational decision making, which are
8
especially important in view of the multinational nature of maritime trade. The
rejection of outside help by the littoral states is puzzling, since its presence
would contribute to the shared goal of improving overall security. Are outsiders
simply not welcome in Southeast Asian maritime security cooperation?
This article argues that effective maritime security cooperation in Southeast
Asia can be achieved only under a neutral multinational framework. The effort
must be largely led and implemented by the littoral states themselves, in order to
avoid power rivalries. At the operational level, effective cooperation can be
achieved through information sharing and operational coordination among
9
states. However, the conduct of patrols and enforcement actions within a littoral state’s territorial seas must remain the responsibility of that state, in order to
protect coastal state sovereignty.
To date, effective operational cooperation has been achieved only under regional agreements that are limited in scope and goals, whereas extraregional efforts have been hobbled by politics. By studying these efforts as case studies and
recognizing the issues that inhibit or facilitate regional cooperation, extraregional states can devise strategies to increase their participation in regional security cooperation and apply lessons to promote such international frameworks
as PSI and the “thousand-ship navy.”
This article evaluates how the willingness of the littoral states to cooperate
varies according to differing threat perceptions, concern over sovereignty, and a
desire for geostrategic nonalignment. It surveys recent attempts at maritime cooperation and analyzes the factors for success or failure. Finally, the article discusses how extraregional players could contribute toward meaningful maritime
security cooperation without causing affront to regional sensitivities.
THE LITTORAL STATES
We begin by examining the littoral states that border the Malacca and Singapore
straits (see map), which are the waterways in the region that have attracted the
greatest attention.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21
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THE MALACCA AND SINGAPORE STRAITS

Singapore
The city-state of Singapore is heavily dependent on maritime trade to fuel its exportdriven economy and its hub status in the transshipment trade and in oil refining.
Among the three littoral states, Singapore’s economy would be most severely affected by a disruption in the free flow of shipping through the region. Singapore also
keenly feels the threat of maritime terrorism. First, its advanced infrastructure—
including its container port, its petrochemical refineries, and the city itself—would
suffer the greatest economic damage from a terrorist attack. Second, its city center
and critical industries are situated on its southern coast adjacent to the busy Singapore Strait, exposed to possible maritime attack with minimal time and space
for reaction should one of the vessels in the busy waterways have hostile intent.
This heightens Singapore’s desire for advance warning through information
sharing. Third, Singapore is an ideologically attractive target because of its close
10
links with Western states, which offend radical religious fundamentalists. This
threat environment has heightened Singapore’s sense of vulnerability; Teo Chee
Hean, Singapore’s minister for defense, has consistently maintained that mari11
time terrorism remains “a clear and present danger.” A recent article in Pointer,
the official journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, reasoned that terrorist organizations have the “capability, intent and opportunity” to conduct a maritime
12
attack. Singapore is eager to enhance further international and interagency cooperation in order to defend against the threat of maritime terrorism.
Recognizing the importance of maritime security, Singapore has built a modern and capable navy and police coast guard that effectively protect the
sixty-mile-long Singapore Strait. In 2003, Singapore established the interagency
Maritime and Port Security Working Group, which brings together the navy,
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police coast guard, and the maritime and port authority. The group implemented regulatory measures to improve port security and control the move13
ment of shipping within the port. Singapore also monitors the vessels that pass
14
through the Singapore Strait, via its vessel traffic information system. This system uses coastal radars to track up to five thousand vessels; it is integrated with
electronic navigational chart displays and synchronized voice, track, and data
15
recording, allowing historical and real-time traffic analyses. Within the region,
16
Singapore is one of the most vocal advocates of international cooperation; it
enjoys close ties with regional countries, as well as with the United States, China,
17
and Japan.
Malaysia
Like Singapore, Malaysia is dependent on maritime trade. Eighty percent of its
trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, and major Malaysian ports are situated on the strait itself. Malaysia is also concerned with protecting its fishing and
tourism industries, which would be adversely affected by collisions and
groundings and any oil spills that might result. Accordingly, Malaysia is focused
on ensuring navigational safety and protecting against environmental threats, in
addition to countering piracy.18 Previously, Malaysian policy makers had
downplayed the threat of maritime terrorism and argued that no proof existed
19
of a “concrete nexus” between piracy and terrorism. Recently, however, Malaysia has warned of the possibility of terrorist attacks using hijacked ships, including those carrying dangerous materials. In June 2007, Malaysia’s top police
official stated that maritime terrorism was a “real and possible” threat that could
20
“devastate Southeast Asia’s economic environment and severely disrupt trade.”
The Malaysian deputy prime minister, Najib Razak, has called for greater vigilance and intelligence sharing to combat piracy and prevent terrorism along the
21
Malacca Strait.
To improve its effectiveness at policing its own waters, Malaysia took the major step of reorganizing its five maritime agencies to form the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, which was established in May 2004 and officially
launched in March 2006. The agency will buy new vessels, refurbish many of its
seventy-plus existing craft, and acquire six helicopters for surveillance, enforce22
ment, and search-and-rescue duties.
Malaysia contends that the littoral states themselves have the capacity to safeguard the straits. Nonetheless, the Malaysians “find it difficult to accept that
while international users consider the straits as an international sea lane which
they have the right to use,” the effort and heavy financial cost of securing the
straits and ensuring navigational safety are regarded as the responsibilities of the
23
24
littoral states. Therefore, “modalities for burden sharing” should be explored.
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This will become more important in the future, as traffic volumes are expected
to increase. Malaysia is wary, however, of “internationalization” of the straits,
25
which would impinge upon regional security interests.
Indonesia
Indonesia has a smaller economic stake than Singapore or Malaysia in the safety
of the Malacca and Singapore straits, because the majority of its trade is con26
ducted through the Lombok and Sunda straits. Indonesia’s attention is more
focused on such domestic issues as economic development, political reform, ter27
ritorial integrity, and militant Islamism. For the Indonesian navy, countering
piracy may also be less important than patrolling its extensive maritime borders;
handling maritime border disputes; and countering smuggling, illegal fishing,
28
and environmental degradation. Indonesians are particularly sensitive to border disputes after the painful experience of losing two small islands off eastern
Borneo, Sipadan and Ligitan, to Malaysia as the result of an International Court
29
of Justice decision in 2002. The adjoining oil-rich Ambalat region of the
30
Celebes Sea is still disputed; it is highly valued by Indonesia, which sent seven
warships and four F-16s there in March 2005 after alleged incursions by Malay31
sian warships and aircraft.
In addition, Indonesia’s enforcement capacity is stretched by lack of funding
and poor maintenance of its ships. According to the Indonesian defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, only 60 percent of Indonesia’s fleet of 124 ships is opera32
tional; in contrast, the chief of staff of the Indonesian navy, Admiral Slamet
Soebijanto, estimates that at least 302 ships and 170 aircraft are required to pro33
tect the nation’s archipelago of seventeen thousand islands. Although Indonesia is acquiring new patrol boats, it has asked the United States for military
assistance in the form of training and support in order to build its enforcement
34
capacity. Indonesia has stressed, however, that foreign military presence is out
of the question.
Indonesia’s incentive to protect the straits is to demonstrate sovereignty over its
waters, while promoting good international relations, especially since it receives
security assistance and counterterrorism funding from the United States and Aus35
tralia and aid from Japan. Indonesia has also promoted cooperation between the
36
littoral states; held biannual coordinated patrols with India since September
37
2002; and signed agreements with Australia, Japan, and India to increase cooperation in security matters, including maritime security. Indonesia also expanded its defense interactions with the United States after the restoration of U.S.
international military education and training (IMET), and operational exchanges, such as the annual “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training”
(CARAT) exercises, were broadened to build understanding and interoperability
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further. For example, the sea phase of exercise CARAT was lengthened to five days
in July 2006, more than double the length of the previous year’s exercise.
ATTEMPTS AT REGIME BUILDING
There have been several efforts to involve the littoral states in maritime cooperation. These efforts can be split into two types: top-down frameworks proposed
by extraregional stakeholders, and bottom-up efforts agreed among the littoral
states themselves. These efforts are aimed at shaping the regional maritime security environment, and some states hope that they will result in regional maritime regimes favorable to their interests.
An international regime implies “regulated patterns of practice on which
expectations converge [that] govern state behavior in specific areas of international relations.”38 There are many maritime regimes that cover the rights of
states in the protection of shipping, fishing, marine resources, and other areas.
The most comprehensive and important maritime regime today is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the Malacca and Singapore straits,
all three littoral states are party to UNCLOS, which specifies the rights and obligations of international-strait states in their territorial seas versus the right to
transit passage of foreign states.
The idea of a maritime regime is an appealing one. Since the regional states
have a common interest in enhancing maritime security, it would be in the na39
tional interest of each of them to participate. In 1991, Michael Leifer, for example, envisaged a stable and peaceful maritime regime in East Asia whereby states
could pursue their interests and manage their resources in accordance with the
40
principles of international law and without the risk of conflict. While many
conferences have been held to improve understanding and build confidence, the
41
region’s states have been reluctant to move beyond the status quo. Nevertheless, the ideal of building a maritime security regime has remained attractive to
the present day, especially for the stakeholders with the most to gain, such as the
United States, Japan, and Singapore. The U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security, published in 2005, states that “regional maritime security regimes are a
major international component of this Strategy and are essential for ensuring
42
the effective security of regional seas.” Let us now survey several initiatives
aimed at maritime security regime building, beginning with those initiated by
extraregional stakeholders and aimed at direct operational cooperation.
Top-Down Frameworks
Southeast Asia is a region of not only many diverse states but also of overlapping
spheres of influence between rival extraregional powers. Attempts by one to
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introduce a security regime have been rebuffed by others who perceive them as
upsetting the regional balance.
Japan’s Ocean Peacekeeping Force concept is an example of an initiative by an
43
extraregional power that was stifled. Throughout the 1990s, Japan tried to increase regional cooperation and enhance security by providing much-needed
training and assistance to the littoral states. Building upon these efforts, Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi formally proposed, at the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (Japan, South Korea, and China) summit in 1999,
the formation of a regional coast guard to combat piracy. It was to be based on
multilateral patrols by forces from Japan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. The proposal was immediately and strongly opposed by
China, which saw in it a Japanese move to extend its security role in East Asia and
44
contain Chinese maritime influence. Subsequent Japanese-proposed initiatives, like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), have been much less ambitious
in scope, covering only voluntary information submission, and funded by voluntary contributions. This episode suggests that, in general, attempts by
extraregional powers to exert leadership are likely to trigger unfavorable reactions from rivals. Since the littoral states can ill afford to offend any of the
extraregional powers, externally led efforts at leading change are unlikely to
meet with success.
Another difficulty faced by externally led efforts is that they may raise sovereignty concerns. This was the situation faced by the Regional Maritime Security
Initiative, a conceptual framework proposed by the United States in 2004 for
neutral, multilateral maritime security cooperation. RMSI was intended to be a
voluntary partnership of regional states to share information and provide
45
cueing (early warning) to counter transnational threats. Unfortunately, the
media incorrectly reported that Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), had testified to Congress on 31 March of that year
that American Special Forces and Marines would patrol the Malacca Strait in
46
high-speed vessels. Although this was untrue, RMSI was permanently tainted
47
by this misunderstanding, even in academic papers. RMSI was immediately
blasted by the leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia, who condemned the proposed
48
deployment of U.S. forces in the strait as a direct affront to their sovereignty.
(While Chinese analysts wondered whether RMSI was designed to contain
China, Chinese officials said little and seemed content to stand aside in this dip49
lomatic fracas.) As a result of widespread condemnation, USPACOM allowed
the RMSI concept to wither away, and “RMSI” vanished from the command’s
50
official communications in 2005.
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Even when considered under its true spirit, RMSI would likely not have succeeded. While Admiral Fargo pitched it as a voluntary partnership of the willing, it
appeared that the United States would take a leadership role in concept development and implementation. That would have raised fears that it sought to assume
the initiative in the region, especially in light of the U.S. history of hub-and-spoke
military diplomacy (notably in the organization of the Iraq invasion of 2003).
This would surely have provoked the ire of China and other powers. As it happened, no objections were raised, because the issue of U.S. forces stationed in the
Malacca Strait proved much more sensitive, and sovereignty concerns in that connection provided a convenient diplomatic “out” for the rejection of RMSI. China
was wise to keep silent, because its concerns over American leadership would have
seemed insensitive next to the more important issue of sovereignty.
Concern about international law and U.S. leadership was also evident in the
region’s response to the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI is a U.S.-led
global initiative to prevent traffic of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PSI
requires the political cooperation of many other countries to succeed; flag-state
permission is often necessary for interdiction at sea. PSI is an interesting test
case for the region, because it has the appearance of a top-down framework designed to achieve the common goal of nonproliferation, and the obligations of
PSI “participants” (as opposed to “members”) are recommendatory and legally
nonbinding. To emphasize this, PSI is deliberately marketed as an “activity” and
not an “organization.” Although PSI participants have declared that they are
committed to certain principles to impede and stop shipments of WMD, including searching in their waters vessels “reasonably suspected” of carrying such cargoes, they are not obliged to take part in any specific activities that they oppose.
Also, they need only “seriously consider” providing consent for their vessels and
aircraft to be searched when suspected of carrying WMD. All in all, PSI could be
seen as an effort to facilitate operational cooperation and by which participants
can signal political support for nonproliferation. It attempts to promote multi51
lateral cooperation without a cumbersome treaty apparatus. In addition, the
spirit of PSI was emphatically affirmed by the passage on 28 April 2004 of UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, requiring all states to take mea52
sures to prevent proliferation.
Nonetheless, participation in PSI by Asian states was initially very low. Only
Japan and Singapore expressed early public support and formally signed on.
Other states might have refrained from participating because of concern about
53
its “ad hoc, extra–United Nations, U.S.-driven nature.” In September 2004, the
Malaysian prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, declared to the UN General Assembly that while Malaysia was committed to nonproliferation, there was a need for
multilateral negotiations for “universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory
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54

agreements and arrangements.” This statement reflects fears that American
leadership would be nonconsultative and unilateral, that implementation of PSI
would “constitute a major shift from negotiated multilateralism of the post-war
system to cooperative unilateralism under post–Cold War American hege55
mony.” There were also concerns that the United States would use the Proliferation Security Initiative in an inequitable manner against countries, such as Iran
56
and North Korea, that it designates as “rogue states.”
Some countries cited concern over the legality of the initiative as well. Since
the U.S. national security strategy states that the United States will, if necessary,
act preemptively against WMD threats, some states are concerned that it would
57
use the PSI to conduct interdictions in ways that violate international law. In
September 2005 China declared that it would not join PSI due to concerns over
58
legality. In March 2006, Indonesia declined Secretary of State Condoleezza
59
Rice’s request that Indonesia join the PSI. Subsequently, on 10 June 2006, the
Indonesian minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono, wrote in the Jakarta Post
that Indonesia would not join PSI because it “contravenes provisions of
60
[UNCLOS].” He further explained in his official “weblog” that “it was impossible for Indonesia in strictly legal terms to accept the total package of the PSI, as it
endorsed interdiction of vessels passing through Indonesia’s territorial waters
61
[as] in the high seas.” In fact, PSI is intended to operate in a manner “consistent
62
with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.”
This example shows how concern over legality and neutrality can persist even
over an initiative that has been deliberately designed to be legal and neutral.
While the Proliferation Security Initiative has had some successes, until very
recently it appeared unable to make further inroads into Southeast Asia after its
63
rejection by China and Indonesia. American statements aimed at
depoliticizing PSI and emphasizing its multilateral, voluntary nature failed to
produce new participants in Asia willing to declare their support publicly. Paradoxically, the passage of UNSCR 1540 in April 2004 made open participation in
PSI less politically attractive, in that the resolution requires states to conduct
counterproliferation. Participating in PSI would no longer signal support for
counterproliferation in general but support for U.S.-led operational cooperation in particular. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the founding
PSI members were the United States and other Western nations. Following an
apparent U.S. lead in an initiative supported by only two states within Asia was
something that most regional states, in particular Malaysia and Indonesia, were
unwilling to do, as it might have antagonized China.
Many states took the politically expedient option of being a “supporting”
country without making a “public statement of support,” as encouraged by the
64
United States. From 2003 to 2007, such states took part in PSI conferences but
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65

their identities were not known. This situation changed on 1 May 2007, when
66
the United States published a list of participants—eighty-two countries; this
was a staggering increase from the seventeen countries listed in September
67
2006. Within Southeast Asia, Brunei, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, and the
Philippines are now listed by the United States as participants, although they
68
have not made public declarations of support. It remains to be seen whether
the large number of participants will confer an air of neutrality on PSI and pave
the way for the recruitment of more participants. Also, the commitment level of
these “revealed” PSI supporters remains in doubt in the absence of public statements of support.
Several lessons can be drawn from these three attempts at regime building.
First, ambitious attempts at regime building by extraregional powers are unlikely to succeed, because of major-power rivalries. This leads to inaction on the
part of regional states who wish to preserve their nonalignment. China’s economic influence in the region and suspicion toward American and Japanese motives in particular will continue to deter smaller states from allowing any of the
major powers to play too great a role in regional regime building.
Second, offers of external operational assistance run up against sovereignty
concerns related to direct intervention by foreign powers. The littoral states do
not wish their waters patrolled by other countries, desiring to prevent majorpower rivalries and to retain tight control over their territorial seas. Some of this
reluctance can be attributed to enduring postcolonial nationalism and to popu69
lar antagonism toward the United States. Extraregional players should also
keep in mind that Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most-populous country, has
historically regarded itself as a regional power and remains fiercely nationalistic.
Third, there is evidence of a strong desire to preserve the status quo under existing international law and of resistance to new precedents that might compromise future actions or negotiations. Thus, Indonesia has taken a “wait and see”
stance toward PSI since 2003; while it has declined to become a participant, it has
not ruled out partial adherence to PSI provisions on an ad hoc basis, thereby keep70
ing its diplomatic options open without compromising any of its interests.
In summary, if a littoral state is to participate in a formal maritime security
regime, it must be prepared to give up some of its political freedom of action in
exchange for greater security. At present, the threats are not sufficiently compelling, and the political costs, both foreign and domestic, are too great for Malaysia
and Indonesia to do so.
Bottom-Up Building Blocks
An alternative approach to deliberate regime building is to put in place mechanisms or even institutions to perform the tasks necessary for operational
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cooperation. For example, coordinating patrols and sharing information are relatively simple, unobjectionable actions that can be undertaken by the littoral
states among themselves. A long tradition of confidence building through bilateral, coordinated antipiracy patrols, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and
personnel exchanges and interactions has built a firm foundation from which
71
the region might progress to noncoalition operational cooperation. An additional benefit of these relatively humble initiatives is that they tend to originate
within the region itself (an exception was ReCAAP, initiated by Japan).
The Malacca Straits Patrols was the first multilateral initiative to be implemented in the region.72 It was deliberately designed to be modest, originating
from and limited to the three littoral states, and restricted in scope so as to avoid
sovereignty issues. The three littoral states, expanding on long-standing bilateral
coordinated patrols in order to enhance operational cooperation, launched tri73
lateral coordinated patrols on 20 July 2004. Since the sea patrols are coordinated, not joint, each littoral state’s force patrols only within its own territorial
seas, with no right of pursuit across territorial sea boundaries; the states rely on a
hand-off mechanism to handle cross-boundary enforcement. Therefore, they
gained in operational effectiveness without the issues of legality that would arise
from intrusion into other states’ waters. A conceptually linked but officially unrelated boost to the initiative’s effectiveness was Project SURPIC, a technical system that allows information sharing between Singapore and Indonesian
command and control (C2) centers in order to achieve a common operating picture in the Singapore Strait, facilitating communication and enforcement.
An “Eyes in the Sky” initiative to enhance surveillance by combined maritime
air patrols was launched by the littoral states and Thailand on 13 September
74
2005. Previously, each state had conducted air surveillance patrols only within
its own airspace. This new program allows combined air patrols across territorial boundaries, allowing for better effectiveness in the narrow straits as well as
promoting operational cooperation. A foreign liaison on board each aircraft
controls actions over the waters of that officer’s state, assuaging concerns over
sovereignty and ensuring that states do not abuse the flights for other purposes,
such as intelligence gathering. The use of air assets, which have less psychological “presence” than surface craft, also alleviates sensitivity about sovereignty.
Since the aircraft can conduct only surveillance, not enforcement—in fact, they
carry no weapons that could be used for enforcement purposes—there is no
possibility of one state enforcing laws in another state. Overall, such efforts as
these have no impact on foreign-power rivalries or international law, and they
demonstrate the ability of the littoral states to police their own waters and airspace under initiatives limited in scope and purpose.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

103

98

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 1, Art. 21

Similarly, working under the principles of regional inclusiveness, neutrality,
and noninterference, Japan managed to refashion its Ocean Peacekeeping
(known as OPK) concept into the more conservative and ultimately successful
ReCAAP proposal made by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001. ReCAAP
is a broadly based initiative, involving all the ASEAN nations plus Bangladesh,
75
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Sri Lanka. ReCAAP, which came into
force on 4 September 2006, is “the first regional government-to-government
agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed rob76
bery at sea in Asia.” The operational heart of ReCAAP is its Information
Sharing Centre (ISC), located in Singapore, which reports and coordinates responses to incidents at sea. The member states also agree to cooperate in capacity building, legal assistance, and extradition.
The establishment of ReCAAP was a breakthrough. It is an international institution to fight piracy, not merely a set of multilateral arrangements and exercises.
The inclusion of regional powers such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea
and the basing of the ISC in a littoral state have also given the initiative neutrality
and inclusiveness. Malaysia and Indonesia have not yet ratified the agreement,
77
though they are expected to do so. Their hesitation is attributed to concern over
78
the location of the ISC in Singapore; this concern, in turn, reflects rivalry among
the littoral states, as well as fear that the ISC would publish reports unfair to other
79
member states. This delay suggests that the neutrality of such initiatives is important not just among powers but also among the littoral states themselves.
On 27 March 2007, Singapore announced that it would construct a command
and control center to “house the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC),
an Information Fusion Centre (IFC), and a Multinational Operations and Exer80
cise Centre (MOEC).” The IFC will facilitate information fusion and sharing
among “participating militaries and agencies,” and the MOEC will provide the
infrastructure for multinational exercises, maritime security operations, and
81
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief should the need arise. In essence,
Singapore is offering a ready-made capability that can be leveraged for regional
cooperation at any time. This will allow a rapid operationalization of cooperation initiatives should the political environment be conducive. Singapore’s action could also reflect the hope that the existence of an additional C2 facility will
spur international cooperation. While it is still too early to see the impact of Singapore’s announcement, Singapore’s command and control center looks to be an important seed crystal for future cooperation when it becomes operational in 2009.
TOWARD WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS
When it comes to maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia, are outsiders
not welcome? The evidence shows that extraregional stakeholders are welcome
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in Southeast Asia. The littoral states appreciate the assistance of outside states—
but only within limits that are highly circumscribed and not politicized. The region
is unreceptive to regime building that sets off power rivalries and sovereignty
concerns. In contrast, the efforts of the littoral states themselves have been more
modest in scope, characterized by bottom-up cooperation that incrementally
82
builds operational cooperation. This cooperation has been facilitated by the
absence of an overarching framework, which would be political baggage.
ReCAAP, for its part, was successful only because it was seen by extraregional
powers as neutral and was limited to operational information sharing and
low-level, nonmilitary assistance.
Such experience suggests several options extraregional states could take to
strengthen regional maritime security. These are in line with the need for
multilateralism and neutrality. First, they can share ideas and build understanding through multilateral forums. The annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore,
attended by defense ministers, has proved useful for exchanging viewpoints and
83
building understanding. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium is similarly
valuable at the operational level. Second, they can support intraregional initiatives. Support of such existing initiatives as ReCAAP would improve the prospects for security. Although the United States is not a member of ReCAAP, it can
assist that effort by not establishing parallel or competing initiatives. Singapore’s new C2 center is also a possible nexus for future multilateral cooperation.
Extraregional powers can promote confidence and increase interoperability
through exercises. Bilateral and multilateral exercises build the operational expertise of local navies, improving their abilities to secure the straits. Such exercises
also increase interoperability, which would facilitate future operational cooperation should the opportunity arise. These exercises include CARAT and SEACAT
between the U.S. and Southeast Asian navies, and the Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia, and Singapore.* PSI exercises and discussions should continue to be
inclusive in order to build understanding of that initiative.
They can offer technical assistance to build capacity. Such help is welcome in
84
the region, especially by Indonesia. Outside assistance would render Indonesia,
with its limited budget and other priorities, better able to promote maritime security. Japan has installed navigational aids in the Malacca Strait and, through
85
the Nippon Foundation, donated a training ship to Malaysia in June 2006.
While such assistance is not multilateral in nature, it takes place within normal
bilateral frameworks, and outside powers have not protested such interactions;
political sensitivities can also be somewhat lessened by rendering the assistance
* SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism) promotes information sharing and multinational cooperation in maritime interception scenarios.
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in low-key, behind-the-scenes ways. Goodwill can also be built through humanitarian civic assistance. Political and operational payoffs accrued to the United
States, Japan, and other nations from the tsunami humanitarian relief mission
in northern Indonesia, and humanitarian civic assistance should be continued
86
in peacetime. Humanitarian aid does not directly strengthen regional maritime security, but it can promote mutual understanding and goodwill.
Finally, external powers can work through international organizations. New
international frameworks established through the UN and International Maritime Organization would be the most effective way of introducing new norms to
the region. Security Council resolutions are difficult to bring to adoption, but
the legal authority of such resolutions and the moral authority arising from such
focused expressions of international opinion make them highly effective. For example, many of the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative, as we have seen,
were achieved with the passage of UNSCR 1540. In this regard, ratification by
the United States of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea would increase
the legitimacy of that vehicle and facilitate the success of future initiatives.
There has been considerable progress in international understanding and cooperation in Southeast Asia. The norms for acceptable participation by outside
actors in the region have become more clearly defined through the region’s experience with OPK, RMSI, PSI, and ReCAAP. Future cooperation initiatives can
thereby be tailored to avoid regional sensitivities. Although the main focus of
such initiatives has been the Malacca and Singapore straits, the inclusion of
Thailand in combined air patrols and the establishment of ReCAAP, involving
sixteen countries, suggest a potential to increase the geographical scope of regional cooperation. Ultimately, extraregional players need to appreciate the differing needs and preferences of the littoral states and other extraregional powers
and to act accordingly to find a win-win solution for all parties.
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MINES AND UNDERWATER IEDS IN U.S. PORTS
AND WATERWAYS
Context, Threats, Challenges, and Solutions
Scott C. Truver

A

broad spectrum of nontraditional and asymmetric threats challenges U.S.
1
maritime homeland security. The smuggling of drugs, arms, and people;
vesselborne improvised explosive devices, like that used by terrorists against the
guided-missile destroyer USS Cole in October 2002; proliferation of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive weapons of mass destruction and disruption; piracy and organized crime; overexploitation of marine resources and the destruction of marine habitats; environmental attacks and trade
disruption; political and religious extremism; mass migration flows; global
health threats (e.g., the spread of infectious diseases like SARS and avian flu)—
all these and more pose far-reaching dangers for American security interests at
home and abroad. Under the cloak of legal activity, groups that would do us
harm can enter the U.S. homeland anywhere along more than ninety-five thousand miles of coastlines and through some 360 ports from Maine to Guam.
“The challenge is enduring,” Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S.
Coast Guard, wrote in his foreword to the Coast Guard’s 2007 maritime security
2
strategy. “The threats of the Cold War are gone, and we again find ourselves operating in an environment where piracy, illegal migraDr. Truver is executive adviser, national security
tion, drug smuggling, terrorism, arms proliferation
programs, Gryphon Technologies LC. He was the prinand environmental crimes are carried out by anonycipal author of the U.S. Navy’s 1992 Mine Warfare
Plan and supported the development of subsequent
mous, loosely affiliated perpetrators.”
plans. He has written extensively on mines and mine
Naval mines and underwater improvised explosive
countermeasures, coauthoring the second edition of the
devices (UWIEDs, or minelike “booby traps”) are among
U.S. Naval Institute’s Weapons That Wait: Mine
3
Warfare in the U.S. Navy. Dr. Truver is a member of
these threats to U.S. maritime interests. A true
the editorial board of this journal.
“sleeper threat,” mines and UWIEDs can with great effect attack the good order of American ports and
Naval War College Review, Winter 2008, Vol. 61, No. 1
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waterways. They are the quintessential asymmetric naval weapons, used for
more than two centuries by weak naval powers against the strong, regardless of
whether they were “unworthy of a chivalrous nation,” as Rear Admiral David G.
4
Farragut, of “Damn the torpedoes!” fame, declared. If left unaddressed, they
could constitute an Achilles’ heel for U.S. homeland security.
Until very recently, naval mines and UWIEDs, if included in domestic maritime threat assessments at all, have usually been relegated to the status of a
5
“lesser included” problem. If we can deal, it is argued, with what planners believe are the more likely maritime threats, especially vesselborne devices, we can
certainly handle mines and underwater IEDs. But the history of naval and terrorist mining since 1945 challenges this assumption, and the stakes are high if it
turns out to be wrong. Indeed, the assessments and planning that have focused
on the M/UWIED threat underscore critical weaknesses in how federal, regional, state, and local actors charged with ensuring America’s maritime security, as well as private entities whose assets are at risk, must respond to weapons
that can easily be deployed in U.S. ports and waterways.
THE NATURE OF THE M/UWIED THREAT
In the American experience, the first use of UWIEDs came in September 1776,
when the patriot (or, in English eyes, terrorist) David Bushnell attempted to fix a
limpet mine on Lord Howe’s flagship HMS Eagle in the Hudson River.6
Bushnell’s attack was frustrated by bad luck and the “passive protection” of the
ship’s iron fittings. Fifteen months later, Bushnell used floating kegs of gunpowder fitted with contact-firing mechanisms against the British fleet above
Philadelphia; four British sailors died trying to retrieve the kegs from the Delaware River—an early example of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) against an
7
unknown threat—but the fleet was unscathed.
More than two centuries on, terrorists can use or threaten to use mines and
UWIEDs for a variety of political, economic, or military ends, often with psychological effects foremost in mind. While small devices might have no more
than nuisance value, as a way to exacerbate anxieties (Boston’s reaction to “guerrilla marketing” in early 2007 comes to mind), larger mines can be placed surreptitiously in channels and harbors to achieve spectacular effects—against, for
example, the Staten Island Ferry, crammed with 2,500 commuters during an
evening rush hour, or a cruise ship with four thousand vacationers and crew on
8
board leaving Miami or Seattle. The tragedy of hundreds of bodies floating in a
port would intensify the psychological message about the true security of America’s home waters.
Mines can directly attack the nation’s waterborne trade. More than 90 percent
of American exports and imports by volume transits U.S. ports, and the efficient
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and safe movement of our foreign, coastal, and inland-waters trades is critical
for America’s globalized, just-in-time, and just-enough economy. The economic
consequences of just a few mines in our ports could be catastrophic, as the
two-week West Coast labor slowdown in the fall of 2002 implies—a $1.95 billion
impact per day. According to a University of California at Berkeley analysis, the
direct and indirect economic impacts of a twenty-day longshoremen’s work ac9
tion would cost the U.S. economy more than $50 billion (in 2002 dollars). Even
if no ships were sunk or damaged and no channels were blocked, explosions in a
few key ports on East, Gulf, and West coasts and in the Saint Lawrence Seaway—
clearly not an impossible feat, as September 11th tragically proved—would have
a chilling effect on commercial shipping in terms of increased insurance costs
and vessel lay days. The economic tremors would reverberate throughout the
nation and to trading partners overseas.
There could be serious military impacts, as well. Mines in critical waterways
could slow the movement of military cargoes in crisis and conflict. During
World War II, the port of Charleston, South Carolina, was closed for sixteen days
by mines from German submarines. In all, U-boats managed to lay 327 mines
from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the Mississippi Delta, closing several ports for a total of forty days and sinking or damaging eleven ships. Today, while mines might
not be “showstoppers,” they would certainly be “speed bumps”; just a few weapons in the approaches to the port of Savannah, Georgia; the Houston Ship Channel; and one or two other waterways could hamper the military sealift that
10
undergirds war plans.
Mines and underwater IEDs are easy to acquire or build, and they are cheap,
ranging from a few tens of dollars to thirty thousand dollars for the most ad11
vanced, multiple-influence weapons. But their low cost belies their potential
for harm. They can be deployed by submarines, surface warships, small craft,
commercial vessels, dhows, fishing vessels, pleasure boats, fixed-wing aircraft,
and helicopters. They are designed for operations from the surf zone (less than
ten-foot water depth) to deep water (greater than two hundred feet). Their payloads can range from a few pounds to several tons of high explosive, and they can
have a variety of firing mechanisms: remote control and command; contact; and
magnetic, acoustic, seismic, pressure, or combinations of some or all such “influence” signatures of ships.
Mines can be buoyant and suspended in the water column, close tethered to
the bottom, resting on the bottom, or even buried under sediments to confound
minehunting and sweeping. Some mines are mobile, capable of being launched
from submarines thousands of yards from intended minefields, while others
have torpedo or rocket-propelled warheads that dramatically expand potential
damage zones against submarine and surface targets. Limpet mines are designed
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to be placed directly on targets by combat swimmers or, perhaps even today, unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Old mines can be refitted with modern,
highly sophisticated components, and any mine can be equipped with countercountermeasure features to frustrate EOD, sweeping, and hunting. They can be
fabricated from fiberglass and plastic, making them extremely difficult to detect,
identify, or counter—once in the water.
More than that, mines are a broad-spectrum, global threat. According to
Navy data, more than a quarter-million naval mines of more than three hundred
types are in the inventories of more than fifty navies, not counting American
weapons. More than thirty countries produce, and more than twenty countries
export, mines. Even highly sophisticated weapons are available on the black
market, usually on a cash-and-carry basis. Worse, these Navy figures are for
mines proper; they do not include UWIEDs, which can be fabricated easily and
cheaply, as an Iraqi “bicycle”-type, floating, anti-small-boat mine encountered
during Operation DESERT SHIELD proved. As then–Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Admiral C. A. H. Trost, USN, remarked in July 1989, at the height of the
Persian Gulf “Tanker War” mine strikes:
Very little sophistication is required to manufacture and deploy mines. Any nation
with either money to buy mines on the open market, or the capability to forge metal
and make explosives, can become an active participant in mine warfare. Minefields
can be seeded by anything that flies or floats. And again, crude but effective mines are
cheap, easy to stockpile, and easily concealed in holds of ships and fishing boats.12

THE POST–WORLD WAR II MINE EXPERIENCE
Winston Churchill once remarked, “The farther backward you look the farther
forward you can see.” The U.S. Navy’s post–World War II mines and mine
countermeasures experience underscores the cost-effectiveness of these weapons that wait and the need to counter them.13
At the outset of the Korean War, in September–October 1950, some three
thousand Soviet and Chinese mines kept a 250-ship amphibious task force at
bay off the coast of Wonsan for a week. Three minesweepers were lost and more
than a hundred men killed during the initial minesweeping operations through
early November. Overall, though the U.S. mine force accounted for just 2 percent of the UN naval forces during the three-year “police action,” it suffered 20
percent of the casualties.
Two U.S. Navy warships suffered mine strikes during the Vietnam War, while
the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army used a bewildering variety of
UWIEDs and mines—from antipersonnel floating-basket booby traps with a
handful of explosive to a two-thousand-pound command-detonated weapon—
in the rivers and deltas. (Another one or two Navy ships might have been victims
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

115

110

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 1, Art. 21

of “friendly fire” from USN converted-bomb Mark-62/63/64 Destructor
mines—themselves essentially very sophisticated UWIEDs.) As the Navy continues to stand up its new Naval Expeditionary Combat Command and squadrons, the experiences of task forces 116 and 117 in Vietnam can provide
14
important lessons for future “riverine” and “brown water” MCM operations.
During the Tanker War, the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts almost sank, with potentially great loss of life, after striking a Soviet-designed
15
World War I–era contact mine on 14 April 1987. Only heroic efforts kept the
ship afloat. Repairs cost about $96 million, from a $1,500 weapon. On 18 February 1991, in the same waters, the helicopter assault ship USS Tripoli encountered
an Iraqi contact mine, which blew a hole twenty-three feet by twenty-five in its
starboard side. Four hours later, the Aegis guided-missile cruiser Princeton was
almost broken in half by an Italian-made Manta bottom mine in approximately
sixty-five feet of water. Princeton had to be taken out of the war, and the total cost
to repair came to more than $110 million—all from a single mine costing about
fifteen thousand dollars. The presence of some 1,300 Iraqi mines laid by barges
and tugs in the northern Persian Gulf utterly frustrated plans for a Marine amphibious task force to open up a second front east of Kuwait City. Finally, the
posthostilities mine clearance took eight navies’ mine countermeasures (MCM)
forces nearly two years to confirm that ten mine-danger areas had been made
safe for naval and maritime traffic. The U.S. Navy still homeports several MCM
vessels in Bahrain, just in case a quick response is needed.
Since the end of World War II, then, mines have damaged or sunk four times
more U.S. Navy ships than have all other means of attack: mines, fifteen ships;
missiles, one; torpedoes/aircraft, two; small-boat terrorist attack, one (and this
last, the attack on Cole, can be seen as a “terrorist in the loop” mobile-mine
strike).
In addition to the U.S. Navy’s experiences with mines since September 1945,
mines have been used or threatened in a wide variety of scenarios that are harbingers of terrorist dangers yet to come. In October 1946, during a “freedom of
navigation” operation, two Royal Navy warships were severely damaged by Sovietmade mines laid by Albania in the Corfu Channel. In 1974–75, the U.S. Navy assisted in clearing the Suez Canal and its approaches of mines and unexploded
ordnance left from the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
The “patriotic scuba diver” mine crisis of January 1980 showed that a terrorist threat of mines—in this case “mining” the Sacramento River during the Soviet grain embargo announced by President Jimmy Carter—could have
dramatic effects on maritime trade. An unknown person identifying himself as
the “patriotic scuba diver” claimed by telephone to have placed a mine in the waterway; all shipping movement ceased almost immediately. Once on scene, the
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Navy minesweeper USS Gallant required four days of intensive minehunting to
determine the channel was safe. No mines were discovered, but the cost in merchant vessel lay days caused by the hoax was estimated in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Since the 1970s, the Tamil Tigers have been particularly vicious in mine attacks against Sri Lankan government ships, commercial vessels, and private
boats. In 1982, the Argentine military used mines during the Falklands War. Reports have the Nicaraguan Contras using limpet mines to damage two ships in
Corinto Harbor in 1984, in a direct challenge to the Sandinistas.
But it was the “Mines of August” crisis in the summer of 1984 that showed
16
most vividly how easily mines can be used as weapons of maritime terror.
From 19 July to 13 September as many as twenty-three vessels reported damage
from underwater explosions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez, a rash of attacks
that generated a massive multinational mine countermeasures response. Egypt,
France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United
States helped clear the waterway. Only one new mine was recovered and rendered safe, by Royal Navy divers—a 1,700-pound, multiple-influence Soviet
bottom mine completely unknown in the West. (The British and French MCM
forces also detected, identified, and destroyed a two-thousand-pound bomb, a
practice torpedo, and numerous old mines, some dating to World War II.) Later
it was proved that Libyan naval personnel aboard the commercial ferry Ghat had
rolled off the mines as the vessel meandered throughout the waterway, completely unchallenged, for more than two weeks. This experience prompted Admiral Trost to comment that
five years ago mine warfare entered the age of indiscriminate terrorism and international blackmail. . . . No country claimed responsibility for this act, but that did
not change the reality that mines were there impeding the flow of commerce in this
major waterway. . . . The bottom line is simple. Mine warfare may not be considered
glamorous, some even call it ugly. But it works well. For the most part, a mine doesn’t
17
care who or what you are, and usually gives little warning of its presence.

Finally (although more incidents might well remain unreported), on 21 April
2004 a tugboat operator on Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, spotted a suspicious
18
floating bag and called the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard contacted the Jefferson Parish bomb squad, which fished the bag out of the water. It proved to be a
UWIED, a couple of pounds of explosive in plastic pipes with a timer, wrapped
in trash bags to keep it afloat. One possible target was Senator John Kerry, a presidential hopeful who had been scheduled for a campaign trip on the lake. The
bomb squad used a water cannon to neutralize the device.
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In addition to showing how easily a UWIED can be built, this incident highlights the challenges of deciding who is in charge of response to a mine crisis in
American ports and waterways: the Coast Guard or the Navy? What are the roles
and responsibilities of local police bomb squads or fire departments? In some
jurisdictions, even natural-resources police could be involved. Most fundamentally, is an M/UWIED incident a homeland security or a homeland-defense “problem,” and who makes the call, one way or the other, when the first weapon fires?
FRAMEWORK AND RESPONSIBILITIES
At the federal level, domestic mine/UWIED responsibilities seem to be clear.
Under the 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard, in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security (MHLS).19 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the
Department of Justice, is the lead agency for terrorism/counterterrorism; Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also figures prominently in investigations involving explosives. The Navy, in the Department of
Defense, is the lead for mine countermeasures expertise and operations. Below
this strategic context, however, relationships remain murky, and the frameworks—let alone the formal requirements—for responding to a mine or
UWIED threat at the operational and tactical levels need work.
Under the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System and the National Incident Command System, and the Maritime Operational Threat Response
(MOTR) Plan provide the going-in architecture for MHLS operations. But regional, state, local, and commercial partners must also be closely integrated and
informed. Indeed, a multiagency, multiple-governmental command, control,
communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance architecture
and response system is needed for each U.S. port—or at least the seventeen “tier
one” facilities having significant military or economic importance—within the
overall maritime homeland security and maritime domain awareness (MDA)
framework. Mines and UWIEDs collectively represent just one set of the many
threats to the nation’s maritime homeland security, but they are particularly
treacherous, insidious, and deadly—and at this writing in mid-2007 were not
yet included in the Defense Department’s MDA concept of operations. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Homeland Defense publication in numerous
places does address the threat from mines in U.S. ports and waterways and outlines the supported and supporting roles in domestic countermining and mine
20
countermeasures operations.
The U.S. Coast Guard’s sector commanders, in their roles as “Captains of the
Port” (COTPs) and local Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, will be
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crucial to mine/UWIED defense. Among other vital security and safety functions, COTPs:

• Establish the port maritime security plans for their respective areas of
responsibility

• Conduct risk-based area security assessments
• Develop area maritime transportation plans
• Have command-control-communications responsibilities and authorities
for MHLS incidents

• Can close ports in the event of emergency
• Provide a vital “bridging function” among the Defense and Navy departments
and regional, state, local, and commercial partners, as a result of the Coast
Guard’s inherent military, civilian, maritime, law enforcement, and humanitarian character and authorities.
But a Captain of the Port has no capability—or even desire—actually to conduct MCM operations. Vice Admiral James D. Hull, USCG (Retired), who
served as Atlantic Area Commander, understood well the need to deal with
mines and UWIEDs in American waters, “but that’s primarily the Navy’s re21
sponsibility,” as he later explained. “The Navy has the expertise and equipment
to do the job. The real question is whether the Navy’s MCM forces can respond
in the appropriate time to neutralize a no-notice threat.” Of interest in this regard is the fact that the Coast Guard’s 2007 Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security,
and Stewardship in only two places mentions “water-borne IEDs,” and even
there it limits the concept to a small-boat/bomb threat like the one that attacked
22
the USS Cole and nowhere mentions mines or underwater IEDs. Likewise, the
Coast Guard’s Underwater Terrorism Protection Plan of mid-2007 does not address mine/UWIED threats or defense requirements.
Since 2003, the Navy and Coast Guard have, however, come together at the
“grassroots” levels to address the mine and UWIED threat. The three LEAD
SHIELD exercises on the West Coast have uncovered surprising capabilities and
strengths but also many more areas that need close attention, especially command23
and-control relationships involving nonmilitary participants. Other war
games conducted by the Office of Naval Research and by the mine warfare program at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School during 2006–2007 have identified
technological, system, and platform issues that also need focused attention and
24
sustained funding.
More, a 2005 memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the inclusion of the Coast
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Guard in support of Maritime Homeland Defense (MHLD) established for
MHLD operations a Defense Department joint command and control structure
that includes Coast Guard forces and identified that service’s MHLD roles, mis25
sions, and functions. It recognizes that the Coast Guard “is at all times a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States,” is charged
with maintaining a state of readiness “to function as a specialized service in the
Navy in time of war,” and is “authorized to work closely and cooperatively with
the Navy during peacetime.” The memorandum of agreement also underscores
the Coast Guard’s role “in support of the National Security Strategy while maintaining its identity as an armed force.” Recognizing also that maritime homeland
defense missions “required flexibility, time-critical response, and immediate access to a broad spectrum of capabilities and associated forces to ensure mission
success,” it “establishes a standing DoD [Department of Defense]/DHS working
relationship and operational C2 [command and control] construct for conducting MHLD missions under the authority and command of DoD.”
The next year, the secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security signed a
memorandum of agreement for Defense support to the Coast Guard for maritime homeland security.26 That memorandum identified and documented appropriate MHLS capabilities, roles, missions, and functions for the Defense
Department and arrangements to facilitate the rapid transfer of tactical control
of forces to the Coast Guard in support of MHLS operations generally. The
memorandum recognized the constraints on Defense Department support to
law enforcement operations, a consequence of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act,
27
which does not affect the Coast Guard. It also laid down that the Coast Guard
would have the predominant MHLS role and be the lead federal agency for exercising law enforcement authorities on waters subject to American jurisdiction
(from inland waters to the extent of the exclusive economic zone) and on, under,
28
and over the high seas. In addition, the memorandum of agreement underscored the Coast Guard’s role in the armed deterrence of as well as response to acts
of terrorism in the maritime environment. Although it granted the Coast Guard
tactical control over Defense Department forces in maritime homeland defense
29
operations, it noted that this would not confer “type command” authority; all
DoD forces operating under Coast Guard tactical control would remain under
DoD command.
The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan and its outline of supported/
supporting relationships are particularly important for defending against mines
and UWIEDs. The plan includes mines in its catalog of threats to U.S. maritime
security and identifying Defense as “the lead MOTR agency for tactical response
and resolution of nation-state threats within the maritime domain,” as well as
for “maritime terrorist threats that occur in the forward maritime areas of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21
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responsibility.” Further, while the Coast Guard has the lead in responding to
maritime terrorist threats in U.S. waters, clearly the Defense Department has a
major role as a supporting agency.
For domestic MCM operations, then, the Navy’s airborne, surface, and underwater MCM forces and EOD mine countermeasures assets, particularly the
shallow-water Naval Special Clearance Team (NSCT) 1, with its marine mammals and UUV MCM systems, will be “chopped” (operationally turned over) to
USCG sector commanders/Captains of the Port, as they have overall command
and control responsibilities for maritime homeland security.
These dedicated MCM forces are being concentrated in Norfolk, Virginia,
and San Diego and Coronado, California; EOD MCM mobile unit detachments
are also based at Charleston, South Carolina, and Whidbey Island, Washington.
In October 2006, the Navy disestablished the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, in Corpus Christi, Texas, and began moving staff to the revamped Naval
Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command in San Diego. All air, surface, and
underwater MCM and explosive-ordnance-demolition assets will be operating
out of southern Texas in the next few years. That needs to be borne in mind, because although the airborne MCM helicopter squadrons, EOD MCM mobile
units, and NSCT 1 can be airlifted anywhere in the world within seventy-two
hours or so, assuming overtaxed American strategic airlift assets are available,
and while the helos can self-deploy within the United States, the surface vessels
have top speeds of only ten or twelve knots, making a quick response in most scenarios problematic.
Under the still-operationalizing “National Fleet” policy, both the Navy and
Coast Guard are looking to innovative solutions to meet current and future requirements across the spectrum of both services’ roles, missions, and tasks.
(First promulgated by Commandant Admiral James M. Loy and Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Jay Johnson in September 1998, the National Fleet policy
has since been formally expanded and embraced by subsequent commandants
30
and CNOs, in 2002 and 2006.) For example, the Navy is addressing domestic
MCM requirements and capabilities, and Navy and Coast Guard planners are
developing a joint domestic MCM concept of operations within the MOTR
planning process. But perceptions of the threat and requirements to deal with it
are uneven: in mid-2007, for example, the Department of Defense concept of
operations for maritime domain awareness did not even mention mines, much
less UWIEDs, and there were no formal operational DoD requirements for domestic mine countermeasures operations.
One of the Coast Guard’s contributions to the National Fleet will be a new
Deployable Operations Group (DOG), championed by Admiral Allen. The concept calls for a close integration of the Coast Guard’s port security units, the
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National Strike Force, maritime safety and security teams, the Maritime Security Response Team, and the tactical law enforcement teams into adaptable force
packages that can be surged domestically and internationally to meet emergency
31
requirements.
Moreover, these forces will be available not only to Coast Guard operational
commanders but also to other federal agency operational commanders for missions throughout the United States and overseas high-interest areas. If the new
DOG can be taught some old (and new) MCM tricks, even if no more than
mine-awareness training, the group’s adaptable force packages could be the
Coast Guard’s “surge responders”—complementing the first-responder sector
and COTP personnel already on scene—to an M/UWIED incident well in advance of Navy mine countermeasures forces that might require several days if
not longer to respond, unless the threat presents itself in or near Charleston,
Norfolk, San Diego, or Whidbey Island.
“But, I’m not sure we’ve done all our homework concerning who could or
should hunt for real weapons,” says Captain Thomas B. Davilli, USN (Retired),
32
who has extensive air MCM operational and command experience. “One thing
I do know, AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM [airborne, surface, and underwater
MCM] assets are designed and prepared for and take specific procedural measures to allow them to operate safely in the presence of the threat. Whether others will have the capability is doubtful,” he continues. “Some players in a recent
war game pointed to a local law enforcement organization that has an EOD-like
response dive team. It might be able to handle an underwater IED, but they are
not diving in low-influence gear. And, the presence of an antitamper countermeasures device on the mine or UWIED certainly complicates consideration of
manned operations.” Further, “Others have suggested hunting for actual mines
from small craft towing commercial side-scan sonars. The helmsman and other
crew would indeed be patriots! The thought of sending crewed assets into a
mined threat area without signature silencing or some sort of ‘safe track’ procedures is foolish.”
In July 2007, the Coast Guard announced that it had been training as many as
six hundred police and rescue scuba-team divers to help protect the nation’s
33
ports, harbors, and waterways against terrorists. “For the first time in the industry, we have a malicious threat to manage,” Steven Orusa of the International
Association of Dive Rescue Specialists has noted. “Any place that has water in its
jurisdiction may have a risk—recreational, commercial, shipping or industrial.”
Some teams have received new equipment, such as underwater robots and sonar
systems. In Jacksonville, Florida, the sixteen-member dive team responsible for
underwater security is part of the sheriff department’s homeland security division. In the past two years, the team received $596,000 from the Department of
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Homeland Security to buy equipment, including boats, a sonar system, and an
underwater remotely operated vehicle. Kenneth McDaniel, chief of underwater
port security for the Coast Guard, comments that his unit has worked with the
Department of Homeland Security intelligence division to develop a course that
teaches divers how to search for and identify “underwater hazardous devices” or
explosives that might have been placed on ship hulls, bridges, or piers. “We do
underwater hull searches, and we sweep ports,” Orusa, leader of a dive team that
covers Chicago and other Midwest towns, explains. “There’s a whole layer of
skill sets we’ve developed.”
There are concerns, however, should anything but the simplest limpets or
UWIEDs be encountered. Underscoring the importance of appropriate equipment, preparation, and training, Captain Davilli concludes, “clearly, this is not a
job for well-intentioned amateurs.”
THE M/UWIED DEFENSE CHALLENGE
The United States confronts the daunting task of protecting, as noted, some
ninety-five thousand miles of coastlines, as well as thousands of miles of inland
and Great Lakes waterways, 361 ports, and a territorial sea/exclusive economic
zone that comprises more than 3.4 million square miles of ocean space and at
any time is cluttered with thousands of warships, commercial vessels and fishing
boats, tugs and ferries—not to ignore millions of private pleasure craft. Sorting
the legal from the illegal in such a complex maritime domain is a Herculean task
that challenges federal, regional, state, and local agencies, as well as commercial
entities and other nongovernmental organizations, to work hand in glove and
also to collaborate with allies and friends to safeguard maritime security at
home and abroad.
Maritime domain awareness—what the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime
Security describes as the “effective understanding of anything associated with
the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States, and identifying threats as early and as distant from
our shores as possible”—will thus be absolutely necessary for success against a
34
broad spectrum of maritime threats, including mines and underwater IEDs.
Exacerbating the M/UWIED challenge for federal, state, and local actors is
the fact that no two ports are alike. Each differs in geography, channel layout,
bathymetry, wind, tide, current, bottom sediment, turbidity, climate, and critical infrastructure—piers and wharves, moorings, navigation markers, cables,
pipelines, and more, with most bottom infrastructure uncharted or its location
long forgotten. That fact will make the already complex problem of detecting,
identifying, and defeating M/UWIEDs even more daunting. Questions begging
answers include:
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• What is already on the bottom?
• How do we know when something new is there?
• What is the local oceanographic and environmental situation?
• What port or waterway infrastructure needs to be protected from M/UWIEDs,
as well as from the Navy’s countermine operations?

• In a crisis, could we quickly and effectively tell the difference between a refrigerator or a fifty-five-gallon drum—what in the MCM trade is called a
“nonmine/minelike bottom object” (or “NOMBO”)—and the real thing?
The best MCM is to interdict the minelayers before the weapons can be put in
the water. If that fails, the Coast Guard, Navy, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, and other federal and nonfederal first responders will
need to understand what the Naval Oceanography Program describes as the “in35
telligence preparation of the environment.”
First, strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence about the mine/UWIED
threat is absolutely essential: What terrorist groups are active? What weapons
might they have? Are there any indications and warning that they are planning
single or multiple strikes in U.S. waters? What tactics might they employ? In addition to good strategic and operational intelligence, existing and future MDA
vessel surveillance, identification, and tracking systems and organizations, such
as the Coast Guard/Navy Joint Harbor Operations Centers, need to be “attuned”
at the tactical level to the potential need to detect, control, and engage minelayers before they start their tasks.
Second, and of equal but different importance, there must be environmental
awareness of potential mining areas and data of sufficient quality and currency
to support MCM operations. At least for each of the seventeen tier-one ports
these data must be available and up to date:

• Port geography and infrastructure from the high-water mark seaward
• Climatic, environmental, and oceanographic factors and their daily/
monthly/yearly variations

• Detailed sonar bottom maps and surveys, at high precision and accuracy, to
determine clutter and known NOMBO contacts for change detection and
possible channel conditioning before a crisis erupts.
It has been years since the U.S. Navy, developing port-breakout concepts in
the Cold War, conducted routine bottom surveys and mapped “Q-routes” to ensure the safe egress of warships and auxiliary and sealift vessels in support of national strategies and war plans. While there might well be databases for selected
ports, waterways, or estuaries that could satisfy some (but certainly not all) port
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/21

124

War College: Winter 2008 Full Issue

TRUVER

119

geography and environmental data needs, the reality, as former defense secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld acknowledged, is that “we don’t know what we don’t know.”
Who has what data and information today? The Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy? The Meteorology and Oceanography Command? The Coast
Guard? National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)? The
Corps of Engineers? State or local agencies, or regional authorities? Local pilots
and the maritime transportation industry? Sea Grant colleges and marine environmental groups? Whoever has these data, are they good enough to support MCM
operations? Where are the gaps in our knowledge? Who should have the responsibility to fill them?
Some have suggested that the Navy revisit its port-breakout model for key
commercial and military ports to identify critical routes and other areas needing
attention and to conduct channel-conditioning operations that would in essence
wipe clean selected areas to facilitate subsequent change detection. (By 2006, the
Royal Navy had already embarked on such an effort in several British ports.)
Others have proposed resurrecting the ill-fated COOP—Craft of Opportunity—
program of the mid-1990s and having Navy Reserve units conduct periodic surveying and sonar mapping of bottoms. Still others have recommended that the
maritime transportation industry and port authorities take the lead for local
areas. Or the survey and mapping responsibilities could be outsourced to commercial contractors. In short, in mid-2007 there was no coherent plan, staffing,
or program—except perhaps for references to the USCG’s sector/COTP responsibilities for port maritime security plans, area security assessments, and area
maritime transportation plans, in addition to the efforts of the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee—to address this threat and port geography
and environmental data requirements. Even then, Captain Davilli’s concerns
loom large.
Collecting such MCM data for even a handful of ports and keeping it up to
date will not be inexpensive. In May 2007, for example, NOAA estimated that it
could conduct a survey program that would support draft Navy–Coast Guard
operational concepts—twenty ports per year and relooking every three years—
at a cost of approximately $14 million per year. This figure is well below an “educated guess” that Los Angeles/Long Beach alone would require about $10 mil36
lion annually, raised during a December 2006 technology war game. In any
case, compared to the $60 billion economic impact if major ports were closed
for a couple of weeks or more, several million dollars each year seems to be an insurance premium that the nation could and should afford.
Still, the operational challenge should not be underestimated. An April–May
2007 San Diego mine warfare harbor survey conducted by Third Fleet and supported by the Naval Oceanography Operations Command, the Naval
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Oceanographic Office, EOD Group 1, U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Diego, and
NOAA provided a real-world look at the complexity of the problem. According
to Captain James Berdeguez, Director, Oceanography Operations for Mine Warfare at the Naval Oceanography Operations Command, the survey of eleven
nautical miles of channel and secondary areas required nearly six hundred
man-hours to complete—350 hours for the actual survey and about 230 hours
for analysis of the data collected on the more than six hundred minelike and
37
nonminelike contacts detected. Clutter, bottom roughness, sediment burial, in
situ optics, currents, bathymetry, sound-velocity profiles, and infrastructure
significantly complicated the survey effort.
However any focused domestic mine survey program is undertaken, a consensus is growing that there must be a central database of American port infrastructure and environmental survey data that can “set data standards, conduct
critical analysis to produce tactical decision aid products, and hold this information centrally,” according to Commander Robert Witzleb, Deputy Director,
38
Oceanography Operations for Mine Warfare. “Such a centralized data repository exists in practice at the Naval Oceanographic Office, which has the largest
oceanographic holdings in the world, but is nonetheless very weak in US waters.
For that reason,” he continued, “Navy METOC [the Meteorology and Oceanography Command] has prepared a draft technical instruction, Mine Warfare Survey in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense, that explicitly details how we
would collect environmental data to support domestic MCM operations.”
“We need that information now, not when the act takes place,” Tony Fuller,
who supports concept development and experimentation for Navy mine warfare sea trial initiatives, noted in a March 2007 e-mail exchange. “There is a significant amount of gap analysis that will need to be conducted, probably
followed by substantial programmatic issue work. In simplest deck-plate terms,
the direction as to what has to be brought to bear in a port to begin MCM in how
much time, culminating with what has to be accomplished, in how much time,
to make the call that all, or part, of a port is ‘open’ is needed.”
Finally, there are operational and tactical issues that need to be addressed.
The Coast Guard and Navy in the spring of 2007 were developing a domestic
MCM concept of operations within the MOTR framework. These concepts and
associated response plans, which will involve relevant state and local actors,
must be specific to and in place for selected ports and waterways well in advance
of the first “flaming datum.” The two services are building upon recent war
games and exercises—for example, LEAD SHIELD III in 2005, which brought together a broad spectrum of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations to
deal with terrorist mines in the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach—and upon the
Navy’s real-world experiences of clearing the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq, in 2003.
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Coast Guard, Navy, and other participants must equip for, train to, and exercise
the plans; analyze and share the results of the exercises and war games; refine
concepts of operations and “TTPs” (tactics, techniques, and procedures); incorporate new technologies and systems—and then plan and train and exercise
again, and then again.
“The Umm Qasr port MCM ops show what we might confront in a domestic
mining incident,” said Captain Terry Miller, who has more than twenty years’ experience as a surface mine warfare officer and commander, including in DESERT
39
STORM mine-clearance operations. An international MCM force comprising
Royal Australian Navy and Royal Navy explosive-ordnance-demolition and
mine countermeasures specialists and American NSCT 1 divers, aided by marine mammals and UUVs, cleared some nine hundred square miles to enable the
landing ship RFA Galahad to deliver much-needed humanitarian-relief supplies
at the outset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
“The Australians worked in some very confined areas, alongside piers, and
among numerous obstacles and clutter,” Miller noted, “and were aided by their
extensive HLS planning and training for the 2000 Sydney Olympics.” The lack of
prior knowledge of the port and its approaches, however, contributed to the fact
that nine days of intensive underwater MCM operations were needed to clear
the channel for Galahad and follow-on shipping. Closing Los Angeles/Long
Beach for nine days could cost the American economy as much as $18 billion.
These domestic plans and concepts of operations should also identify where
the Navy can sweep and where it must hunt. Constrained airspace and water
space and extensive port infrastructures will certainly affect the ability to use
traditional airborne and surface sweeping gear or to neutralize mines/UWIEDs
by hunting or sweeping. While in some cases it will be appropriate to “blow in
place” weapons that are discovered, in others critical port assets could be damaged severely by a detonation. When “BIP” is not feasible, the Navy would have
to raise and neutralize or render safe the mines, a process that would also support intelligence exploitation of the weapons and law-enforcement evidentiary
needs. It would also, however, increase the danger and the duration of the countermine process.
There are, as well, logistical concerns that arise unless the mine crisis occurs
near Navy MCM bases or home ports. Transit times will affect responses and contribute to economic hardships until ports and waterways are declared safe. If mine
countermeasures helicopters had to self-deploy across the country, they might require maintenance before getting gear in the water, unavoidably extending the duration of the crisis. The physical security of MCM assets—helicopters at nearby
commercial airports and vessels in commercial berths—must also be assured,
which could put additional strains on local capabilities. Finally, the plans must
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consider “hotel” sustainment for crews—including the marine mammals, if they
deploy—and support people and maintenance support for platforms and systems
if the crisis goes on for long. In short, the Coast Guard and the Navy must start
planning notional “time-phased force deployment data” for domestic MCM
operations.
“Until we have an approved HLS/MCM CONOPS [concept of operations] it’s
hard to say what level of capability is missing,” Captain Miller offered. “Most certainly confined waters inside an inner harbor pose challenges for the current force
construct, although we did adapt and overcome the Umm Qasr challenge with
some innovations in systems and TTPs. Plus we have quite extensive lessons
learned from ‘Down Under’ during the Sydney Olympics,” he continued. “Sydney
had an extensive harbor defense plan that accounted for mines and floating IEDs
and is a blueprint for any mine/UWIED scenario and domestic MCM planning.”
In the spring of 2007, Rear Admiral John J. Waickwicz, Commander, Naval
Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command, directed his staff to brief him on
the operational environment and all salient issues and requirements relating to
the Navy’s support to Northern Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard in response to a mining or IED attack in U.S. ports or
40
waterways. A predecisional brief underscored the impression that the Navy’s
mine warfare community is taking this threat seriously. Indeed, for the last several years—via conferences, full-scale exercises, and national-level commandpost exercises—the mine force has been working to define operational response
requirements sufficiently to allow concepts of operations and port-specific response plans to be developed and put in place. Meanwhile, “joint” Navy and
Coast Guard planning continues within the MOTR framework.
It continues in other venues as well. For one, “Charleston has created Project
Seahawk to address and implement port-security capabilities against terrorism,”
41
Rear Admiral Charles “Chuck” Horne, USN (Retired), has noted. Horne, who
served as Commander, Mine Warfare Command in Charleston and still resides
there, is helping the SEAHAWK Team to include the terrorist mine threat. “Project SEAHAWK will be looking at ways to prevent as well as respond to a mine
threat by addressing it well ahead of time.”
“The harbor and port MCM problem will not ultimately be resolved using traditional AMCM, SMCM, UMCM assets,” Rear Admiral Deborah A. Loewer, USN
(Retired), cautions, “as these tactics won’t work in the confined waters of ports,
42
harbors, and approaches.” Loewer, who was the last commander of Mine Warfare Command before its stand-down on 1 October 2006, explained, “This problem will be solved using a combination of small vessels and helos, towed sensors,
UUVs, EOD, change detection and a variation of the tools currently under development for the MCM mission package for the Littoral Combat Ship.”
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“Admiral Loewer’s comments are right on the mark,” Rear Admiral Richard
43
D. Williams III, USN (Retired), underscores. “The breadth and complexity
added to the mine problem in an in-port/near-port home-waters situation, as
compared to the blue-water or assault-breaching situation, are significant. Not
only are U.S. Navy ship and aircraft MCM assets of limited utility in in-port/
near-port roles, but operationally useful environmental, bottom, and port infrastructure data and prearranged logistical and support procedures for each individual port of major importance will be critical to a timely, successful, and safe
response to an in-port mine/UWIED scenario.” Admiral Williams notes further,
“The most important issue [for] current efforts—as well as supporting efforts at all
levels and across all boundaries that need to proceed with appropriate priority—
is to define action responsibilities so that requirements can be clearly determined and articulated and budgets aligned to ensure that the right tools and
operational support are acquired and put in place before they are needed.”
In short, once formal requirements for domestic MCM operations are established, operational concepts and concepts of operations agreed upon, risk assessments conducted, and priorities among and timelines for the various ports
articulated, capabilities strengths and gaps identified, and time-phased force deployment data laid out, government and industry programs can be put in place
to ensure that strategic, operational, and tactical objectives will be met.
“Such a capability would have a deterrent effect,” Vice Admiral Hull has underscored, “and could make our adversaries think twice before attempting to mine
U.S. waters. Why make the attempt if it will be for naught?”
A TERRIBLE THING THAT WAITS . . .
The “anonymous, loosely affiliated perpetrators” who would strike America’s
ports and waterways have no qualms about “unchivalrous” attacks against any
target that would serve their causes. As Rear Admiral Farragut understood, “it
44
does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.”
In 1950, after three thousand mines stymied plans for an amphibious assault
on Wonsan, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, declared,
“We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re going to
45
start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week!” Four decades later the
CNO, Admiral Frank Kelso, underscored fundamental lessons relearned in the
northern Persian Gulf and called for renewed mine consciousness: “I believe
there are some fundamentals about mine warfare that we should not forget.
Once mines are laid, they are quite difficult to get rid of. That is not likely to
change. It is probably going to get worse, because mines are going to become
46
more sophisticated.” Writing on the eve of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Admiral Robert J. Natter, Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Fleet Forces Command,
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warned: “Our first priority must be improving our near-term capabilities, but it
is also important to keep an eye on our long-term vision of mine warfare. . . .
Given the growing threat to our fleet and the current state of technology, we are
47
fools if we don’t.”
Eight thousand foreign-flag ships enter American ports each year. Millions of
other vessels and pleasure boats ply America’s waterways. But only a few come
under close scrutiny by the Coast Guard or the Navy or state and local marine
police. This is troubling, as the Libyan ferry Ghat proved beyond reasonable
doubt that any ship can be a mine-layer once—if not many times. In short, as we
address America’s “threat-rich” maritime security problems we must become
mine and UWIED conscious, if not “last week” then certainly before a terrorist’s
weapon ruins our day.
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VALUABLE LESSONS FOR THE LEADERS OF TODAY
Husted, Stewart W. George C. Marshall: Rubrics of Leadership. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College
Foundation, 2006. 259pp. $23.95

In recent years a veritable avalanche of
monographs and manuscripts has examined corporate and military leadership. Recognizing the need for a book
about leaders of character, Stewart
Husted selected as his model one of
America’s most admired figures, General George C. Marshall. This work examines Marshall’s leadership and its
impact on the world throughout his career as a military officer, Army chief of
staff during World War II, secretary of
state, and secretary of defense.
Husted is hardly a stranger to the study
of General Marshall. He is a former
business school dean, a retired U.S.
Army Reserve officer, and the inaugural
John and Jane Roberts Chair in Free
Enterprise Business at the Virginia Military Institute, Marshall’s alma mater.
Writing primarily for the military market, Husted draws heavily upon historian
Forrest Pogue’s masterful four-volume
biography of Marshall, the private and
public papers of General Marshall
housed at the Virginia Military Institute’s Marshall Foundation, and the
Preston Library.
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Husted has chosen well in selecting
Marshall to exemplify leadership during
trying and difficult times. No leader
better encapsulated moral and ethical
leadership than George C. Marshall. In
the words of General Colin Powell, “We
have so much to learn from Marshall—
from his character, from his courage,
his compassion, and his commitment to
our nation and to all humankind.”
Using Marshall’s career as a foundation
to examine contemporary leadership,
Husted cites numerous “untold stories”
that not only are entertaining reading
but also serve as “tried-and-true examples of how today’s leaders of government, the military, and business can
demonstrate character, competence and
skill.” Rubrics of Leadership addresses
such diverse topics as managing and
planning the impossible, turning crisis
into success, dealing with communications, and conflict resolution and
negotiation.
By far the most interesting chapter is that
on civil-military relations. Husted examines Marshall’s contributions over a period of two decades and provides valuable
insight into his subject’s nonpartisan

134

War College: Winter 2008 Full Issue

approach to complex problems. This
chapter concludes with a call to develop
military and political strategy that demonstrates the importance of nation building
in the aftermath of war—a valuable lesson
to current leaders attempting to cope with
the ongoing global war against terrorism.
On the debit side, Husted’s approach is
frequently choppy and lacks adequate
transitions. Though he provides a list of
Marshall’s salient leadership principles
throughout the text, a concluding paragraph summarizing each section’s salient
points would have greatly enhanced the
overall text. So too would an introductory chapter outlining the broad context of the areas on which the author
concentrates.
These observations aside, Husted has
produced a valuable leadership primer
that will be well received by military officers, regardless of rank or position. As
do the military’s senior service colleges,
Rubrics of Leadership urges understanding of the importance of positive relationships with civilians at all levels of
government and business. It is here that
Husted makes his greatest contribution.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
New Windsor, New York

Toll, Ian. The Six Frigates: The Epic History of the
Founding of the U.S. Navy. New York: W. W.
Norton, 2006. 592pp. $27.95

Many books have been written about
the history of the American navy, but
this one is of particular excellence.
While truly a scholarly work, this book
contains many attributes of a historical
novel. Any reader with an interest in
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either the U.S. Navy or early American
history will find it hard to put down.
Toll begins his story with a review of
the Continental navy and its limited
value during the American Revolution,
then moves seamlessly into the postrevolutionary period. America’s colonial
experience and the needs of the newly
formed nation had a direct effect on the
founding of a navy. Pro-navy views were
largely tied to the merchant interests of
the north, championed by leaders such
as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton.
The foes of a naval force were essentially
southern based and included James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who favored domestic development, westward
expansion, and agrarian interests.
In March 1794, these political and economic interests were rooted deeply in
the American experience, and were the
seeds of an acrimonious debate in Congress that preceded House and Senate
authorization for the construction of
six frigates to keep the sea-lanes safe for
America’s large merchant fleet. They
were originally designated merely as
frigates A through F. The first five
names—United States, President, Congress, Constitution, and Constellation—
were chosen by George Washington
from a list of alternatives suggested by
the War Office; subsequently, the Chesapeake was named.
The debate over the question of who
would design the ships began in the
wake of the authorization to build them.
The nation’s most respected ship designers, Joshua Humphreys and Josiah Fox,
clashed over the most desirable warship
design, with Humphreys being the victor. In the end, the six frigates emerged
as the most powerful of their type in the
world, equipped to serve as the nation’s
first blue-water force.
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The first trial by combat of the new
navy was against the French in the undeclared “Quasi-War” of 1797–1800,
which was fought to protect American
merchant shipping. The next naval action occurred in the Mediterranean
during 1803–1805, when war was
waged against the pirates of Tripoli.
However, the true test for the Navy, of
course, occurred during the War of
1812, when the value of the ships and
their crews was proved beyond doubt.
The author’s descriptions of the ships,
their handling, and the combat actions
is excellent, and his portrayal of the
people is equally impressive. The positive and negative characteristics of the
civilian leaders—including John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison—
as well as of the naval officers who became well known in American history
(Stephen Decatur, William Bainbridge,
Thomas Truxtun, Edward Preble, and
James Lawrence) are all examined.
This is Ian Toll’s first book. It is a product of his sailing experience, interest in
the period, writing skill, and thorough
research. The result is an excellent work
that should become a permanent part
of the library of anyone with an interest
in American naval history.
JACK A. GOTTSCHALK

Livingston, New Jersey

O’Rourke, Ronald. The Impact of Chinese Naval
Modernization and the Future of the United
States Navy. New York: Nova, 2006. 106pp. $79

Well written, succinct, and timely, this
balanced assessment of Chinese naval
weaknesses and strengths offers specific
technological development and procurement alternatives to inform
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Washington’s decision making. O’Rourke
is a naval issues analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Specialists will want
to consult his related product, China
Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background
and Issues for Congress. First published
in November 2006, the latter report has
been updated regularly. Each report
contains details that the other does not.
Like its CRS counterpart, O’Rourke’s
present study draws on a variety of U.S.
government analyses; congressional testimony; and articles from the media,
think tanks, and academia. Additional
details are provided in an appendix.
Charged with presenting different
points of view, with an emphasis on official analyses, O’Rourke cannot be held
responsible for disagreements concerning the underlying assumptions or conclusions of his sources. It should also be
emphasized that Beijing’s continuing
reluctance to offer detailed information
on the purpose or scope of many aspects of its rapid military development
both raises concerns in Washington and
makes it difficult for policy makers
there to rule out worst-case scenarios.
O’Rourke has explicitly chosen to focus
his report by limiting the attention paid
to such issues of potential relevance to
the U.S. Navy as China’s aerospace development. In light of recent significant
Chinese achievements in this realm (including the acknowledged testing of an
antisatellite weapon on 11 January
2007), however, such factors should
perhaps be integrated into follow-on
studies by O’Rourke and his colleagues.
After all, China’s ability to project naval
power farther from its shores will hinge
on developing effective air defense for
surface assets. Certain military
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scenarios, such as those involving Taiwan, might motivate China to attempt
to deter American intervention by the
threat of nuclear strikes or damage to
U.S. space assets.
O’Rourke’s study raises important questions as the United States develops a new
maritime strategy. If preventing Taiwan
independence and promoting reunification is the present focus of China’s naval
development, what other national interests might fuel such development in the
future? What is the proper balance for
the U.S. Navy between supporting operations in the global war on terror and
maintaining (if not increasing) its presence and operational capabilities in the
vast, strategically vital Asia-Pacific region? What resources will be required
to meet the latter requirements, and
how should they be allocated? Finally,
what fleet and basing architecture can
best accomplish this at sustainable cost
to taxpayers?
Critical procurement decisions with
ramifications for years to come are being made in Beijing as China develops a
new five-year plan. As this dual strategic crossroads looms ever larger, it is to
be hoped that the two Pacific powers
can reach an understanding about their
respective regional roles and thereby
keep competitive coexistence from degenerating into a new cold war.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Wortzel, Larry M. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control,
and Campaign Planning. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. 51pp.
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In China’s Nuclear Forces Larry Wortzel
has delivered an exceptional monograph that demands the attention of
both nuclear strategists and China experts. The author, a leading authority
on China, Asia, national security, and
military strategy, is currently serving as
a commissioner on the congressionally
mandated U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission. He previously served as the director of the Asian
Studies Center and vice president for
foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation. Wortzel’s distinguished thirtytwo-year career in the U.S. armed
forces, during which time he served as
both assistant Army attaché and then
attaché at the American embassy in
China, culminated with an assignment
as director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College.
The title of this monograph promises
an expansive scope, and Wortzel delivers quite ably. While the scale of the
work is extremely helpful in keeping the
various aspects and issues in perspective, the most important new contributions to understanding the evolving
Chinese nuclear posture are Wortzel’s
treatments of “no first use” and nuclear
command and control. As stated by the
author, “The major insights . . . come
from exploiting sections of . . . A Guide
to the Study of Campaign Theory[,] . . .
an unclassified ‘study guide’ for PLA officers on how to understand and apply
doctrine.” These insights, however,
which Wortzel so adeptly lays forth, are
corroborated in other reliable Chineselanguage material.
It has become conventional wisdom
among China scholars to take Chinese
declaratory policy of “no first use” of
nuclear weapons at face value, excusing
away various past unofficial statements
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suggesting that “no first use” ought not
to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel
offers a counterbalance to this view,
elucidating both the concept of preemptive counterattack and the current
debate within China on the viability
and utility of adherence to “no first
use.” His conclusion on this crucial issue is that the debate within China on
“no first use” is real, that a new generation of officers, diplomats, and scholars
leans significantly toward modifying or
jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In
fact, this conclusion is quite in accord
with the one developed and briefed by
the Mahan Scholars student research
team at the Naval War College in the
spring of 2007.
Regarding nuclear command and control, Wortzel finds that the originator of
valid firing orders for the Second Artillery is the Central Military Commission
(CMC), “the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party.” While we
would agree that tongshuaibu, or “supreme command,” probably refers to
the CMC in the context of nuclear release authority, this is not completely
clear, and explicit phraseology to bolster that conception was uncomfortably
dropped from defense white papers of
2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other
writings it appears that conventionalmissile firing authority during conflict
is certainly delegated downward, to the
Second Artillery itself. Such delegation
is, of course, to be expected, but in a
conflict that involved the movement of
nuclear forces and became intense, the
concomitant risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent nuclear missile launch
would grow alarmingly.
In addition to solid scholarship regarding the question of “no first use” and
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nuclear command and control, this
monograph offers substantial original
material on missile-force readiness levels, survivability issues, and targeting.
Overall, as expected from an academician
of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands
our understanding of the Chinese nuclear posture. As such, it demands the
attention of all China specialists and
nuclear strategists.
CHRISTOPHER YEAW

Naval War College

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China.
New York: Basic Books, 2007. 489pp. $29.95

Ralph D. Sawyer, noted scholar of Chinese strategic thought, has produced an
enlightening study of the beginnings and
the evolution of deception in Chinese
political and military history. Contrary
to some contemporary commentators,
China has a long martial tradition.
Warrior leaders and military heroes
permeate both historic and contemporary Chinese literature, as well as modern movies. Deception has long been an
integral part of Chinese warfare. Drawing on the classic works of Chinese military thought, Sawyer demonstrates that
deceptive practices and unorthodox approaches are the norm rather than the
exception. Deception is a fundamental
tenet of Chinese strategic culture, one
that permeates strategic thinking not
only in the military realm but also in
the diplomatic, information, political,
and economic spheres. (Readers of
Sawyer’s previous work, The Tao of
Spycraft, reviewed in the Winter 2007
issue of this journal, will recall that
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Chinese states were using “all elements of
national power” several millennia ago.)
The reader can conclude from this work
that Chinese military thought places deception on an equal level with fire and
maneuver. In this it differs from Western
military thought, which fundamentally
considers deception as “unsportsmanlike” and relegates it to the operational
and intellectual fringes. Deception and
unorthodox approaches afford ways for
the inferior to defeat the superior force.
The “stronger” force, as judged by conventional military standards, is not necessarily more likely to win in battle.
Rather, the force that applies the orthodox and the unorthodox in a way that
fits the situation better is more likely to
prevail. The book abounds with examples of how a little deception or unconventional application can have a great
effect on outcomes.
The relationship between military operations and statecraft is another fundamental thread through this book.
Subversion of an enemy state begins
well before military conflict, and ideally
it makes conflict unneeded. Bribery, assassination (both physical and character), dissension, and distraction are all
basic tools of statecraft, as well as of war.
Fundamentally, Chinese thought makes
no real distinction between the two.
The final chapters address the ongoing
renaissance of traditional Chinese military thought in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). The once-despised classic
works are now widely used in PLA
institutions.
Several years ago, two PLA officers published a book, Unrestricted Warfare,
that describes unconventional approaches for defeating a superior force.
In light of Sawyer’s new work, Western

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

BOOK REVIEWS

133

scholars should reinterpret Unrestricted
Warfare. Rather than being an exception to PLA military thought, it may
well reflect current, core thinking.
Sawyer argues that “China has a lengthy
heritage of conceiving and implementing systemic programs for subverting
other states.” It would be interesting for
scholars of contemporary Chinese diplomacy to compare the “active measures” stratagems outlined in the book
against current U.S.-China events.
This book reads well. A dynastic chronology helps place the events in historical (Chinese, if not world) context.
However, maps would have greatly assisted understanding.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Shirk, Susan. China, Fragile Superpower: How
China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful
Rise. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007.
336pp. $27

According to Susan Shirk, China suffers
terribly from the “wag the dog” syndrome. Shirk argues rather persuasively
that China is saddled with a host of internal problems, ranging from widespread social unrest to rampant political
corruption, that have sharply intensified insecurities among Chinese leaders
with respect to their hold on power.
Such perceptions of vulnerability have
in turn heightened Chinese sensitivities
to slights by Japan, Taiwan, and the
United States, slights that accordingly
threaten to arouse potentially uncontrollable national passions and, in the
process, stimulate regime-toppling impulses at home. For Shirk, this volatile
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nexus of domestic and foreign pressures
means trouble for regional stability in
Asia. As Chinese citizens increasingly
scrutinize Beijing’s relations with the
outside world, the Chinese Communist
Party can ill afford to look soft on
hot-button foreign policy questions.
The party’s obsession with internal stability thus compels Beijing to guard vigilantly against foreign insults to China’s
national honor—a critical source of the
regime’s legitimacy. Consequently,
more than ever before, Beijing is
primed to overreact to external crises
and trigger confrontations that might
otherwise have been averted by more
temperate responses.
Overall, Shirk makes a compelling case
about this peculiar dilemma that
Beijing confronts. Although the proposition that the international community
ought to be more concerned about
China’s weaknesses rather than its
strengths is not new, her coverage of its
domestic challenges is quite informative. In particular, Shirk provides a useful framework for understanding
Beijing’s internal priorities—leadership
unity, social harmony, and tight control
of the military—that would be instantly
recognizable to those familiar with
Clausewitz’s famous “paradoxical trinity.” The analysis of China’s prickly ties
with Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States, however, covers well-trodden
ground, material that has been widely
documented in other studies.
As a former deputy assistant secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Shirk writes with authority on
U.S. diplomatic encounters with the
Chinese during the Clinton administration. Her extensive interviews with Chinese policy makers, senior military
officers, scholars, students, and “netizens”
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not only attest to the unusual degree of
access she has accumulated during her
tenure but enliven the narrative with
fascinating vignettes.
Nevertheless, this study is hobbled by
an apparent reluctance to revisit basic
assumptions about the regime itself,
which, after all, the author contends, is
fragile. Shirk does not render crucial
judgments about the viability of
China’s regime-sustaining strategies,
vaguely observing that “[Beijing] may
be capable of surviving for years to
come so long as the economy continues
to grow and create jobs.” Thus the validity of the book’s findings rests almost
entirely on the premise that the Chinese
Communist Party in its current form
will endure indefinitely. The analytical
consequences of this unwillingness to
explore alternative futures are evident
from the author’s boilerplate policy
prescriptions for the United States, including an injunction that Washington
must live with China’s repressive domestic policies.
But what if Shirk’s cautious optimism
about the regime’s longevity is wrong?
This unsettling question awaits another
forward-thinking China watcher.
TOSHI YOSHIHARA

Forest Hills, New York

Alexander, Yonah, ed. Counterterrorism Strategies:
Successes and Failures of Six Nations. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2006. 283pp. $24
Zimmermann, Doron, and Andreas Wenger,
eds. How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics
in the West. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
2006. 269pp. $55

Since the attacks of 11 September, a
kind of conventional wisdom about
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counterterrorism has emerged. On one
hand, the “new terrorism” involves the
violent expression of a radical religious
agenda, suicide attackers, and masscasualty violence. It is, therefore, both
harder to deter and more destructive
than the old ideological and ethnonationalist varieties of terrorism, whose
practitioners, in Brian Michael Jenkins’s
now classic (and obsolete) formulation,
wanted a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead. On the other hand,
the takedown, led by the United States,
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
forced the operational core of al-Qa‘ida
to disperse and the transnational terrorism network to become even more flat
and decentralized. This meant that operational initiative was increasingly left
to local “upstart” cells, which, though
perhaps aided by al-Qa‘ida middlemen,
were merely inspired rather than directed by the central leadership.
The upshot is that the new foot soldiers
of the global jihad may be motivated
less by the cultural humiliation of Islam
at the hands of the West or Osama Bin
Laden’s redemptive grand vision of a
global caliphate than by local or regional social conditions, onto which
they simply graft that ideal and thereby
generate greater energy, purpose, and
focus. In Europe, the main culprits may
be the political and economic marginalization of Muslims in their host countries and their bitter memories of
colonial abuses. In the Middle East, the
gravamen of the radical Muslim complaint could be the plight of the Palestinians or the perceived co-optation of
Arab regimes by the United States and
other Western powers. In the Philippines, it might be the refusal of the state
to accord Muslims political parity and a
measure of autonomy.
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In accord with these views, the perception has evolved among counterterrorism experts that containing the Islamist
terrorist movement requires disaggregating it into regional and sometimes
local elements and devising customized
policies to deal with them. Effective
policies will inevitably entail direct applications of soft as well as hard power—
in particular, conflict resolution and
state building. Also, successful applications of soft power are likely to have a
more positive effect on Muslim perceptions of non-Muslim governments than
are exercises of hard power. Two new
edited volumes of essays, Yonah Alexander’s Counterterrorism Strategies and
Doron Zimmermann and Andreas
Wenger’s How States Fight Terrorism,
approach the challenge of terrorism in
the post-9/11 world on a state-by-state
basis. In doing so, they appear to certify
this evolving view, and with it the corollary that although the global jihadist
movement is in many ways transnational
and virtual, it admits of no holistic solution. Even if there was, one might add,
existing multilateral and supranational
organizations would be incapable of
implementing it.
Alexander’s book is a workmanlike
and highly competent compendium of
substantially descriptive historical case
studies of counterterrorism approaches
in the United States, selected European
countries (France, Germany, and Italy), one Arab state (Egypt), and Sri
Lanka, bracketed by the editor’s introduction and summary with conclusions. Those conclusions are perhaps
the probative elements of the volume,
as Alexander in them attempts to distill from the case studies a range of
constructive counterterrorism policies.
But the proffered list tends either to
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state the obvious (“prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
to rogue states and terrorist groups”)
or confirm admonitions that have already been made in abundance (“increase cooperative relationships and
alliances with like-minded nations”).
Furthermore, probably because Alexander’s study was initiated in 1998—
that is, before 9/11—the choice of case
studies is arguably misaimed. Egypt’s
pre-9/11 experience is relevant precisely because it is a formative aspect
of the transnationalization of Islamist
terrorism and the rise of al-Qa‘ida,
and the Tamil Tigers’ activity in Sri
Lanka is worthy of study also because
of their persistence and innovation
(for instance, suicide attacks). However, one key European state, from a
counterterrorism standpoint—the
United Kingdom—is completely
excluded.
Zimmermann and Wenger’s book, unlike Alexander’s, was undertaken at the
specific prompting of the 9/11 attacks
and jihadist terrorism. It constitutes a
more incisive and structurally oriented
look at issues and challenges, namely,
those peculiar to counterterrorism in
the post-9/11 epoch. Indeed, following
a trenchant introduction outlining the
contemporary challenge, the first chapter, by Laura K. Donahue, deals comprehensively with the United Kingdom,
aptly summing up the British dispensation as having “not been a radical departure from the previous state of
affairs but rather an acceleration of the
state’s counterterrorist strategy.” This
volume also contains chapters on countries like Norway that have had little
counterterrorism experience and those
like Canada whose security policies are
overdetermined by strong and
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prominent neighbors. Given the wide
transnational presence of the global
jihadist movement and the potential
problems it poses to states heretofore
untouched by (or at least insulated
from) terrorism, the inclusion of such
states seems wise. The chapter on the
United States by RAND analyst William
Rosenau is nuanced and marked by
calm pragmatism. Rosenau stresses that
even transnational Islamist terrorism as
perpetrated by al-Qa‘ida does not qualify as an existential threat to the United
States and intimates that treating it as
such could unduly skew national priorities—and may already have done so.
Martin van Creveld’s fine but largely
historical treatment appears at first
blush to be something of a non sequitur, but it may have been included to illustrate (as it does) the attritional
effects that a long-term terrorist campaign can have on a modern state and
military in the absence of political
resolution.
Rohan Gunaratna’s thorough but familiar assessment, entitled “Combating
Al-Qaida and Associated Groups,”
counsels that “governments should
move from traditional cooperation to
collaboration,” if the global network is
to be neutralized. It characterizes the
war in Iraq as counterproductively antagonistic to radical Muslims and suggests that regional conflicts will have to
be ameliorated to tame them. Such recommendations, while generally sensible,
may get ahead of the other material in
the book. However, the editors’ excellent
concluding essay nicely grounds the volume by casting the central counterterrorism task as striking a “balance . . .
between the efficiency of the legal, political, civilian and military means used
to combat terrorism, on the one hand,
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and their legitimacy in the eyes of the
affected constituencies, on the other.”
Overall, the two books do an estimable
job of delineating programmatically
what states seeking to counter terrorism
can and need to do. In so doing, they
also invite more specific and granular
analyses of precisely how to do it.

to electric shock and water boarding.
He was even administered Pentothal, or
“truth serum.” Despite these outrages,
Alleg refused to break, earning him
both wrath and grudging respect from
his tormentors. He escaped from prison
in October 1961, just months before the
war ended.

JONATHAN STEVENSON

Fifty years later, Alleg’s voice remains as
reasoned and penetrating as ever. He laments that France’s political elite have
attempted to purge the Algerian War
and its attendant horrors from the
country’s official memory; many military men responsible for these crimes,
he notes, have received not only amnesty but promotion and praise. Only
in 2000 did the French government admit that it had perpetrated widespread
torture and other abuses during this period. Ironically, one former torturer
proudly admitted to his actions in a
2001 book, causing such a backlash that
he was punished, albeit lightly. However, Alleg insists that even this slap on
the wrist signals a shift in official
French thinking.

Naval War College

Alleg, Henri. The Question. Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 2006. 74pp. $16.95

During France’s Algerian War (1954–
62), the French journalist Henri Alleg
sided with the insurgents. Arrested by
French authorities in June 1957, Alleg
was detained and tortured. During his
confinement he managed to write and
smuggle out an account of his experiences. Originally published in 1958,
The Question was quickly banned by
the French government, the first such
action France had taken since the eighteenth century. The book nonetheless
became a sensation.
Reissued after half a century, this new
edition retains its preface by French
novelist and philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre, now supplemented with a foreword by author Ellen Ray, an introduction by author James D. Le Sueur, and a
new afterword by Alleg himself.
The book’s title euphemistically refers
to torture. In calm and lucid prose,
Alleg describes his fate at the hands of
his captors. Held for a month in Algeria’s El Biar prison, Alleg was tortured
by French paras (paratroopers) before
being transferred to another prison,
where he composed The Question. His
“interrogations” ranged from beatings
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The accompanying essays deserve mention. Ray minces no words, accusing
the United States of pursuing a “strategy that incorporates racism, torture,
and murder” in its current conflicts.
Seeing America as headed down a moral
slippery slope, she wonders if it might go
the way of the French Fourth Republic
or whether “Americans might be the defendants in future war crimes trials.”
Le Sueur provides background on
Alleg’s experiences and the debate that
The Question aroused in France. He argues that present-day France has yet to
come to grips with its sordid conduct.
In fact, the French parliament passed a
law in February 2005 enjoining educators to teach the “positive role” of
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French imperialism and to recognize
the “sacrifices” made by France’s armed
forces in the Algerian War.
Sartre is biting in his psychological dissection of both torturer and victim. He
maintains that torture stems from racial
hatred and that only by believing an individual to be less than human can one
justify torture.
We should be grateful for this timely
republication of The Question, as it reminds France of a chapter in its history
it has tried hard to forget. It is also evidence that fighting terrorists by sacrificing one’s humanity ensures not just a
long war but an endless one.
MICHAEL H. CRESWELL

Florida State University

Evans, Michael. The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901–
2005. Duntroon, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare
Studies Centre, 2005. Available online at www.
defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/SP/
SP_306.pdf.

In this excellent monograph, Michael
Evans argues that Australia has a distinctive way of war that focuses on continental defensive strategies. These
strategies, for most of its history, have
been abandoned by statesmen upholding Australia’s extended vital interests
in a favorable regional and world order.
In other words, Australian military
strategists instinctively think about
homeland defense, especially of the air
and sea-lanes connecting Australia to
the world, but their political leaders inevitably require them to adapt their
strategies to intervening around the
world as a member of coalitions of
like-minded liberal democracies. In the
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United States, we call this a “policystrategy mismatch,” but Evans calls it
the “tyranny of dissonance,” with the
interventionist tradition of Australian
foreign policy pulling one way and the
more isolationist official Australian
military strategy pulling another. In
that respect, Australia resembles Britain
and the United States, which have also
been torn between “splendid isolation”
and foreign intervention in different
periods of their histories.
Evans is as relentless as a fly at a picnic
in the Australian outback in demonstrating his thesis, which makes his style
sometimes just as annoying. He might
have limited his analysis to a few archetypal case studies and so made his point
with greater power in fewer words. He
does prove, however, that both the geographical position and unique political
culture of Australia have inclined its
military leaders to treat their continent
as an Anglo-Saxon island in the middle
of Asia, one that needed to be isolated
from the rough-and-tumble of regional
and global conflicts. Time and again,
however, Australia’s dependence on
great powers (first Britain, then the
United States), as well as the broader vision of Australian political leaders,
compelled it to adopt a coalition strategy of “limited liability.” Both to avoid
overextension and to demonstrate their
bona fides to Australia’s allies, statesmen “down under” have consistently
made limited commitments to imperial,
later international, security in World
War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam,
the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Like more unilateral interventions in
East Timor and the Solomon Islands,
these expeditions demonstrate that official Australian defense strategy is often
out of sync with Australian foreign
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policy. More precisely, these trends
show that official strategy will probably
have to be abandoned again, so Australians will have to develop the expeditionary means to back up their
interventionist interests.
So, what are the Australians to do about
this tension between their cultural instincts and their strategic necessities?
Evans, who served as a major in the
Zimbabwean army before emigrating to
Australia, is hopeful that Australia’s
gradual shift from its “white only” culture of the early twentieth century to a
more pluralistic society in the
twenty-first century will increase the
growing tendency of Australians to see
themselves as stakeholders in both the
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international system and the regional
balance of power in the Pacific and
Asia. Echoing contemporary American
misgivings about poor interagency cooperation in the United States, Evans
also calls for what he refers to as the
“whole government approach” that
matches Australian foreign policy and
defense strategy, so neither is formed in
a vacuum. Australians would still make
limited-liability investments in foreign
interventions but would have a better
chance to develop strategies and force
structures suited to their extended interests in a liberal world order.
KARL WALLING

Naval War College
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IN MY VIEW

IRREGULAR MARITIME STRATEGY

Sir:
It was both informative and a pleasure to read Martin Murphy’s “Suppression of
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism” in the Summer 2007 issue of the Naval War College
Review. I do want to comment on his use of the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in
the mid-1980s to illustrate a successful strategy of economic dislocation focusing
on maritime targets. In addition to being a former Foreign Service Officer who
served in Central America during the period, I have recently had the opportunity
to revisit the harbor mining while writing Crossroads of Intervention, my justcompleted book about U.S. involvement in the wars there as a bridge between
Vietnam and Iraq.
There is an important twist to the harbor mining that bears directly on his assessment of irregular maritime strategy. Not only did the Nicaraguan mining, as he
states, “depend on covert American assistance for its success,” but a clandestine
team of CIA sea raiders that included U.S. Navy SEALs operating from go-fast
boats and a converted oil rig tender conducted the entire campaign. The Contras
themselves knew nothing about it until their CIA handlers gave them a statement to read in which they claimed credit. In addition to causing direct damage,
the intent of mining Corinto Harbor, along with sea-borne attacks on tankers
and shore-based oil facilities at Puerto Sandino, was to raise the risks to international shipping, thereby increasing insurance rates and provoking hesitation
in Nicaragua’s suppliers. In this the campaign was a partial success. However, by
far the greater impact of the mining was the blowback that erupted in Congress
when the CIA role became public and the Nicaraguan government won a judgment in the International Court of Justice that the United States had engaged in
unlawful use of force (although the U.S. refused ICJ jurisdiction).
There is another naval-operations angle. At the same time Washington was
supporting the Nicaraguan insurgency against the Sandinista government, it
was providing counterinsurgency support to the Salvadoran government next
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door. Maritime assistance to El Salvador was aimed at interdicting clandestine
arms trafficking by sea from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas, under circumstances similar to those Murphy cites of the Israelis and Palestinians.
U.S. measures included the nearly full-time stationing of a Navy frigate offshore,
along with operating an intelligence facility on Isla de los Tigres in the Gulf of
Fonseca and providing security assistance to develop the brown-water capability of the Salvadoran navy. What is most notable is that this effort had had almost no impact on the flow of arms, which became apparent after the war ended
in 1992.
Because they took place in America’s backyard, there was also a regional maritime dimension to the wars in Central America. One underlying justification for
U.S. determination to halt the spread of Soviet- and Cuban-backed revolution in
Central America was the extrinsic national security interest in guarding Caribbean Basin sea lines of communications. Although, as Colin Gray has pointed
out, at the end of the day Cuba was a “strategic hostage to U.S. sea power,” among
the principal consequences of the Bay of Pigs debacle and the Cuban missile crisis was the effective shielding of the Castro regime from any further direct U.S.
military action. Moscow avoided provoking the United States directly in the Caribbean again, and the way remained open for Cuba to continue serving as the
regional sponsor of revolution in Central America, providing an uninterrupted
platform for transshipping Eastern Bloc arms, primarily in Soviet vessels. These
aspects of this already nearly forgotten conflict are a matter of public record,
which I would be happy to amplify with details and additional sources.

TODD GREENTREE

Visiting Scholar, Johns Hopkins University,
School of Advanced International Studies

TARGETED KILLING

Sir:
Professor Gary Solis’s article “Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict”
(Spring 2007) is a well written opinion that the law of war does not render illegal
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the killing at the direction of a state of a specific individual taking part in hostilities. An important element of the definition of “targeted killing” is that the individual cannot be reasonably apprehended.
I do not propose that any change or addition should be made to the article.
Rather, I would like to emphasize the importance of the apprehension element
from a practical as well as legal aspect. In the heat of battle between two military
forces, it is difficult for troops not to desire to kill every enemy soldier, even after
he has surrendered. However, commanders are well advised to make their forces
aware not only of the illegality of such action but also of the advantages of capturing an enemy soldier. One of the more important reasons is the possibility of
garnering valuable information and intelligence from him.
For this reason, any commander or official who is contemplating a targeted
killing should consider whether or not apprehension of the individual is possible. This, of course, may raise other issues the person making the decision would
rather avoid, such as how the individual is going to be incarcerated and what
rights, if any, must be afforded him. If these matters can be satisfactorily addressed, the value of information that might be obtained about the enemy from
the individual may be far greater than that of his demise.
I commend the Naval War College Review for sharing this thought-provoking
article with us.

HARPER B. ATHERTON

Colonel, JAG, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
FROM THE U.S. NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
The Director of Naval History has selected Commander James C. Rentfrow,
USN, to receive the $5,000 Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Naval History
Scholarship, which is open to serving officers of the Navy and Marine Corps
who are pursuing graduate degrees in history or related fields.
The Government Printing Office recently published Pentagon 9/11, by Alfred
Goldberg, Sarandis Papadopoulos (a professional staff member of the Naval
Historical Center), Diane Putney, Nancy Berlage, and Rebecca Welch. The comprehensive history documents the damage inflicted on the Pentagon building,
the pain and suffering of its occupants, and the epic struggle of medical, fire, police, and other emergency personnel. Additionally, the U.S. Naval Institute has
published The U.S. Navy in the Korean War, edited by Edward J. Marolda, senior
historian of the Naval Historical Center. The Naval Historical Center is developing a twenty-thousand-square-foot exhibition highlighting the Navy’s contribution during the Cold War. See www.navyhistory.org/coldwar.
Finally, the remaining events in the Naval History Seminar Program for 2007
are “Pentagon 9/11” by Dr. Sarandis Papadopoulos, coauthor of Pentagon 9/11,
on Tuesday, 20 November; and “Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War” by Dr.
Mark Moyar, Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the U.S.
Marine Corps University and author of Triumph Forsaken and Phoenix and the
Birds of Prey, Tuesday, 18 December. The seminars are held in the National Museum of the United States Navy, Building 76, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., noon to 1:00. For more information contact Dr. Edward J. Marolda at
(202) 433-3940 or edward.marolda@navy.mil.
CALL FOR INFORMATION
The Australian Defence Attaché Manila, Republic of the Philippines, requests
information regarding the burial place of Rear Admiral John Dumaresq, RN/
RAN, a veteran of the battles of Jutland and Heligoland Bight and the first nativeborn Australian officer to head the Royal Australian Navy. The admiral was en
route to Britain in 1922 when he fell ill of pneumonia aboard ship. He was hospitalized at an American military hospital in Manila and died there. He was buried
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in Manila, but exactly where remains unknown. Information or assistance regarding the grave site would be highly appreciated and can be forwarded to Lieutenant Commander Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary, at
Coast_Guard78@yahoo.com.ph; or to Major Paul Anthony Rosenzweig, Australian Army, at paul.rosenzweig@dfat.gov.au.
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